Politics

How the U.S. Failure in Iraq Haunts Trump’s Gaza Plan.

The initial response to the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, reached by the Trump administration last week, was enthusiastic. Palestinians relish the prospect of an end to two years of almost unimaginable brutality and crushing famine that has decimated every part of the long-suffering people and land. Israelis celebrated the return of 20 hostages freed by Hamas alive and the chance to end international isolation. Enthusiastic crowds in Israel and Egypt showered US president Donald Trump with appreciation.

But it is difficult to share Trump’s optimism that the ceasefire has unleashed a broader transformation in the Middle East — or even that it will remain in touch with the reality on the ground in Gaza.

The initial response to the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, reached by the Trump administration last week, was enthusiastic. Palestinians relish the prospect of an end to two years of almost unimaginable brutality and crushing famine that has decimated every part of the long-suffering people and land. Israelis celebrated the return of 20 hostages freed by Hamas alive and the chance to end international isolation. Enthusiastic crowds in Israel and Egypt showered US President Donald Trump with appreciation.

But it is difficult to share Trump’s optimism that the ceasefire has unleashed a broader transformation in the Middle East — or even that it will remain in touch with the reality on the ground in Gaza.

The ceasefire agreement charts a path forward, which, if achieved, would see the return of normalcy to Gaza, the rebuilding of its infrastructure and economy, and the consolidation of the post-Hamas political order. The deal, which remarkably responds to the concerns of key Arab states, disavows key hard-line Israeli demands, such as expelling the Palestinians and annexing the West Bank. It promises an influx of much-needed humanitarian aid, without a role for the widely reviled Gaza humanitarian facility, and proposes a broad economic rebuilding while setting aside fantasies of Trump hotels on the Gaza Riviera.

The agreement has already had a positive impact by stopping the killings and returning hostages and demonstrating the new international consensus to end the war. What it lacks is a realistic roadmap for real progress. Humanitarian conditions in the completely devastated Gaza Strip remain catastrophic. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already placed restrictions on aid deliveries before it even starts flowing. Hamas has shown little interest in disarming, instead moving aggressively to consolidate its control and clamp down on militias backed by Israel and other rivals. The agreement itself is worryingly vague, relying at key points on heroic assumptions about a wide range of regional actors. Although there was a great deal of international goodwill and broad regional consensus in support of the plan, it did not produce resolutions from the UN Security Council or firm commitments from external actors.

This does not mean that the return of large-scale war is likely in the short term. A simplified version of the agreement is likely to take hold. All actors now believe in one way or another that they have reached the limit of what can be achieved through war. Netanyahu’s determination to enter Gaza City was of deep concern to many in the Israeli national security establishment and the broader public. Palestinians in Gaza are desperate for anything to end their suffering. With Trump putting his personal reputation on the line, and all parties exhausted, we should not expect a repeat of the short-lived January ceasefire, which collapsed after the first phase, and the resumption of severe violence and famine.

But there is little chance that the ceasefire will move to the second phase, with Hamas disarmed and a ruling authority formed, not to mention the longer-term aspirations of the third phase. The crucial question today is not whether the agreement will be fully implemented. This is what the area will look like when it isn’t. How Israel, Hamas, the United States, and the major regional players maneuver in the meantime, and what kinds of competitive dynamics will shape post-war Gaza, will be driven by broader regional dynamics. The hopes of this moment may be enough to restart Arab moves toward normalization with Israel and a return to the bleak but apparently stable pre-October situation. November 7, 2023, status quo. But the dashing of those hopes in Gaza or an Israeli shift toward annexing the West Bank could tear apart the new US-led Arab-Israeli regional order that Trump hopes to build.

The challenges begin with the devastation of Gaza itself, a grim reality that has somehow been reduced to an afterthought in the joy of a ceasefire. There is no new beginning in the ruins of Gaza. Almost the entire population has been displaced and traumatized. At least 67,000 Palestinians have been killed, and many more are likely dead, buried under rubble and torn apart by two years of war and siege. Most of the infrastructure of what was once among the densest urban areas on the planet has been destroyed: schools, hospitals, roads, residential buildings, water treatment facilities, electrical generators and agriculture. The neighborhoods to which Gazans hope to return simply no longer exist, and what remains is incapable of sustaining life.

The ceasefire plan envisions a massive influx of humanitarian aid to mitigate the most pressing conflicts. But although it is urgently needed, it is unlikely to appear fully and inadequate to the needs. Israel has maintained its blockade of Gaza for nearly two decades and, for the past two years, has obstructed the delivery of humanitarian aid – even as it agreed to do so under US and international pressure. Who can forget the grim spectacle of the American construction of a floating dock, designed to avoid the need for aid to pass through Israeli checkpoints, but which quickly collapsed and floated away in a perfect metaphor for former US President Joe Biden’s futility? Netanyahu has already halved the amount of aid allowed into Gaza due to alleged delays in returning hostage remains; This will almost certainly be the first of many such hurdles.

