Trump Seems Unconcerned Amid Iraqi Political Maneuvering

The November 11 Iraqi elections, the sixth national parliamentary elections under the country’s current constitution, brought in a mix of old and new parliamentarians. The elections witnessed more than 7,000 candidates competing for 329 seats, including 31 alliances, 38 political parties, and 75 independent candidates. Now, the new parliament is scheduled to convene in the coming weeks, paving the way for the selection of the new Parliament Speaker, President and Prime Minister.

The formation of the next government should be relatively clear, but politics in Iraq is never that way. Now the country’s political class has entered a familiar period of post-election bargaining and deal-making. In previous election cycles, forming a government took months, at one point breaking the record for the longest time it took any country to form a government.

The November 11 Iraqi elections, the sixth national parliamentary elections under the country’s current constitution, brought in a mix of old and new parliamentarians. The elections witnessed more than 7,000 candidates competing for 329 seats, including 31 alliances, 38 political parties, and 75 independent candidates. Now, the new Parliament is scheduled to convene in the coming weeks, paving the way for the selection of the new Parliament Speaker, President and Prime Minister.

The formation of the next government should be relatively clear, but politics in Iraq is never that way. Now the country’s political class has entered a familiar period of post-election bargaining and deal-making. In previous election cycles, forming a government took months, at one point breaking the record for the longest time it took any country to form a government.

The big question is whether or not the rival political parties will allow Prime Minister Mohamed Shiaa Al-Sudani to form the next government. Al-Sudani’s electoral list received the largest number of votes, winning 46 seats. But he is not guaranteed a second term. In a fragmented political landscape, his party did not obtain the majority it needed to form a government. As bargaining begins between the parties, there is no clear kingmaker.

A week after the elections, the Islamic parties supported by Iran met under the umbrella of the coordination framework. They announced that, having formed the largest parliamentary coalition, they have the right to choose the next prime minister. Al-Sudani and his electoral list are part of the coalition. But Sudanese relations became strained with many members of the coalition, most notably his predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki, and he sought to present himself as a national leader outside sectarian lines.

The coordination framework consists of competing political parties that have a vested interest in maintaining the premiership within their alliance. However, competing leaders also do not want one of their peers to appear significantly stronger than them. This is why Al-Maliki is the only prime minister to have served more than one term since 2003 – and this is why the coordinating framework may choose someone other than Sudanese.

In light of all this political maneuvering, it remains to be seen whether the new government will simply represent a redistribution of senior positions or whether real change can be achieved. All indications are that it will be the same old cast of characters. The main political parties will certainly remain the same, even if the actual representatives differ.

Any hope of forming a reformist government capable of tackling the ills of corruption, impunity and inequality has been shattered. The winners of the elections are the people and the special interests who actually run the country. Armed groups subject to US sanctions, such as the Badr Organization and Kataib Hezbollah, were able to rise to power under the guise of their political wings. In fact, they may end up getting a ministerial position in the next government, unless there is enough international pressure to keep sanctioned individuals out of Parliament. In the midst of all this, any chance of bringing in reformists or secularists, which was already slim before the elections, has now vanished.

Of course, Iran is closely monitoring the elections and the formation of the government, to the point that the Iraqi government issued a statement on the eve of the elections criticizing Iranian provocations. Tehran has always been interested in the political process in Iraq, but it is especially interested now that Baghdad remains its main Arab ally. With Hezbollah weakened and Bashar al-Assad gone, Iran’s prevailing interests lie in increasing its influence in Iraq and limiting Washington’s presence there.

So far, Washington doesn’t seem too bothered. Ten days after the vote, the US envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, wrote on the X website that “Iraq has made great progress over the past three years, and we hope to see this progress continue in the coming months.” This has been interpreted as an indirect reference to Al-Sudani as the incumbent. Savaya added: “At the same time, we are carefully monitoring the process of forming the new government. Let it be clear that the United States will not accept or allow any external interference in the formation of the new Iraqi government.” The fact that the first official statement by the American envoy came in the form of Publication X more than a week after the vote does not indicate excessive interest. Moreover, neither Savaya nor US President Donald Trump gave any indication on how Washington would enforce its threat regarding the formation of the new government. Moreover, while Savaya says Washington will not allow outside interference, his statement will be interpreted as such. It is worth noting that Savaya is not well known in Iraq, nor does he have diplomatic experience that could help him in this highly complex terrain.

In recent weeks, Trump received two major leaders from the Arab world. First, Ahmed Al-Sharaa became the first Syrian president to visit the White House. After that, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman arrived in Washington to receive a warm reception. Washington is right to closely follow developments in these two countries.

But Iraq also deserves attention, and it has not been getting much of it recently. Trump is simply not interested in Iraq’s internal affairs. He has long recognized the level of American public exhaustion with all things Iraq, an assessment that was reflected in his first presidential campaign and later in his presidency.

In Trump’s first term, Iraq was largely viewed through the prism of confronting Iran. Washington’s main political initiative was the assassination of Qassem Soleimani and his Iraqi guide, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, from the Popular Mobilization Forces. The January 2020 attack on Baghdad signaled to the Iraqis – and the Iranians – that Trump would not hesitate to act in what he saw as his country’s interests. But it also indicated the lack of a broader strategy in Iraq.

In his second term, Trump did not seem more interested in Iraq. He did not visit Iraq or receive its prime minister. He did not comment on the upcoming Iraqi elections, nor did he comment on their results. This is in stark contrast to his predecessors in the past two decades.

Iraq, with its strategic location, diverse population, and rich natural resources, is more than just a buffer zone for Iran. Washington must realize this. What happens in Iraq will affect the region as a whole, affecting its ability to both overcome sectarian tensions and secure economic renewal.

If left to their own devices, Iraqi political forces will attempt to maintain power and the status quo and repel any fundamental change. But in a changing region, and more importantly in a dynamic country in need of real reforms, change may become inevitable.

Whether this change is possible has nothing to do with who the next prime minister is. Instead, it requires removing known militants from their positions and pressing for the formation of a true civilian government. Once this first step is taken, it becomes possible to address larger challenges, such as corruption, chronic unemployment, and a fractured security landscape.