China’s Dominance of the South China Sea Is Not Inevitable

As a very owned container container, which leaves the port of Singapore and the intervention of international waters, it turns a blind eye to the Chinese vessel identity system, providing an update to its shipment and its intended way across the South China Sea to Shanghai. Despite long -term concerns about China’s threat to freedom of movement, Beijing still allows all commercial ships to reach unrestricted to these critical global trade roads, as long as it adopts Chinese monitoring technology. In contrast, the foreign navy is severely reduced in this water, while maintaining control through the navy and unparalleled coast guard in China, connecting to a sprawling network of drones, drones, sensors and satellites.

The year is 2035. This short article reflects a virtual scenario of Chinese hegemony in the South China Sea that we recently presented to policymakers and marine experts in Southeast Asia and the United Kingdom in a “background” exercise.

As a very owned container container, which leaves the port of Singapore and the intervention of international waters, it turns a blind eye to the Chinese vessel identity system, providing an update to its shipment and its intended way across the South China Sea to Shanghai. Despite long -term concerns about China’s threat to freedom of movement, Beijing still allows all commercial ships to reach unrestricted to these critical global trade roads, as long as it adopts Chinese monitoring technology. In contrast, the foreign navy is severely reduced in this water, while maintaining control through the navy and unparalleled coast guard in China, connecting to a sprawling network of drones, drones, sensors and satellites.

The year is 2035. This short article reflects a virtual scenario of Chinese hegemony in the South China Sea that we recently presented to policymakers and marine experts in Southeast Asia and the United Kingdom in a “background” exercise.

A technique used by governments and intelligence and army agencies to reduce human biases and encourage critical thinking, and rear pumpkin is a mirror image of prediction. It takes the researchers to draw a possible future scenario and then work from there to the present time, and they ask, “How did we get here?” The goal is not to predict the future, but rather to determine long -term drivers and short -term trigger points.

The path and results of the South China Sea disputes will be the nature and extent of the global rise in China as well as the future of freedom of navigation and open trade. But we are afraid that the collective and the short term will think about the provisions about this water.

We have designed with us The scenario as a worse realistic result (except for the black swan events). Distinguished, many officials and researchers that we spoke to in Southeast Asia have seen this result is just a continuation of the usual work. This was one of the many surprises that arose in our discussions, which confirms the importance of technologies such as the back casting in difficult traditional wisdom.

Since Beijing united its pioneering location in the South China Sea, international analysts may tend to focus on factors such as the dramatic expansion of the Chinese marine landfills and coasts, China’s use of the tactics of the gray region, and violations of international law. But in our background discussions, participants in Southeast Asia thought that the combination of the economic power in Beijing and its increasing leadership in digital and renewable energy technologies would be more occurrence if China dominates the South China Sea.

How can this scenario be revealed? China will continue to be called its alleged activities in Salami in the South China Sea, where it achieves weaknesses in the defenses and societies of other demanding countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam) and evaluating the American coalition system. But the main engine is its enormous economic power, which is used through attractive and coercive means.

China is much more than the largest commercial partner in the region and a large material infrastructure. It is binding on Southeast Asian economies in the world’s leading manufacturing network, investing in the most exciting startups in the region (including Goto Group, Lazada and Tokopedia), providing advanced digital and renewable energy techniques at reasonable prices. The more this continues, the less likely that the governments of Southeast Asia will be ready to risk to relinquish their economic interests by returning the marine coercion of Beijing.

Some of the politicians and analysts we spoke to in the United Kingdom questioned the long -term prospects for China, citing the aging of the population, the local government, housing debts, and the suffocating environment for private institutions. But our discussions in Southeast Asia thought that even China, with slowing down, they would become a more and more development partner for their countries over the next decade thanks to their proximity and deep interdependence. They believed that the political elites in Southeast Asia would fail to stand on Beijing over the next decade because of the desire to keep money and flowing technology, along with the justified fear that Beijing will be economically punished for those who oppose it in the South China Sea.

This probably reflects the different priorities – in Southeast Asia, China’s economic domination is already a reality of life, and contrary to China’s competitiveness in relation to the West, it is unlikely to meet any slowdown in China’s growth.

The dangerous exposure in Southeast Asia is the high temperatures and sea levels, as well as the increasing energy requirements over the next ten years can accelerate China’s path to domination. Although the previous US administrations and allies in Europe and Asia have launched a large number of green financing initiatives in the region, these things were slow, even before President Donald Trump returned to the White House and delivered the climate policy in Washington in a state of turmoil.