Even if much-needed humanitarian aid enters Gaza, it will only be a temporary solution. It is estimated that Gaza needs more than $50 billion in development aid just to rebuild the basics that Israel has systematically destroyed. Although the Gulf states have expressed their willingness to support the reconstruction of Gaza, they are neither willing nor able to provide open financing at the required levels. Inflated Gulf promises of aid rarely appear, and always come with political conditions. Even if the required funds are provided one way or another, no serious development will be possible as long as Israel continues its blockade and prevents the opening of ports and airports to allow the movement of people and goods. Everything in Israel’s behavior over decades indicates that it will do so.

Israel’s insistence on destroying Hamas and depriving it of any role in Gaza after the war would further complicate the situation. Hamas has shown little interest in disarming or withdrawing, and has already begun moving aggressively to reassert its control over Gaza, waging a tough crackdown on Israeli-backed militias that have emerged to fill the security vacuum. It is not clear which force will carry out the disarmament of Hamas or will replace it in imposing order. The experience of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank indicates that Israel will reject the establishment of any armed Palestinian police force, no matter how politically affiliated it may be. It is difficult to see any effective international or Arab peacekeeping force without the actual cooperation of Hamas – or to imagine Israel relying on such forces to achieve its security demands.

However, Hamas’ continued presence would provide Israel with countless opportunities to resume military operations and slow down humanitarian aid and reconstruction. That would be more of an excuse than a reason. Netanyahu only agreed to a ceasefire under significant American and local pressure, and showed little sign of his real commitment to anything beyond the exchange of hostages. The right-wing settlers who dominate the current Israeli government have made no secret of their ongoing ambitions to annex Gaza and the West Bank, and will look for every opportunity to ensure the failure of the ceasefire.

It is not only the dismal history of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements that haunts the current ceasefire. The unrealistic assumptions and exaggerated claims are disturbingly similar to the failures of the US occupation of Iraq. The absence of security and order would make it difficult to establish any form of effective governance or build legitimacy for a new regime, just as happened in Baghdad two decades ago. Overly aggressive efforts to disarm Hamas would backfire, but leaving it under effective control would place any new administration at its mercy. The envisaged guardianship may be established, but like the unfortunate first administrators in occupied Iraq, this guardianship will never truly be able to exercise control and will have no legitimacy among Palestinians who aspire to a state of their own rather than an international mandate. Even on the path charted by the ceasefire agreement, Gaza is more likely to be the site of sustained low-level violence, economic disaster, failed governance, and escalating insurgency than the shiny new modern global city promised.

Hopes that these apparent hurdles can be overcome rest largely on Trump’s resolute commitment and personal investment in the outcome. But this should not be taken seriously. In fact, the Trump administration has no capacity or bandwidth to monitor, supervise, or implement the difficult operations ahead. The few officials in place are stretched thin, while the closure of USAID and the hollowing out of the government have left little technical expertise or staff to deal with complex issues. With worryingly few internal controls over Trump’s erratic decision-making, it is all too easy to imagine a sudden and rapid shift by the United States to support a renewed Israeli war. An administration embroiled in endless escalating domestic political crises, mostly of its own making, will likely be distracted.

Israel hopes that the ceasefire will put an end to its international isolation and mitigate the widespread revulsion over its destruction of Gaza. But such hopes are premature. This can only be achieved by moving towards genuine peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians, and nothing of the sort is on offer at this stage. What is happening in Gaza has caused a generational shift in views of Israel around the world – a shift as profound as the occupation of Iraq has been in views of the United States – profound changes that will not be easily mitigated by a short-term ceasefire. International justice and accountability for war crimes does not dissipate when immediate fighting ends.

Having this agreement is better than not having it. The disastrous war had to end, and Trump did what Biden had not done to make it happen. But making it outlast this exhilarating moment and create the historic dawn of the “new Middle East” that Trump promised will require not only the kind of sustained attention that is rarely highlighted, but also a willingness to learn from the mistakes of the past. It is all too easy today to hear echoes of a long history of American hopes for the transformation of a Middle East emerging from the rubble of catastrophic devastation. But the invasion and occupation of Iraq did not achieve the promised regional transformation. Nor was it affected by Israel’s devastating month-long bombing of Lebanon in 2006, which then-US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice celebrated as “the birth pangs of a new Middle East.” There is no reason to expect better from the smoldering rubble of Gaza’s killing fields.

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2025-10-16 18:25:00

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