Europe Has Willed Itself to Power in Ukraine

Initially, for post -War, Diton, Ohio. Yugoslavia’s disintegration has led to the first geopolitical crisis in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many European countries had a firm interest in ending the conflicts that erupted in the Balkans. However, they lacked cohesion, common position, and military ability to act. A final round of diplomacy occurred in the American Middle West – in Dayton – and the United States took the role of indisputable security guarantor in Europe. To the indispensable security guarantor, go to diplomatic spoils.

It is easy to tell the story of the European military deficit over the past three decades. When the United States was keen to invade Iraq in 2003, many European countries were horrific, but there was nothing to do; Some European countries, such as Spain and the United Kingdom, have joined the American war effort, and some have not clearly done. He rushed to the United States to support the United States. They wanted to prove their solidarity and value to Washington.

Initially, for post -War, Diton, Ohio. Yugoslavia’s disintegration has led to the first geopolitical crisis in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many European countries had a firm interest in ending the conflicts that erupted in the Balkans. However, they lacked cohesion, common position, and military ability to act. A final round of diplomacy occurred in the American Middle West – in Dayton – and the United States took the role of indisputable security guarantor in Europe. To the indispensable security guarantor, go to diplomatic spoils.

It is easy to tell the story of the European military deficit over the past three decades. When the United States was keen to invade Iraq in 2003, many European countries were horrific, but there was nothing to do; Some European countries, such as Spain and the United Kingdom, have joined the American war effort, and some have not clearly done. He rushed to the United States to support the United States. They wanted to prove their solidarity and value to Washington.

Regardless of its reservations about the American Authority, Europe did little to increase its military capacity after 2003. When Russia annexed the Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014, Germany and France mediated in Minsk Conventions between 2014 and 2015. They failed to restore the Ukraine or its regional integration. US President Barack Obama was hoping to be the European watch. Instead, it was an introduction to the massive invasion of Russia for Ukraine in 2022.

As far as Europe fought to achieve victory for Ukraine, the story of the European deficit has become old. Now, it’s half of the story – and perhaps not even. The other half is one of the monotheism, a process started by non -European leaders: Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose appetite in the war has no clear borders, and US President Donald Trump, who does not exercise his commitment to Europe.

The Trump administration does not see the United States as the basic security guarantor in Europe. For its interest, Europe must fill the void, which it started to do by enhancing the widespread support of Ukraine and the great European investment in defense. In June, NATO allies supported a pledge to spend on committing 5 percent of the GDP of defense. Berlin has announced that it will reach defensive spending by 3.5 percent of GDP by 2029 – before the coalition’s schedule was preceded. Germany is preparing to become one of the three best defense spending in the world.

This newly discovered sobriety reshapes the eastern side of NATO. While the Kremlin repeatedly demanded to return to 1997 and NATO retreat, Europe enhances its future defenses. The Baltic countries have prompted the transition from the symbolic journey wire to trusted deterrence: specific stocks, enhanced air control, and the deployment of a full German brigade in Lithuania. This effort led the Europeans themselves and not by Washington, as it was before.

It appears that the arranged meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska on August 15, followed by a chaotic day from the summit across the Atlantic Ocean at the White House, appears to be on both sides of Europe. Trump put himself in front of the cameras as a central decision -maker and host. However, the photos of European leaders gathered around his office is misleading. Carefully prepare the Europeans and design their visit. Leaders from all parts of the political spectrum – from Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni on the right of the UK’s Prime Minister Kiir Starmer at the left – aside their differences and spoke with one voice.

In the White House, they were addressing three separate fans. They pointed to fixed support for Ukraine and the opposition to any scenario in which Moscow dictates terms to Ukraine or Europe. To Washington, they were politely proven that Europe would have a seat on the table.

European leaders traveled to the White House for Ukraine. Their argument was soft, but according to it: Ukraine should not give up its lands to Russia, and Europe will not recognize Russian control over Ukrainian soil (even if the United States may be). As long as Russia challenges the sovereignty of Ukraine, Europe will continue its military support – whether the United States chooses it.

This position is supported by material capabilities. The Ukraine facility of 50 billion euros ($ 58.4 billion) (intended to be used from 2024 to 2027) provides predictable financing; European military support, in 2025 points, exceeded US military aid flows. Ukrainian President Foludmir Zelinski, who was not flawed in a flawless manner of Trump, was not sitting alone in the Oval Office – as he returned in February – and he was told that he should consider surrender to Russia. Despite the popularity at home that led to a decrease or rejection, Zelinski can return to Kiev with his head.

