A new maritime security architecture for the UK and her neighbours

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Rula Khalaf, editor of the Financial Times, picks her favorite stories in this weekly newsletter.

The writer is a former security minister and deputy governor

We can’t say we weren’t warned. Since last Christmas, a crude oil tanker linked to Russia has been accused of cutting cables connecting Finland and Estonia, a Russian spy ship has been spotted off the British coast, and cables connecting Ireland to the world have proven to be very interesting for Moscow’s fleet. Every connection we had to each other was attracting the attention of those trying to tear us apart.

The front line in Europe is no longer limited to the muddy trenches in the Donbass region, but in the open waters of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Fleets of dilapidated and uninsured ships are transporting sanctioned oil through our waters, while other vessels of suspicious ownership loiter atop data cables and pipelines. The combination of environmental hazards and sabotage is a new way of warfare. We just lack the honesty to call it that.

Russia’s violence in Ukraine, its violation of environmental and security standards, and its subversion of the European community demand a response, but reliance on the United States has only seen us through NATO’s military lens. We need to reconsider the rules that would allow us to remove unsafe vessels. To prepare ourselves so that we can prioritize more than protecting ourselves; We can cut off the revenue sources that fund Vladimir Putin’s war machine.

Under Articles 19 and 25 of UNCLOS, coastal states have the right to intervene when passage through territorial waters threatens security. Article 220 allows the boarding and detention of ships that pose serious pollution risks.

We need to change the attitude in Whitehall. The new Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office, is likely to be just another forum for conversation. What we need is a Minister responsible for the UK’s extended maritime interests, as the Admiralty once was. This – in addition to abandoning the belief that international law only applies to us in a form of masochistic decolonization as the recent decision to hand over the Chagos Islands demonstrated – will see a shift in our approach to the vital waters around us. It would remind us why the rules were written in the first place: to defend our freedoms.

When combined with British sanctions and the entrenched powers of maritime states, we have a powerful legal repository to knock these sanctions-busting rust out of our waters. But only if we are willing to enforce the rules: power is nothing without ability. You cannot inspect a ship’s hull or pursue a shadow transporter armed only with a warrant. You need ships, in the right numbers, at the right speed.

The UK, Ireland, the Nordic countries and the Baltics face the same threat in the same waters, but for too long we have treated offshore procurement as a series of national job creation schemes – leaving us poorer and weaker.

Instead of designing and building different, expensive frigates, these countries should adopt a common fleet. Lower costs, faster production, and easier repairs at their respective ports would increase operational frequency, access, and endurance.

Poland has already understood this logic. The Arrowhead 140 frigate will serve as a platform for drones, sensors and more. In Britain, the ship itself will be a Royal Navy Type 31, allowing cross-subsidy and purchase of additions. Warsaw is also purchasing Swedish Blekinge submarines, creating reliable supply chains and opening the possibility of cross-border crewing. NATO’s Joint Reconnaissance Force already includes other countries in the Baltic Sea, which, if they coordinated equipment, could turn passive surveillance into active disruption.

The UK’s role in leading the World Trade Fund could position us as the architects of a new Northern Maritime Compact. Joint patrol ships and undersea infrastructure protection would demonstrate that Europe is capable of securing its neighborhood without falling behind the United States.

This signal is vital for Washington. Submarine cables and submarine energy are not just commercial assets; They are the backbone of Western economic and military power. Their protection is a core responsibility of NATO, and effective monitoring would reassure the United States that we can uphold our part of the bargain without constantly turning to them.

We do not need new institutions or even new ideas. The cities of the Hanseatic League once teamed up to besiege the Republic of Novgorod, knowing that trade depended on the strong defense of the bases that made it possible. We need the same commitment across the northern capitals to understand that maritime security is an endurance effort.

After a year of escalation, the question is not what we stand to lose, but what we are willing to defend.