Possible Paths Forward After Caribbean Strikes, Machado Nobel

On Friday, Venezuelans opposed to President Nicolas Maduro woke up to unusually hopeful news: opposition leader Maria Corina Machado had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee recognized her tireless work to promote Venezuela’s return to democracy in the face of Maduro’s tyranny.

In a way, the award honors not only Machado, but also the millions of Venezuelans yearning for change who have rallied around her ahead of the 2024 presidential campaign. Her leadership contributed to the opposition’s landslide victory in that election, according to independently verified statistics – and galvanized the resistance when Maduro blatantly stole it.

On Friday, Venezuelans opposed to President Nicolas Maduro woke up to unusually hopeful news: opposition leader Maria Corina Machado had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee recognized her tireless work to promote Venezuela’s return to democracy in the face of Maduro’s tyranny.

In a way, the award honors not only Machado, but also the millions of Venezuelans yearning for change who have rallied around her ahead of the 2024 presidential campaign. Her leadership contributed to the opposition’s landslide victory in that election, according to independently verified statistics – and galvanized the resistance when Maduro blatantly stole it.

Prospects for a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela remain unclear. Machado has close relationships with several members of the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio. But since US President Donald Trump took office in January, he has sent mixed signals about his policy toward Caracas.

The White House initially appeared to favor a more transactional approach to Maduro. But in recent months, her actions have become more aggressive. Last September, the United States sent a large naval force to the Caribbean, claiming that it aimed to suppress the flow of cocaine, fentanyl and other drugs crossing Venezuela. So far, US aircraft have bombed at least five civilian boats allegedly carrying drugs. Democrats in congress have raised concerns about the unauthorized attacks that killed at least 27 people.

There are high expectations that the United States will pursue a more militaristic course in Venezuela.

In the wake of the US naval buildup, Machado promised her followers that Maduro’s days in power were numbered, and said in online videos that the regime was “over.” Many Venezuelans, understandably frustrated by years of authoritarian repression and economic chaos, have begun to speculate when, not if, Trump will send Marines to their country.

Trump on Wednesday confirmed reports that he had already instructed the CIA to carry out covert operations inside Venezuela. On the same day, in an interview with CNN, Machado appealed to the United States to help fight what she called Maduro’s “war.”

When asked if the White House was considering striking targets inside Venezuelan territory, Trump refused to rule this out, saying only: “Well, you’ll find out.” This week he dropped more hints about such a move. “We’re certainly looking at land now, because we control the sea very well,” Trump told reporters on Wednesday.

Further US strikes could target more alleged drug shipments, or could include drug transport flights, many of which depart from secret airstrips along the Venezuelan-Colombian border. But after blowing up a few ships, what’s the endgame for Washington? There are three possible ways in which US policy toward Venezuela could evolve from here.

First scenario This will require disaffected members of the Venezuelan military, opposition-led demonstrations, or some combination thereof, to lead an uprising against Maduro. Machado herself has called on security forces to engage in a campaign of “disobedience” against Maduro in recognition of the opposition’s election victory. (The opposition leader has repeatedly claimed to have sources within the Venezuelan army.)

Such an insurgency could depend on logistical, intelligence, or even direct support from the United States through its current deployment in the Caribbean. But Washington will not lead this mission. As in 2019, when the United States recognized Juan Guaido as “interim president” of Venezuela and encouraged the country’s military to turn against Maduro, the Trump administration prefers to play a behind-the-scenes role in regime change.

But an organic uprising led mostly by Venezuelans is unlikely. On the one hand, Maduro’s government has brutally suppressed dissent since last year’s elections. Machado was forced into hiding, and presidential candidate Edmundo González fled the country. The opposition that remains in Venezuela is divided over whether to participate in increasingly controlled local and regional elections or organize a more confrontational resistance movement. At the same time, the regime’s security and intelligence services have proven effective in preventing rifts.