In their meetings with Trump, European leaders did not transfer any weakness towards Russia. On the contrary, they emphasized that Europe will not normalize relations with Russia unless Russia withdraws from Ukraine and accepts the reliability of Ukrainian sovereignty as a fact in European life. Europe supported this position through the increasing sanctions system – which was more than the eighteenth European Union package on July 18 – targeting energy, financing and fraud associated with the Russian “shadow fleet” of oil tanks.

The natural market in Russia is not the United States, and it is not China: it is Europe. Even if Russia is advancing on the battlefield, it will struggle to achieve economic growth without reaching European markets and without urging Europe to lift its sanctions. In the war of attrition, which has become the war in Ukraine, Europe has a huge lifting of the Russian economy. He uses this leverage.

Europe has the power to restrict the United States over Ukraine, as it is clear that many European leaders are present at the White House meeting. Trump designed himself as a peacemaker during his second term and often talks about a desire to end the war. He can not only do this by withdrawing US military assistance to Ukraine or by signing documents with Putin. Many European countries do a lot that does not maintain the Ukrainian war effort.

In 2003, Joschka Fischer, the famous Minister of Foreign Affairs, intercepted the war processor in Iraq. “I am not convinced,” said to the United States policy makers when they made war. His unforgettable comment was unrelated. The war took place. Now, it is important whether or not European leaders are convinced, and they are convinced that the Ukrainian defeat will be disastrous for Europe.

The White House reluctantly understood this. The level of coordination with the Europeans was not similar before and after Alaska the early stages of Trump’s second state, when the Europeans were left in the dark about his dealings with Moscow.

Trump is still imaginary on Europe. On the one hand, his administration explores ways to reduce the number of American forces on the continent, hoping to turn resources towards China or repeat the “peace profits distribution” to former President Bill Clinton. On the other hand, Trump described himself as “president of Europe” after he pushed the war in Ukraine. Although he declared himself the negotiator in the president, he could not restore Dayton and impose a purely American design solution in Europe. Trump did not gain European confidence, and Europeans expand instead of abandoning their agency.

It is indispensable to the United States in Europe. There are no reliable security guarantees for Ukraine possible without an American role, and Europe knows it should bring Trump. This looked unreasonable: his administration is still called “Biden’s War”.

The Washington meeting may have set a turning point. At the present time, the narration has changed from Trump, who contemplates NATO to take advantage of the American president who discusses the security provisions of Ukraine, who is not a president who is not a friend of Trump. The contributor to this reflection was not a simple achievement for Europe.

The European watch will really come not only when Europe requires a sufficient military force to contain Russia on its own, if that happens. It will come when it can integrate Ukraine into European institutions.

Russia will definitely try to prevent this from happening, while Washington will be on the sidelines. Washington is not to say how and when should Ukraine join the European Union. Washington does not say how the Europeans should contribute to the rebuilding of post -war in Ukraine. These will be European decisions, and the charge of challenges, as Europe has been skilled in integration between East and West, after it has followed it unabated since 1991. From an ideal point of view, the United States will continue to work with Europe on common security concerns while Europe has dealt with political repercussions from the serial invasions of Russia Ukraine.

As for the ongoing war, it is wrong to fight everything that Europe has not achieved since February 2022. Ukraine has been invaded through a nuclear force and a country that has a way to maintain a large army. More surprising than Russia’s ability to finance its war and continue to find recruits is the inactive feasibility of this war – for Russia.

In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine to reshape the security architecture of Europe. Since Putin’s trip to Alaska, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has brought back this ambition, but during the three and a half years last year, Russia has not carved a place for itself in Europe. Finland and Sweden entered the NATO alliance, and Europe is doing what it can to prevent Russia from reshaping the security architecture of Ukraine. In the summer of 2024, the European Union opened the joining talks with Ukraine, which places institutional integration, not Russian dictations, in the position of Europe’s long -term strategy.

The uselessness of the Russian war, among other things, is a reflection of the will of Europe. The open question is whether the Europeans themselves can see what they have achieved or whether they are psychologically burdened with the costs of war, terrible suffering in Ukraine, and by containing Russia.

Evidence on the past few weeks and months – leaders speak one voice in Washington, harden the position of strength on the eastern side, and increase their spending obligations – shows a positive path for Ukraine. This was definitely the result that Putin expected from his personal meeting with Trump. However, this may be the most important transition in the past few months. If the European watch is still here, you will approach.