Erdogan-Trump Meeting Shows That U.S.-Turkish Relations Matter Less Than They Used to

“Don’t be a harsh man. Don’t be fool!” US president Donald Trump appealed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 speech. The jury may be out of the difficult or flexible difficulty of Erdogan, but it is certainly not fool. In fact, he has proven his skill in playing Trump. It was not long before the White House mistakes (which he played in the container, according to reports), Erdogan obtained Washington to swallow Turkish military intervention in Syria against the Kurdish allies of the United States.

On September 25, the Turkish leader returned to the White House, ready to do more geopolitical work with his “honorable friend”, Trump. But the fact that the talks did not highlight a little reporting of the extent to which the United States and Turkey diverge. Chemistry between Trump and Erdogan, who are strong men who have a reputation for the wheel and deal, make things better – but just a little.

“Don’t be a harsh man. Don’t be fool!” US President Donald Trump appealed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 speech. The jury may be out of the difficult or flexible difficulty of Erdogan, but it is certainly not fool. In fact, he has proven his skill in playing Trump. It was not long before the White House mistakes (which he played in the container, according to reports), Erdogan obtained Washington to swallow Turkish military intervention in Syria against the Kurdish allies of the United States.

On September 25, the Turkish leader returned to the White House, ready to do more geopolitical work with his “honorable friend”, Trump. But the fact that the talks did not highlight a little reporting of the extent to which the United States and Turkey diverge. Chemistry between Trump and Erdogan, who are strong men who have a reputation for the wheel and deal, make things better – but just a little.

The fact is that the problems in the relations between the United States and the Turkish are baked, and the chances of breakthroughs are small. Moreover, the risks are no longer high anymore, and the relations between the United States are more love than being during the first period of Trump. As a result, both sides are happy to enjoy a reference and pocket pictures that it can win.

Trump’s return to power was welcomed in Ankara as an opportunity. From the beginning, Erdogan camp believed that the American administration was subject to Turkish interests. When Trump’s initiatives to Moscow have resumed Russian Ukrainian talks in Istanbul, Turkish commentators were martyred as evidence of his position as an engine and thankful in international politics. After the fall of Bashar al -Assad, Turkey’s position in Syria has strengthened, the leaders believe that this gives them more cards with the Trump administration. Now, Türkiye hopes to play a role in the new Trump plans for post -war settlement in Gaza as well.

Trying to grow relations in Washington is being made against the backdrop of a wider Turkish batch to support relations with the West. Yes, Erdogan appeared in China for the Schenghai Cooperation Organization summit in August and participated in the BRICS+ gathering in Russia in October 2024.

But at the same time, Türkiye moved to strengthen strategic relations with Europe. Ankara has repeatedly described its potential contribution to the so -called “coalition from those who wish”, a group that gathered throughout France and the United Kingdom with the aim of sending an exploratory force to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire.

Time in mind, Ankara was keen to participate in the current NATO efforts to contain Russia. The Turkish Air Force recently sent an early elage eagle eagle aircraft to Lithuania as part of the coalition’s response to escalating aircraft violations of Russian aircraft aircraft on its eastern suite. Moreover, Turkey has applied to join the security plan for Europe (Amna), a plan of 150 billion euros ($ 176 billion) proposed by the European Commission to encourage joint military purchases within the European Union and perhaps among its external partners.

Finally, Türkiye continued its long -term pushing to modernize the current customs union of the European Union to cover public services and purchases. With both Europe and Turkey to which Trump’s tariff and economic expansion in China, intentional integration has a great meaning.

There is part of the story, too, precedes Trump. The Russian invasion of Ukraine led the geopolitical stocks in Türkiye on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, and Erdogan is still keen to exploit this mood. In 2024, Türkiye obtained an agreement with the Biden administration to update its current F-16 fleet and obtained 40 additional aircraft. Although the update element has been dropped, the rest of the contract is still being implemented. The F-16 deal included Ankara’s approval of Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO. Erdogan now hopes to be able to buy F-35 combat aircraft as well, despite the concerns of the United States that their security will be at risk through Turkey’s ownership of the Russian S-400 S-400.

But Brum Erdogan is not with Trump nor his feelings to the West (or whatever remaining of it) is sufficient to produce real rapprochement between Türkiye and the United States.

First, there is little evidence that Türkiye and the United States can cooperate in Gaza. Erdogan insisted after the White House meeting that Turkish officials had reached a joint understanding with Trump, but Trump did not confirm this. There are still many questions that have not been answered, not the least of which is whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas on board with the latest set of proposals made by Trump Steve Witkev. Finally, the exact role that Türkiye will play after the supposed ceasefire is still unclear: Israel is skeptical of Turkish participation, and Ankara may be unhappy if it is deported to the situation of the Gulf states.

Second, Türkiye will not drop energy relations with Russia to redirect it to the United States, one of Trump’s keys. Potas, a state -controlled Turkish gas company, has signed a 20 -year -old LNG (LNG) contract in the period before Erdogan’s visit. But the annual amount of the cubic billions of gas covered by the deal is about five what Türkiye imports annually from Russia via TURKSTREAM and Blue Stream pipelines. As with other Potas contracts, dealing with liquefied natural gas with the United States is a hedge against future turmoil and price fluctuations instead of replacing Russian folders.

Moreover, Türkiye has not abandoned its long -term ambitions to resell Russian gas to other customers in Europe. Its companies have already achieved a lot of money by buying crude from Russia and passing refined products to the European Union countries. All this makes Trump’s request difficult to accept it.

It was also previously with the Memorandum of Understanding Civil Nuclear Energy signed during the visit of Erdogan’s white home. As much as the United States wants to be a piece of the Turkish market, the fact remains that the nuclear power plant in Turkey, Akkuyu, is run and operated by a subsidiary of Rosatom Corporation in Russia, and is scheduled to come online by 2028. Progress in any new factory will be slow. The uncertainty about financing and energy prices can easily come out before it becomes economical.

Third, despite the optimistic tone and Trump’s hints that Türkiye may be able to buy F-35s, his talks with Erdogan have only achieved little case. Structural obstacles, like the US sanctions imposed on Türkiye to purchase Russian S-400 missiles in place. There is no critical bloc of support in the US congress to shed light on the resumption of cooperation with the Defense Procurement Agency in Türkiye.

The gestures of goodwill in Erdogan – which are fighting some customs tariffs on American imports that have been reported to buy hundreds of Boeing aircraft – are working on Trump, but they will not weaken legislators in Capitol Hill. Reports on the Congress Bloc on the export of engines in favor of Kaan Jet in Türkiye being disappointed in Ankara.

But if none of the great hopes of this bilateral meeting are achieved, it may not matter much. Türkiye has adapted well with a multi -polar world that has a deficient impact of the United States. For Erdogan, the greatest benefit in the visit was to create the impression that Trump supported the opposition Republican People’s Party campaign. However, Erdogan’s authoritarian career will take place regardless of.

In short, the United States and Turkey do not need each other as it was in the past. Ankara does not need support against Russia the way it did in the Cold War. Washington does not depend on Turkey to contain Russia or to work as a partner in the Middle East. Trump may want to support Türkiye to achieve some of his (constantly changing) goals in the region, but he has many other partners in the neighborhood. As a result, the two parties can live with mystery, and work together when interests overlap, and agree on the difference as it does not do so.