The second scenario is for the United States to strike Venezuela directly. Washington may carry out a crushing pre-emptive strike on Venezuelan military targets followed by subsequent strikes to behead key targets, and perhaps even assign special forces to arrest Maduro and bring him to justice. Senior officials in the Trump administration refused to rule out the possibility of such an escalation.

Despite these reports, there is reason to doubt that the US military will strike inside Venezuela, let alone invade it. This is partly because the country has a capable air defense network, at least on paper.

Analysts disagree on how much of Venezuela’s air defenses are fully operational and maintained, but there is consensus that the military possesses a nationwide network of S-125 Pechora anti-aircraft batteries, as well as multiple air defense units armed with ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and Igla-S man-portable air defense systems. The military also has several S-300VM Antey-2500 missiles, an advanced long-range missile system capable of shooting down aircraft and ballistic missiles, although they are more concentrated along the country’s border areas.

Any serious US plan to carry out air strikes on Venezuelan territory would likely seek to neutralize these systems first, which would mean engaging directly in hostilities with the Venezuelan armed forces. Direct and open conflict with the Venezuelan army would be risky. It may develop into a series of violent acts that may last for years and may extend to neighboring countries.

Venezuela is home to one of the largest arms stockpiles in the Western Hemisphere, not to mention defectors from Colombian guerrilla groups and thousands of members of pro-government paramilitary organizations known as colectivos. Further complicating matters is the presence of the Bolivarian Militia, a volunteer civilian body with which Maduro has conducted training in recent weeks.

If Trump is not careful, unilateral US military action in Venezuela could collapse the country into chaos, potentially fueling a Libya-style collapse just a three-hour plane ride from Miami.

Probably the end of the game As for US policy toward Venezuela, it may be the least satisfactory for Venezuelans who yearn for change and who voted overwhelmingly against Maduro in last year’s stolen election.

Maduro may be betting that Trump will soon want to declare victory after all his boat strikes in the Caribbean. In September, Maduro sent a letter to Trump offering to negotiate with Washington. Until the administration recently paused outreach, US presidential envoy Richard Grenell said he maintained contact with the regime with Trump’s blessing.

Once it becomes clear that Maduro’s grip on power is not weakening, Trump may return to seeing how he can use Grenell’s diplomatic channels to advance American interests beyond democracy and promote human rights, such as in the areas of energy, immigration, and regional security.

It is possible that any new agreement between the United States and Venezuela would be public, such as the prisoner exchange in July and the corresponding sanctions waiver that Trump granted to the American oil company Chevron to operate in Venezuela. Or it could be private — such as the terms of an existing agreement under which the U.S. government sends twice-weekly deportation and Immigration and Customs Enforcement flights that currently arrive directly into Venezuela.

Any US agreement must address the political crisis in Venezuela. Washington should press for the release of more than 800 political prisoners in the country, as well as for an end to the repression of opposition parties and civil society. But above all, the United States should try to provide a road map for restoring democratic institutions in Venezuela.

This does not require starting from scratch. In 2020, the first Trump administration proposed the Democratic Transition Framework, which outlined a plan for democratic reforms and power-sharing, leading to free and fair elections. The road map offered to ease sanctions on Caracas in stages in exchange for the formation of a joint transitional government composed of the opposition and the ruling party.

Trump and Rubio should dust off the plan for now and reconsider the idea of ​​incentivizing Venezuela’s democratic reform path rather than insisting on an overnight magic solution. Of course, since Maduro has repeatedly used dialogue as a stalling tactic to buy time until pressure subsides, any new talks must be measured in light of his history of broken commitments. Agreements must be verifiable, time-bound and measurable, not simply based on empty promises.

In testing its next move in Venezuela, the Trump administration faces a choice: whether to use its naval deployment in the Caribbean as a pressure tactic to advance American interests and democratic reforms, or whether to roll the dice with military escalation and risk a potentially destabilizing conflict.

If Trump can avoid war and promote a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela, he may finally get the Nobel Peace Prize he so desperately wants next year.