Did Trump Just Lift Sanctions on Iran’s Oil Exports?

Satellite images often give interesting results. After Israel’s sudden attack on Iran on June 13, Iranian oil companies rushed to export the largest possible oil-which led to the country’s production to the highest level in seven years of 3.5 million barrels per day. If Iranian oil companies rushed to pump raw in preparation for a potential tightening of US sanctions, they were in treatment: On June 24, US President Donald Trump published the social fact that China “could now continue to buy oil from Iran”, leaving experts guessing purchases in Washington’s long. Nobody knows what it means, if anything, Trump’s social media post. However, if the sanctions on Tehran’s oil exports are lifted, the effects of his orientation at his turn can be further than Iran-in China, Russia and even the United States.

Confusion often prevails about secondary penalties. These measures are designed to punish companies (such as mysterious shipping companies and Chinese oil refineries) that want to do business with the basic goals of US sanctions (such as Iranian oil producers). However, there is hunting: secondary penalties, even if they are enact, rarely imposed in practice. Proof that these transactions can be difficult, take a long time, or simply not deserve this effort. The strength of such measures is mostly in their comfortable effect, as it is just the risk of falling within the framework of secondary penalties sufficient to deter companies from dealing with the goal of the initial penalties.

Satellite images often give interesting results. After Israel’s sudden attack on Iran on June 13, Iranian oil companies rushed to export the largest possible oil-which led to the country’s production to the highest level in seven years of 3.5 million barrels per day. If Iranian oil companies rushed to pump raw in preparation for a potential tightening of US sanctions, they were in treatment: On June 24, US President Donald Trump published the social fact that China “could now continue to buy oil from Iran”, leaving experts guessing purchases in Washington’s long. Nobody knows what it means, if anything, Trump’s social media post. However, if the sanctions on Tehran’s oil exports are lifted, the effects of his orientation at his turn can be further than Iran-in China, Russia and even the United States.

Confusion often prevails about secondary penalties. These measures are designed to punish companies (such as mysterious shipping companies and Chinese oil refineries) that want to do business with the basic goals of US sanctions (such as Iranian oil producers). However, there is hunting: secondary penalties, even if they are enact, rarely imposed in practice. Proof that these transactions can be difficult, take a long time, or simply not deserve this effort. The strength of such measures is mostly in their comfortable effect, as it is just the risk of falling within the framework of secondary penalties sufficient to deter companies from dealing with the goal of the initial penalties.

Perhaps for this reason-and that targeting oil shipping is often like greenery, as tankers that are sanctions are replaced by a new speed-the United States often indicates the so-called dark fleet of tankers that transport Iran oil under the radar. This is not the development of Trump: Iran’s secret oil shipments have been more or the least informal policy since the Biden administration.

Iran Hoks may feel comfortable with hearing that Tehran is unlikely to benefit from a great benefit from Trump’s decision to make an informal American tolerance to export Iranian oil a formal policy (almost). It is recognized that Iran can export oil to China, which absorbs more than 90 percent of Iranian crude exports, without the need for risk discount by 8 to 10 percent, with a different amount depending on the type of crude and the negotiating power of each Chinese liquidation.

However, getting rid of the discount will not be enough to feed an Iranian financial bonus: at most, Tehran can hope to get 3 billion dollars to 4 billion dollars annually from additional revenues. (This annual estimation of Iranian exports of 1.5 million barrels per day assumes $ 66/barrel – the average price of oil made by the International Energy Agency and the American Bank JP Morgan in its predictions for a period of 2025 – by $ 60 after deducting 10 percent.)

The Iranian regime will certainly welcome a few billion dollars of additional revenues to rebuild its nuclear program. However, the poor oil sector in Iran means that the surprise surprise will only be a temporary aid. After decades of non-investment and access to Western technology, Iranian oil companies will struggle to enhance production without huge flows from foreign capital and know-how-which will remain in a state of deficiency in overcoming the official relaxation of US sanctions.

Experience from the 2015 nuclear deal also indicates that Western companies will adopt an approach to waiting and seeing before returning to Iran for fear of sudden sanctions. What makes things particularly necessary for Iran is that many of their oil fields are mature and therefore a decrease in production, which requires a continuous investment just to continue pumping.

For Iran’s main agents, Trump’s news may not be-perhaps on the contrary-a welcome news. Iran officially provides nearly 15 percent of crude imports in China, but the real number may be higher because a large part of Iranian oil shipments to China pass through Malaysia, Oman or the United Arab Emirates using mysterious financial plans. On other occasions, crude is simply transferred from one tanker to another at sea, then announced that it is coming from another place – all in an attempt to escape from the American scrutiny.

Not all Chinese refineries import Iranian oil, though; Chinese state -owned refining companies have long been outside this trade for fear of falling into Washington. On the contrary, Iranian oil is very important for the so-called Chinese tea-tea refineries-widespread independent refineries that have invested greatly in the specialized equipment needed to refine the heavy-rich Iranian oil.

For tea jug refineries in China, Trump’s heart change may have been the death penalty: since 2022, many of these companies have turned into a reduced Iranian crude for staying standing on his feet despite the diminishing profit margins and increasing competition from government refining giants. With the tea jugging refineries provided about a quarter of China diesel, gasoline and other refined products, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing can rejoice in the idea of ​​seeing many of these companies that stop providing refined oil food to the Chinese local market.

Rumors say that Beijing has long wanted to reduce the tea jug of refineries in order to reduce the competition for the state -owned. This idea does not pass the smell test: When Chinese leadership really wants to start in a sector, it has a strong record of being able to do so quickly.

Russia is the final discount of the United States that Trump may not satisfy. For Moscow, the possibility of a war that Iran involved was not completely bad news; The rise in oil prices that usually accompany tensions in the Middle East can help the Kremlin to fill its growing financial hole at a time when the price of a barrel of Russian oil recently recorded two years later, which led to a decrease in generous revenues on the oil tax by 32 percent in May compared to the same month in 2024. The decrease in crude prices would give credibility to the recent ads of Kremlin officials that the Russian economy is that the Russian economy is that the Russian economy is that the Russian economy is Slaves on the edge of the recession.

It is difficult to find cohesion in US policies these days. However, the American economy increases increasingly that Trump Enterprise is writing heavily, the assumption that Trump gives priority to low oil prices over everything else that may not be out of reach. This theory not only explained its favorable comment on Iranian oil flows, but also helps in explaining the reason for not targeting the strikes (and possibly Israeli) from the infrastructure of oil production in Iran.

However, Trump may want to be careful of what he wishes. Oil producers in the United States will be difficult if crude prices drop to $ 60 a barrel. Some oil companies in the United States are likely to work hard to determine the reason for the White House need to reflect the training course and double Iran’s sanctions, and highlight the only certainty with Trump: no one knows what will happen, and everything can change on a whim.

Although Trump appears to have given them a green light, Iranian oil producers are likely to be good to continue pumping as much-as they can.