Meanwhile, China has established a leadership site in the production of cheap solar cells, wind turbines, battery technologies and electric cars, making it an indispensable partner for South Asia as it is installed with the effects of climate change. The integration of renewable technologies with Chinese digital networks, software, artificial intelligence and traditional economic power is likely to increase Southeast Asia to the orbit of China.

Should the United States withdraw from Asia militarily to secure the South China Sea for itself? There was a strong debate on this question in the United Kingdom and Southeast Asia, with our European discussion more convinced than Southeast Asia that the American position is likely to matter. China has already done a lot to confirm control of this disputed water, including building, fortifying the bases of the large island and intimidating its neighbors. This is despite the United States’ continuous condemnation since the Foreign Ministry Hillary Clinton announced in 2010 that the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and respect for international law in the South China Sea. If Washington maintains a similar position, China is likely to continue on the current track. It will definitely take a more muscle response, and possibly escalating from Washington to deter China. This comes with its own risks.

How can China stop without raising the risk of war between two great nuclear militants? Ironically, given that Southeast Asian officials often complain that the United States and its allies overlook their agency, a few participants in Southeast Asian believe that their governments are likely to be pre -emptive results in the South China Sea. None of the participants in the back back was suggested that the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN), the regional organization is influential.

Instead, the consensus was that the most powerful and firm China would be released from Southeast Asia and the short -term in the face of the United States talking about a good but careful game.

However, without the desire to look naive in a world in which raw power and risk providers seem to prevail, we believe that there are ways to prevent China from full control of the South China Sea. The success of any such effort depends on pragmatism; The complete reflection of the Beijing Authority in the region is unrealistic, but Southeast Asian countries and its output partners have a set of practical options to prevent China.

First, China should prevent more infringement by China on naval interests in Southeast Asia. The most important and most challenging requirements for this is the political will on the part of Southeast Asian countries to set aside the differences between Adiriya and the presentation of a unified position against the operations of the China Gray region, and to counter Chinese attempts to undermine the unity of Asian.

Such a joint position needs reliable deterrent support. There will be a relatively cheap and effective way to do this by developing the capabilities of independent marine patrols and enhanced marine monitoring. This can be done in conjunction with a group of partners outside Australia, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, France and other European countries.

There is no doubt that the interest of such countries to help with this task; With the growth of the possibilities of projection of marine energy in China, it may seek to expand its marine operations from the gray area elsewhere in the absence of reliable deterrence.

However, the main long -term challenge for Southeast Asian countries reduces its economic and technological dependence on China while avoiding moving alongside competition and the United States in the face of more protectionist administration in Washington.

It will be the best strategy to diversify, including by promoting trading within the administration, with a special focus on energy sources and technologies emerging from outside China or the United States. The comprehensive and progressive agreement of the Pacific partnership-a commercial agreement that includes Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, as well as Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom-is a useful platform, especially with other regional economies, including Indonesia and South Korea, its interest in joining.

China’s economic footprint in Southeast Asia – its ability and willingness to provide cheap and effective digital systems and renewable energy technology on a large scale, even with a wide participation of partners such as Europe, Japan, South Korea and Australia. But through cooperation inside and outside the region, Southeast Asian countries can diversify their supply chains and sculpting outlets as China is not yet dominated. In particular, they should try to attract external investments in the sectors that will give regional economies mutual lever on China.

While continuing the green transition and digitization, Southeast Asian countries should avoid excessive dependence on Chinese technology by searching for alternative service providers for renewable energy sources, nuclear energy, and artificial intelligence systems (AI). Countries, which are fine to carefully listen to regional needs when it comes to carbon mitigation and climate change strategies, and allocate their participation accordingly. When it comes to artificial intelligence systems, external partners can reap the benefits of sculptures an alternative field to one dominated by Chinese or American technology.

One Most of the beneficial elements of the backward -gray process were to see experts in international law when they heard that others argued that legal operations would not do anything next to the balance of the change in the South China Sea over the next decade. Officials, researchers, and academics who spend most of their time searching for a specific lens in one specific case tend to overcome the largest image in addition to the way in which interconnection and mutual interconnection are paid.

As China continues to strengthen its position, there is an urgent need for the states of the prosecutors in Southeast Asia and its partners who are interested in the future of the South China Sea to consider conflicts in a much wider way. By understanding how Beijing integrates technology, industrial power, economic power, military wandering, and diplomatic ambition, Asians in the southeast and their partners in Europe, the United States and Asia can respond more effectively, using the unique feature of their alliances and reliable networks.