China builds massive missile force to keep US out of Taiwan fight

China has spent decades building a land-based missile force designed to keep the United States out of the fight over Taiwan, and American officials say it now threatens every major airport, port and military installation across the Western Pacific.

As Washington races to stoke its own long-range fires, analysts warn that the terrestrial domain has become the most overlooked — and perhaps crucial — part of the competition between the United States and China. Interviews with military experts show that competition is determined not by tanks or troop movements, but by missile range, access to bases, and whether American forces can survive the first shots of a war that may begin long before any plane takes off.

“The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has built an increasing number of short, medium and long-range missiles,” Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told Fox News Digital. “They have the ability to fire on those across the first and increasingly second island chains.”

For many years, Chinese officials assumed that they could not match the United States for air superiority. Missile force became the workaround: massed ground firepower intended to close down American bases and keep American planes and ships out of the fight.

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“They didn’t think they could achieve air superiority in direct air-to-air combat,” said Eric Higginbotham, a research scientist at MIT. “So you need another way to get the missiles out — and that other way is to build a lot of ground-based launchers.”

The result is the world’s largest stockpile of field-range missiles, backed by fortified underground facilities, mobile launchers, and rapid-fire tactics designed to overcome American defenses.

Despite China’s numerical superiority, US forces still have advantages that Beijing has yet to match – particularly in targeting and survivability.

American missiles, from Tomahawks to SM-6 missiles to future hypersonic weapons, are connected to a global surveillance network that the People’s Liberation Army cannot yet replicate. US targeting relies on satellites, undersea sensors, drones, and joint command tools matured over decades of combat experience.

“The Chinese haven’t fought a war since the 1970s,” Jones said. “We see a lot of challenges in terms of their ability to have joint operations across different services.”

By contrast, the United States has built multi-domain task forces in the Pacific to integrate cyber, space-based, electronic warfare and precision fires — a level of coordination that analysts say China has yet to demonstrate.

Jones said China’s defense industry also faces major obstacles.

“Most (Chinese defense companies) are state-owned enterprises,” he said. “We see huge inefficiency, quality of systems… and we see a lot of maintenance challenges.”

However, the United States faces a near-term problem of its own: missile stockpiles.

“We’re still so far… close to running out (of long-range munitions) after about a week or so of conflict over Taiwan, for example,” Jones said.

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Washington is trying to fill this gap by rapidly expanding the production of ground-launched weapons. The Army’s new systems — Typhoon launchers, a highly mobile artillery rocket system, batteries, precision attack missiles, and long-range hypersonic weapons with a range exceeding 2,500 kilometers — are designed to endanger Chinese forces from much greater distances.

The shift is finally happening on a large scale, Higginbotham said.

“We are buying anti-ship missiles as if tomorrow will never come,” he said.

If current plans continue, US forces will deploy nearly 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles by 2035, up from about 2,500 today.

China’s missile-heavy strategy is built on overpowering US bases early in the conflict. At the same time, the United States relies on multi-layered air defenses: Patriot batteries to protect airfields and logistics centers, Terminal High Altitude Area (THAAD) interceptors to engage ballistic missiles at high altitudes, and Aegis-equipped destroyers that can intercept missiles offshore.

Higginbotham warned that the United States would need to expand this defense mix.

“We really need more and more diversity in missile defenses, preferably cheaper missile defenses,” he said.

A member of the People’s Liberation Army stands as the Naval Operations Group displays YJ-19 hypersonic anti-ship missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. (Tingshu Wang/Reuters)

One of Washington’s biggest advantages is its ability to launch long-range strikes from under the ocean. US submarines can launch cruise missiles from almost anywhere in the Western Pacific, without relying on allied bases and without exposing their launchers to Chinese fire – a degree of stealth that China does not yet possess.

Command integration is another area where Beijing continues to struggle. US units routinely train for multi-domain operations linking air, sea, electronic, space and ground fires.

Both Jones and Higginbotham noted that the PLA has much less experience coordinating forces across the services and continues to grapple with doctrinal and organizational problems, including a dual commander and political commissar structure within missile brigades.

Alliances are perhaps the most important difference. Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea provide depth, intelligence sharing, logistical centers, and potential launching points for U.S. forces.

China does not have a similar network of partners, which makes it able to operate from a much narrower geographic footprint. In missile warfare, accuracy, integration, and survivability are often more important than mere size—and in those areas the United States still has meaningful advantages.

At the heart of this competition lies geography. The importance of missiles is less important than where they can be launched, and China’s ability to project power beyond its coasts remains severely constrained.

“They’re having big problems projecting power right now,” Jones said. “They don’t have a lot of rules when you get out of the first island chain.”

The United States faces its own version of this challenge. Long-range Army and Marine Corps fire requires permission from the host nation, turning diplomacy into a form of firepower.

“It’s quite central,” Higginbotham said. “You need a regional base.”

Recent US agreements with the Philippines, along with expanded cooperation with Japan and Australia, reflect a push to place US launch pads close enough to matter without permanently stationing large ground forces there.

A ground conflict between the United States and China would not involve maneuvering armored columns to gain control of territory. The crucial question is whether the missile units on both sides are able to fire, move, and fire again before being targeted.

China has invested heavily in survivability, deploying its brigades through bunkers, tunnels and fortified underground positions. Many can be fired and move on within minutes. Mobile launch pads, decoys, and deeply buried storage complexes make them difficult to neutralize.

US forces will deploy nearly 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles by 2035, up from about 2,500 today. (Daniel Singh/Anadolu via Getty Images)

US launch platforms in the Pacific will face intense Chinese surveillance and long-range missile attacks. After two decades of focus on counterterrorism, the Pentagon is now reinvesting in deception, mobility, and hardened infrastructure, capabilities critical to surviving the early stages of missile warfare.

Any American intervention in the Taiwan conflict would also force Washington to confront a politically charged question: whether it should strike missile bases on the Chinese mainland. Doing so risks escalation; Avoiding this incurs operational costs.

“Yes… you can defend Taiwan without hitting bases inside China,” Higginbotham said. “But you’re giving up a huge advantage.”

A retreat may help prevent the conflict from widening, but it also allows China to continue firing.

“It’s a reality of conflict in the nuclear age that almost any conflict is going to be limited in some respect,” Higginbotham said. “Then the question becomes where are those boundaries drawn? Can you prevent it from spreading? What trade-offs are you willing to accept?”

Any conflict between the United States and China on the ground would not be fought by massed armies. It will be a missile war shaped by geography, alliances, and survivability—a competition where political access and leadership integrity matter as much as raw firepower.

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For the United States, the challenge is clear: build enough long-range missiles, secure the bases to use them, and keep the launchers under fire. For China, the question is whether its massive missile arsenal and continental depth can compensate for weaknesses in coordination, command structure, and real-world combat experience.

The side that can fire, move, and sustain fire longer will dominate the terrestrial domain—and may shape the outcome of the war in the Pacific.

This is the third installment in a series comparing US and Chinese military capabilities. Feel free to check out the comparison of previous stories sea and Air capabilities.