Kosovo Might Offer the Answer for Ukraine’s Land Swap Dilemma
After nearly a year of chaotic and intermittent efforts to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine, the Trump administration remains deeply engaged in talks to stop the war. Unsurprisingly, the most troubling topic remains territorial concessions — in Trump’s parlance, “territorial exchanges.” So far, diplomats have not come up with anything that would solve the problem.
The discrepancy between the original pro-Russian 28-point plan that emerged in November 2025 and the reworked Ukrainian-American-European version speaks volumes about how far apart Ukraine and Russia remain. The 28-point plan calls for international recognition of all territories currently controlled by Russia, as well as the entire Luhansk and Donetsk regions being considered Russian. This plan represents an ultimatum to Ukrainian forces to surrender, and it also puts Russia in an ideal position to eventually restart its campaign in a better position.
The 20-point counter-proposal calls for fighting to stop at the current battle lines, which would become lines of contact. It refuses to recognize any of Russia’s gains in eastern Ukraine or Crimea as legal. Ukraine says it can accept Washington’s proposed demilitarized zones and a free economic zone in the part of the Donetsk region it controls, but it also wants to annex Russian-controlled territory of the same size as well.
The void between these proposals is where American international affairs analyst and former Balkan negotiator Edward P. Joseph. In a recent newspaper article, Joseph proposes using the model of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which was adopted in June 1999 and affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) but called for “substantial autonomy and meaningful independence.” Autonomous Administration of Kosovo. After a unanimous vote in the UN Security Council, Kosovo was emptied of the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian armies and placed under temporary UN administration with an international security force.
Nearly 27 years later, Kosovo remains a UN protectorate – although Kosovo’s elected officials largely govern and police themselves. Joseph argues that the logic of Resolution 1244’s postponement of the legal question of sovereignty – or specifically who owns Kosovo – is the key to the relative peace that has prevailed there since 1999. Kosovar Albanians govern themselves under a regime they have declared to be an independent state, but neither Serbia nor Russia (let alone the five EU member states and others) do. Serbia continues to consider Kosovo as part of its federation, as stipulated in Resolution 1244. It is important that Russia, as a member of the UN Security Council, stands behind Resolution 1244 and insists on its respect to the letter.
As applied to Ukraine, the agreement could include an international peacekeeping force led by the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to replace Ukrainian armed forces in those parts of western Donbas that are part of the Donetsk region but are not under Russian occupation. Russian forces will remain in their current location. All questions of sovereignty will be put aside until referendums in all of eastern Ukraine and Crimea finally determine sovereignty.
This will certainly be a bitter pill for Ukraine. Kyiv will lose even its symbolic sovereignty over the Donbass region and its environs. But this axis would enable the Ukrainian president to stop the war that has had harsh and devastating consequences on his people, and could become worse, especially if the United States withdraws. Despite conditions that are now unpalatable to most Ukrainians, President Volodymyr Zelensky may be able to sell it to his own citizens because the entire Donbas region — in fact, all of Ukraine within its 1991 borders — will not immediately become Russian. Ultimately, the residents of the five regions in eastern Ukraine that Russia has tried to claim will ultimately decide which country controls them. Therefore, the sham Russian referendums in 2014 and 2022 will become invalid.
To Ukraine’s advantage, international peacekeeping forces on the ground along lines of communication would represent part of the kind of security guarantee that Zelensky has long sought and open the way for more. Ukraine will have a buffer zone consisting of international forces between it and Russia. Such an agreement would also enable Ukrainians currently living in western Donbas – some 200,000 people living in the rejecting enclave, including the cities of Kostyantinivka, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk – to remain there, and it would also allow those who fled to return in a safe environment. It is possible that there are other forces – but not NATO forces – as security guarantors elsewhere in the country. This is not far from the demilitarized free trade zones that Zelensky said Ukraine would consider.
The most difficult party to convince of this is Russia, although it will also benefit it in many ways. On the one hand, it will stop the war that is draining its nation of blood and treasure. In addition, Ukrainian forces and the country’s national emblems will disappear from areas where Russia covets. It is much less than Russia, which is all of Ukraine, wants, but it is a way to save President Vladimir Putin’s face and convince the Russians that the huge expenses the country is spending are worth it. Also, if sanctions relief is part of the package, Russia may actually bite. Joseph claims that Russia’s involvement in implementing Resolution 1244 in Kosovo increases the possibility of Russia’s involvement in a similar manner in Ukraine. She already knows how such a political process works.
For their part, many Ukrainians will respond as writer Oksana Zaboshko did Foreign policyRegarding Joseph’s proposal: “I do not think that this ‘peace plan’ – as well as any other plan aimed at preserving the Russian state in its present state, rather than fragmenting it in the interests of global security – deserves serious discussion.”
