By Hosting Taliban Foreign Minister, India Carefully Engages With Kabul

When Amir Khan Muttaqi, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, met his Indian counterpart, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, in New Delhi on October 10 The fragile scaffolding underpinning India’s engagement with the Taliban was clearly visible. All official communications from the Indian side referred to Mottaki as simply the “Afghan Foreign Minister”. At the meeting, there was neither the tricolor flag of the former Republic of Afghanistan nor the white flag of the Islamic Emirate. At the Afghan embassy, ​​the republican flag was raised outside, while Mottaki and his group raised the white flag of the emirate inside, claiming Taliban ownership of the building and its workers.

Beginning on October 9, Mottaki’s week-long visit to India faced a great deal of scrutiny and attention, given the symbolism and rarity of officially hosting the Taliban leader in India. Few expected such a visit when the insurgent group regained power in August 2021. But India, driven by realpolitik and pragmatism, has steadily increased its engagement with the Taliban in the past few years while still refraining from formally recognizing the regime.

When Amir Khan Muttaqi, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, met his Indian counterpart, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, in New Delhi on October 10 The fragile scaffolding underpinning India’s engagement with the Taliban was clearly visible. All official communications from the Indian side referred to Mottaki as simply the “Afghan Foreign Minister”. At the meeting, there was neither the tricolor flag of the former Republic of Afghanistan nor the white flag of the Islamic Emirate. At the Afghan embassy, ​​the republican flag was raised outside, while Mottaki and his group raised the white flag of the emirate inside, claiming Taliban ownership of the building and its workers.

Beginning on October 9, Mottaki’s week-long visit to India faced a great deal of scrutiny and attention, given the symbolism and rarity of officially hosting the Taliban leader in India. Few expected such a visit when the insurgent group regained power in August 2021. But India, driven by realpolitik and pragmatism, has steadily increased its engagement with the Taliban in the past few years while still refraining from formally recognizing the regime.

In January, Mottaki met with the Indian Foreign Minister in Dubai. After the terror attack in Pahalgam in April, he met the Joint Secretary of the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. In May, he and Jaishankar spoke on the phone.

India’s growing engagement with the Taliban has intensified since New Delhi launched Operation Sindoor and has broadly redefined its approach to Pakistan. The deterioration of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the wake of the return of the Taliban has provided India with more space to build relations with the regime to secure its strategic interests. Moreover, regional dynamics have been an additional factor for India as other countries in the region are slowly expanding their footprints and strengthening ties with the Taliban. Russia became the first country to legally recognize the Taliban in June. China and several Central Asian republics have exchanged ambassadors with Afghanistan.

For its part, the Taliban regime pursued India out of its desire to diversify its diplomatic relations. This fits with the regime’s strategy of presenting itself as a pragmatic player, willing to work with other countries on the basis of mutual interests, regardless of how formal the relations are. The “enemy of none, friend of all” approach is intended to secure the legitimacy of the Taliban regime by marketing itself as a non-ideological and economically oriented government.

India may be its last buyer.

In a joint statement issued by the two sides after their meeting on October 10, Jaishankar reiterated the long-standing civilizational and cultural ties between India and Afghanistan and its commitment to supporting the country’s development. He also expressed appreciation for the Taliban’s “strong condemnation” of the attack in Pahalgam, the group’s understanding of India’s security concerns, and the commitment of both sides to “promote peace, stability and mutual trust in the region.” The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to continuing their regular contacts.

The meeting also yielded more material results for Indo-Afghan relations. On the political front, India decided to completely reopen its embassy in Kabul, which had been operating as a technical mission since June 2022, and officially accredit the diplomats of the Islamic Emirate. (Neither party mentioned appointing an ambassador.)

India has also made humanitarian commitments. It promised to resume stalled public infrastructure and development projects in Afghanistan, help rebuild homes destroyed in recent earthquakes, and continue providing scholarships offered by the e-Indian Council for Cultural Relations to Afghan students. Jaishankar announced Indian support for new healthcare centers across the country and the modernization of the Indira Gandhi Children’s Hospital in Kabul. After the meeting, he presented 20 ambulances to Muttaqi.

In return, Mottaki called on India to invest in the mining sector in Afghanistan, a carrot that the regime used to deal with other countries. He also sought cooperation on hydropower projects and discussed how to effectively use Iran’s Chabahar port, despite US sanctions. He raised visa and investment issues, and also called for the reopening of the Attari-Wagah border crossing between India and Pakistan, which was closed in May. Afghanistan and India also agreed to open an air corridor and increase the number of flights between the two countries.

While in India, the Taliban leader also visited the Darul Uloom Institute in Uttar Pradesh, which holds great religious significance for Sunni Muslims. He met with business and industry leaders at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, interacted with Afghan refugees, and held two press conferences. Female journalists were banned the first time. But they emerged in force three more days later, and their forceful questions about the status of women in Afghanistan showed that these concerns remain paramount within India. But it is too early to say whether these concerns will be reflected in official policy, and India will have to walk a fine line between engaging with the regime and unwittingly supporting it.

New Delhi’s high-stakes diplomacy has not necessarily gone unnoticed. Even as Mottaki was meeting with Jaishankar, Pakistan launched air strikes in the Afghan capital, apparently aimed at targeting the leader of the Pakistani Taliban. The Taliban responded by targeting border sites in Pakistan. The clashes resulted in dozens of deaths before the ceasefire took effect on Sunday. The timing of Pakistan’s strikes reflects its unease with warming relations between New Delhi and Kabul at a time when it is struggling to persuade the Taliban to stop its support for the Pakistani Taliban.

India’s commitment to protecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity may further disturb Islamabad. In its dealings with the Taliban, New Delhi has based its assurances that Afghan lands will not be used against India’s interests. Mottaki reiterated this commitment, as he has done on previous occasions, but the Taliban’s ability and willingness to do so remains in doubt. Despite clear evidence to the contrary, the group denies the existence of any security challenges or external groups inside Afghanistan.

In the short term, the deterioration of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been to New Delhi’s advantage, but the deep-rooted relationship between the two countries cannot be wished away. When India launched Operation Sindoor, the Taliban condemned the escalation and called on both sides to exercise restraint. Afghanistan and Pakistan also raised their relationship to ambassadorial level in May and have been meeting regularly – bilaterally and trilaterally with China – to enhance cooperation. Even after this month’s clashes, Mottaki urged Pakistan to negotiate and blamed only a small group in Pakistan for insisting on destroying relations with Afghanistan.

All of this means that in the wake of Mottaki’s visit, India needs to set realistic expectations about its relations with the Taliban regime. However, engagement remains a strategic necessity. India’s recalibration against the Taliban regime underscores New Delhi’s commitment to prioritizing regional stability at a time of turmoil.