Russia Closes in on Ukraine’s Pokrovsk in Donetsk Region With Help From New Tactics and Drones

The Russian campaign to seize the small city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, which is now likely approaching its climax, looks in many respects like its grinding operations to seize nearby cities like Bakhmut or Avdiivka, where Russia has lost more than 100,000 soldiers for minimal gains.

But beyond the superficial similarities, analysts say they see Russian forces making notable progress in adapting to drone warfare in urban operations, with potential implications for Russia’s ability to seize more territory if Pokrovsk finally falls.

The Russian campaign to seize the small city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, which is now likely approaching its climax, looks in many respects like its grinding operations to seize nearby cities like Bakhmut or Avdiivka, where Russia has lost more than 100,000 soldiers for minimal gains.

But beyond the superficial similarities, analysts say they see Russian forces making notable progress in adapting to drone warfare in urban operations, with potential implications for Russia’s ability to seize more territory if Pokrovsk finally falls.

“The battle for Pokrovsk is actually the first time we’ve seen what expanded urban drone warfare looks like,” said Katerina Stepanenko, a fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank.

In part, Russia simply learned how to maneuver its infantry across a battlefield where Ukrainian drones can strike up to 12 miles or more from the actual front line.

To reduce the chance of drone detection, for example, Russia has resorted to sending small groups of two soldiers across the porous front line in Ukraine, said Can Kasaboglu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Research Institute. These soldiers travel on fast-moving motorcycles to reduce the chance of successful drone interception.

These two soldiers, stationed somewhere behind Ukrainian lines, wait for more troops to join them, and eventually build up enough forces to launch attacks.

Besides these pedestrian attacks, Russia is also increasingly focused on identifying and killing Ukrainian drone operators, said Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign policy Research Institute. Russia has identified Ukrainian [drone] Capabilities and [drone] He said Ukraine was increasingly relying on such operators, as its infantry forces were undermanned.

He added that Russia sends infiltration teams to pursue them to eliminate them, and also uses drones, bombs dropped by aircraft, and artillery. He added that the focus is so intense that Russian artillery is now targeting Ukrainian drone teams more than Ukrainian infantry.

In turn, strikes on Ukrainian drones could help Russian soldiers move forward. Kasapoglu added that at least some Russian commanders are coordinating attacks on drone teams with infantry movements. “They are trying to create windows of maneuver,” he said.

Meanwhile, Stepanenko said Russian drone units worked to stifle Ukrainian logistics by attacking vehicles moving to Pokrovsk. In doing so, they isolate sectors of the front line, limit units, deprive them of supplies, and weaken their ability to defend against Russian attacks.

Behind Russia’s growing drone dominance lies greater investment in specialized drone formations, such as the Rubicon drone unit. These units use a range of drones, including reconnaissance and attack aircraft, which destroy their targets by crashing an explosive payload into them.

Russian drone pilots are also benefiting from growing cooperation with China, Stepanenko said. She added that Russia’s use of fiber-optic drones, which maneuver through signals sent through non-jamming fiber-optic cables, depends on China’s ability to manufacture the cables. Meanwhile, Ukraine has found that its ability to access much-needed Chinese drone components has been halted.

Of course, not all of Russia’s successes near Pokrovsk are specifically related to drones. Russia has also learned to strike when Ukrainian units rotate their limited forces into the front lines, taking advantage of temporary gaps in Ukraine’s line, Kasaboglu said.

Ukraine’s lack of infantry also means that it has to move its forces from one front to another in order to fill gaps. This, in turn, leaves a weakness that Russia can exploit, Lee said. For example, Ukraine’s stabilization of its lines near Dobrobilly led Ukraine to withdraw its forces from Pokrovsk, enabling Russia to control the territory there.

However, Ukraine is achieving victories. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said on November 9 that Russia had lost 25,000 soldiers killed and wounded in October alone, a figure similar to estimates of 20,000 Russian soldiers killed per month provided by analyst Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute.

Despite all these losses, Russia has not yet achieved its goal of encircling Ukrainian forces, in part because Ukraine has been moving its forces to stabilize the outskirts of the enclave in Pokrovsk. While that weakens other areas of the front line, those units may be enough to prevent encirclement, Lee said.

It is not yet clear how successful these tactics will be outside the urban environment of Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk structures provide concealment for Russian infiltration teams, allowing them to gather in numbers large enough to launch attacks. It also provides these soldiers with protection from relatively low-powered Ukrainian drones, which can only pack a small amount of explosives, Stepanenko noted.

The open fields behind Pokrovsk provide no concealment or cover, Lee said, meaning Ukrainian drones may be able to identify and attack Russian infiltration groups more easily.

The upcoming winter weather will also expose these groups to hypothermia, Lee said, especially those initial groups that move and then settle down for up to a week while they wait for other soldiers to join them. He added that the cloudy winter weather would make it difficult for Russian drones to monitor the movements of Ukrainian logistical units.

But regardless of the tactical circumstances, Lee said, Russia will have a card up its sleeve — its ability to move its larger army across the nearly 800-mile front line. “They will advance wherever Ukraine is weaker,” he told me.