Moreover, Ukrainians tend to categorically reject comparisons with the Balkans.
Volodymyr Horbach, director of the North Eurasian Transformation Institute, a Ukrainian think tank, wrote in an email to the Kosovo Precedent. Foreign policy“The problem of Russian aggression and occupation of Ukraine cannot be solved. There was an ethnic conflict in Kosovo, not an external occupation and attempt to annex.”
Moreover, Horbach continues, “Trump’s so-called peacemaking efforts cannot be implemented either, because they are based on a false assessment of the Russians’ goals in this war. It is these false efforts that have formed the opinion of observers that the main obstacle to ending the war is the territorial issue.”
Of course, Horbach was absolutely right that Putin’s intention is not to dismember parts of eastern Ukraine, but rather to completely subjugate the country and extinguish its nationalism. But there is something to be said for participating now in the ongoing negotiations in which Ukraine is actively involved.
Perhaps, working together, the United States and Europe can reach a ceasefire that will give the Ukrainian people a respite — hopefully longer, not shorter — from this hideous war. Zelensky clearly wants this. Putin may also be beginning to realize that Russia will not completely subjugate Ukraine nor take a much larger piece of it than it currently occupies.
Ulf Brunbauer, Director of the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg, Germany, said: Foreign policy In an email, he said that creative thinking was welcome and that it made sense to find alternative solutions for both sides: “So a settlement that leaves some ambiguity for the time being seems preferable to an endless war. Even if Russia’s economic problems are escalating, it does not appear that missiles, missiles and men have been exhausted — at least not as quickly as Ukraine’s.” [Joseph] A settlement would at least prevent Russia from seizing territory that Ukraine would eventually be forced to leave anyway. “So maybe it can be sold to the Ukrainians.”
But Brunbauer pointed out that Serbia was forced to accept Resolution 1244. He said: “It did not have the necessary military means to fight the actual loss of control of Kosovo.” On the contrary, Russia is not subject to such pressure. “United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo [the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo] “It was accepted by the Kosovars, because they felt that ultimately they would be the ones running the show,” he said.
He stressed that Russia – like any Ukraine as well – has never negotiated in good faith until now, and has broken the agreements one by one. “So the implementability of this proposal will depend on the presence of a credible military force that deters Russia,” Brunbauer said. “I don’t really see that.”
Like many Ukrainian sympathizers, Brunbauer suggests putting more pressure on Russia and sending more weapons to the Ukrainians to try to freeze the front line in place — not having to give up the western Donbass region or other areas.
Peter Harris, a political science professor at Colorado State University, sees the proposed referendums as useless. He said neither side wanted the territorial issue to be resolved by a plebiscite: “For Ukraine, it would be a concession that these are disputed territories — and that Russia has the right to that.” [legitimate] “Claim them back.” Essentially, if Ukraine agrees to this, it would be agreeing to a legal process by which illegal invasions of its eastern territories could be made legal. He said that from Ukraine’s point of view there was no doubt about sovereignty: “A deferred question is still a question – and Ukraine does not want to admit that there is a question.”
Additionally, Harris said conditions on the ground make any type of referendum invalid. “Ukraine would not trust such a process because so many of its citizens have fled or been expelled, so how can they vote?” Harris said Russia brought in pro-Moscow settlers, undermining the legitimacy of the popular vote on sovereignty. It is also important that Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, so any operation under UN auspices would give Russia the upper hand, he wrote.
John Feffer of the Institute for Policy Studies, an American think tank, also writes in correspondence with Foreign policyHe believed that this peace plan is more attractive to Ukraine because it is in a defensive position. “Zelensky talked about reintegrating Donbass through non-military means. But I don’t see the Kosovo model as attractive to Putin at the moment,” he wrote. “Russia has already integrated the four regions into Russia – Donbass plus Kherson and Zaporizhia. In other words, Russia has already decided the question of sovereignty,” he said.
Any sober observer will acknowledge that such a deal provides Russia with legitimacy that undermines international law and basic notions of justice. But Ukraine, after its courageous battle against Putin’s Russia, will not have a chance to survive unless the United States remains by its side, providing it with intelligence and weapons and imposing sanctions on it.
Perhaps Ukraine’s best bet is to pursue precisely such a deal, only to have it thwarted by Russia. This would at least make clear to the Trump administration what most other observers already know: Russia is fighting this war to fully invade Ukraine because it cannot tolerate a political regime more attractive than its own on its border. Achieving such certainty may be an option that Ukraine cannot rule out.
Don’t miss more hot News like this! Click here to discover the latest in Politics news!
2026-01-26 13:29:00



