Europe Should Buy More U.S. Weapons

The nature of the transatlantic alliance has changed dramatically. For four generations, the West has been built on long-standing trust and open cooperation around shared interests: containing the Soviets during the Cold War, expanding the liberal order, defeating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, countering Russian aggression, and meeting the Chinese challenge.

Now, that trust has disappeared, and a partnership based on common interests has been replaced by a flexible dealing style. The focus is on ad hoc bargains and deals, such as the US-EU Trade Framework Agreement and the purchase of US arms by European NATO members on behalf of Ukraine, which I have suggested in these pages long before they came into being.

The nature of the transatlantic alliance has changed dramatically. For four generations, the West has been built on long-standing trust and open cooperation around shared interests: containing the Soviets during the Cold War, expanding the liberal order, defeating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, countering Russian aggression, and meeting the Chinese challenge.

Now, that trust has disappeared, and the partnership based on common interests has been replaced by a partnership based on common interests Flexible transactions. The focus is on ad hoc bargains and deals, such as the US-EU Trade Framework Agreement and the purchase of US arms by European members of NATO on behalf of Ukraine, which I proposed in 2008. These pages Long before he appeared.

Europe’s purchase of US-made weapons for Ukraine is only second to direct US support, but it is better than not delivering any US weapons at all. Likewise, business transactions are not as efficient as a partnership, but they are still better than separation. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed Europe’s sober realism when he said: He saidHe added: “Whether we like it or not, we will remain dependent on the United States of America for some time to come.”

This reliance is particularly blatant in the security sphere, whether it concerns the defense of Ukraine or the continent as a whole.

As Merz’s admission suggests, European leaders must face reality and look for mutually beneficial deals if they have any hope of keeping Washington engaged. One opportunity to achieve this end is the creation of the €150 billion (US$176 billion) Security Action Fund for Europe (SAFE), a new EU defense fund that the United States and other non-EU companies do not currently have access to. Opening this fund to US defense companies could – if negotiated intelligently – serve as leverage for Europe to get Washington to close the deal on the $90 billion arms package it has been negotiating with Ukraine, including long-range Tomahawk missiles and additional Patriot air defense systems that only the United States can provide.

The SAFE programme, adopted by the European Union in May, provides €150 billion in long-term loans for arms purchases by member states. The European Commission has so far received requests for a total of 127 billion euros ($148 billion) from the European Union. 18 membersincluding France, Italy, Poland and Spain. Non-EU companies, such as US defense companies, are limited to receiving a maximum of 35 percent of the costs of each project financed under the scheme.

Countries that have concluded a security and defense partnership with the EU are exempt from this limit, as long as they also sign an additional technical agreement setting out the terms of their participation in the SAFE programme. Six countries have already done so, including Japan and South Korea. Britain and Canada are expected To conclude negotiations within the next few weeks, which puts them in a better position than the United States.

Senior EU officials recently told me that the EU would be open to the United States joining as well, but Washington has not expressed any interest so far. Several US officials suggested to me over the summer that Washington might try to scrap SAFE entirely, but that is largely unrealistic given the EU’s unity on the now well-advanced program.

The Trump administration must complete this deal, and it can do so without much effort: the United States is already committed to European security through NATO, and can complete additional paperwork quickly. This would unleash tens of billions of dollars additional Financing US companies and could be linked to negotiations with Ukraine on a wide-ranging US arms package Funded by Ukraine and its European partners.

Giving Washington access to SAFE funds would not only signal Europe’s desire to deepen transatlantic defense cooperation, but would also achieve Washington’s goals of selling more defense equipment to the Europeans and reducing the US trade deficit. For Europe, continued US attention to its security remains essential, at least in the near term, as the continent belatedly ramps up its defense production and attempts to fill various gaps in capabilities and technology.

With continued underinvestment, one appreciation The International Institute for Strategic Studies has found that Europe’s defense industry will struggle to replace American capabilities for at least another decade. Maintaining Washington’s commitment is therefore crucial – and SAFE can be the carrot for Europe to achieve this.

Opening safe money to US companies still faces some opposition in Europe. As usual, the French are keen to keep the United States out. president Emmanuel Macron, who rightly believes that Europe should be militarily independent, but also sees EU defense spending as an industrial subsidy for France, Notice That “spending should not be for [a] New kit ready to use, again not European.

Critics may also point to doubts surrounding the United States’ willingness to enter into a security and defense partnership with the European Union. Given that 23 of the EU’s 27 countries are also members of NATO, to which the United States remains committed, formalizing some kind of defense cooperation with the EU — not an alliance, and not requiring any kind of mutual defense clause — should not be a major concession to Washington. After all, the Trump administration has just provided a full security guarantee to Qatar, far beyond the kind of low-level arrangements required to participate in SAFE.

Certainly, the transactional West represents a major departure from the liberal vision on which a successful decades-long partnership was based. But it is consistent with the new political realities and can provide a good enough basis for future cooperation. It is crucial that this helps preserve Europe’s security and Ukraine’s ability to fight and win.