Trump-Putin Alaska Meeting Scenarios

When the United States bought Alaska’s lands from the Russian Empire in 1867, articles of newspaper liberation indicated ridicule it in the name of “Fools of Cyda” and “Russia”. But when US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet on August 15, for their first summit since 2016, symbolism will be clear: American lands – and then a state – was transferred and transferred in negotiations, and now host talks focused on the regional borders in Okreen.

The opening articles today may indicate the summit as “Trump’s foolishness”. In fact, many commentators expressed their open voice of the idea of speaking to Russia at all. Certainly, the summit may be in vain-or even actively harmful to the solution of the war of Russia, Ukraine. But it should not be. There are scenarios in which this summit can lead to small results that enable more conversations over time.

When the United States bought Alaska’s lands from the Russian Empire in 1867, articles of newspaper liberation indicated ridicule it in the name of “Fools of Cyda” and “Russia”. But when US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet on August 15, for their first summit since 2016, symbolism will be clear: American lands – and then a state – was transferred and transferred in negotiations, and now host talks focused on the regional borders in Okreen.

The opening articles today may indicate the summit as “Trump’s foolishness”. In fact, many commentators expressed their open voice of the idea of speaking to Russia at all. Certainly, the summit may be in vain-or even actively harmful to the solution of the war of Russia, Ukraine. But it should not be. There are scenarios in which this summit can lead to small results that enable more conversations over time.

US President Ronald Reagan, in a 1986 radio speech to the people of the Soviet Union, talked about the arduous process of finding a common ground. He said: “The United States is ready to support all serious efforts to find peaceful solutions to regional conflicts. We are ready to work with the Soviet Union and any other country at this end. There are many complex issues that must be discussed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Solving it will not be easy, but the things they deserve mostly.”

In this spirit, observers should not simply ridicule or reject the Alaska talks, but they must instead look at the expectations they make for some decision to war. Consider the following scenarios.

Nothing burger

The peaks between the United States and Russia rarely achieved good results. There was a Geneva summit from US President Joe Biden with Putin in 2021, followed by a little more than seven months by the full invasion of Ukraine. There was Trump’s 2018 meeting with Putin in Helsinki, a conversation that fed the rumors of the Russian scandal and did a little for the relationship of the United States and Russian. Then, US President Barack Obama was called the “Burger Summit” with then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, with the photography of the Burger couple in Arlington, Virginia. You can call for the Noteing Burger.

One of the potential results of this summit, therefore, is a continuation of this trend: a conversation between Trump and Putin only does a little to solve actual issues at stake. If the discussions end up, many European countries hope that Trump will finally impose more dramatic financial measures on Russia. In fact, some already suggest that the most likely result is that Trump will be able to know that Putin is not serious. But it is possible that the announcement or failure at the top may be isolated by Ukraine from the United States by noting that Ukraine’s maximum demands are to blame a peace ban.

Either way, the summit that does not produce any deal will be worse for Ukraine than it is for Russia. The military situation of Ukraine is increasingly fraught with risks, and it suffers from a lack of workforce and equipment. In any war of depletion, the smallest state – like Ukraine – is in a non -favorable position over time, even if it is supported by larger countries. Ukraine leaders may not be keen to make concessions, but their negotiating situation is still weakening.

Unicorn

Less realistic scenario comes from some of Trump’s most enthusiastic supporters, who suggest that the meeting between the Great Man and Putin will be sufficient to create a full-peace-or-a-starting peace deal between the objective violation between the United States and Russia. In some respects, the most condemned people in this matter are Trump himself and the head of the negotiations, Steve Whittkov, who often go beyond annoying diplomatic details to demand a great victory.

But it is important to point out that Trump and Putin-who were men directed towards the details-may be, within a few hours, to outperform the details of the operational ceasefire with observation, the future of Ukraine in Europe, the thorny regional questions, and the solid sanctions. This result is a fantasy.

However, it is those who continue to pay the “ceasefire first” approach on the other side, who continue to pay the “ceasefire first” approach. This was the plan of many senior European leaders, including Ukrainian President Folodimir Zelinski himself and those from the United Kingdom, France and Germany, who still insist that any negotiations must occur until after the first ceasefire. This camp continues to push Trump to take a solid position at the top in order to achieve an unconditional endowment.

But this scenario is also the result of unrealistic and largest thinking. Why does Russia, which currently won the battlefield and with a damaged economy but still flexible, agree to stop fighting and achieve gains for nothing? In short, this result is a fantasy as much as the idea that everything can be resolved within a few hours.

The first step

Perhaps the best scenario is, one of the paradoxes, the least ambitious. Trump said the summit is a “sense meeting”-a way to assess whether Putin is serious in peace. Although Russia’s current proposal is ridiculous in some respects – only initial regional concessions in exchange for ending the fighting – it is much lower than before.

It is worth noting that this recent proposal does not include preconditions related to the Ukraine government, its sovereignty, or its security. If this is already an editorial from Russia, it is possible that it will be negotiated in a reasonable place: some regional implications that leave the confrontation line for both sides more defense and safer in exchange for stopping in hostilities to clarify the way for more negotiations. Zelinski noted that the Ukraine constitution prohibits the government from giving up land unless a referendum is held at the country level, but there is a difference between league recognition and practical recognition, by reality.

There are many ways to cut the regional node. The United States and Ukraine can identify these concessions in distinct ways. Some areas, such as the Crimea, can be recognized by the Russian and others in principle or actually. Regional recognition can include a time frame like 20 or 30 years. The land should not be exchanged in a similar way for such. Some small areas – such as the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which currently operates under Russian control – is largely at the top of Ukraine from the agricultural land in Donbas.

Any deal that The exchange for peace will be an important step – very difficult – for all aspects. It will also be the beginning of an operation that will need to consider future sovereignty issues in Ukraine (such as whether it can integrate with the European Union), and its future defense mechanisms (what weapons allow any of the two sides in the validity of peace) (such as “hormones” in peace). Each of these issues will need to negotiate, most likely for several years.

However, there is a reason why the third scenario is the best options available: it is the only one that results in a better process of the current situation. Ignoring the Alaska top – or continuing to insist on the maximum demands, as the European leaders do – is not useful. Nowadays, it is unclear whether Zelensky will attend the top. The White House stated that it was not invited and that the employees focused on the bilateral meeting instead. It may be necessary for any of the best results here; policy makers in Europe should encourage him to attend and push the White House to invite him.

At the end of the day, there are ways in which the summit can work as a bridge of the peace process. Excluding the meeting as a meaningless TV trick – or a TV trick in reality Trump – has closed this option, a fatal assumption that the best results are not subject to simply. Even if the summit succeeds, it will be followed by a difficult and arduous process. It will not be easy to move towards a tangible deal on land, ceasefire, or any other complex issues at stake. But as Reagan may have set it, the things that it deserves are rarely easy.