How to Make the Snapback of Iran’s Nuclear Sanctions a Success

France, Germany and the United Kingdom, collectively known as E3, have sparked the “Snapback” operation against Iran, which began to count a 30 -day countdown, after which all United Nations sanctions will return under the 2015 nuclear deal. European countries will also move to restore their nuclear penalties against Iran, including extensive restrictions on the financial and energy sectors.

E3 hopes that the stopped watch on Tehran and Washington will pressure in new talks to avoid another war, which is likely to be worse. However, Snapback is a gambling – those that can determine the way to resume the war unless the main diplomatic weight is now being thrown behind a political process.

France, Germany and the United Kingdom, collectively known as E3, have sparked the “Snapback” operation against Iran, which began to count a 30 -day countdown, after which all United Nations sanctions will return under the 2015 nuclear deal. European countries will also move to restore their nuclear penalties against Iran, including extensive restrictions on the financial and energy sectors.

E3 hopes that the stopped watch on Tehran and Washington will pressure in new talks to avoid another war, which is likely to be worse. However, Snapback is a gambling – those that can determine the way to resume the war unless the main diplomatic weight is now being thrown behind a political process.

E3 was stopped using Snapback despite pressure during the first Trump administration to use it as part of the maximum pressure on Iran. (The United States has fully supported the current step.) The main reason E3 now is that the Snapback tool is a veto-resistant mechanism to re-impose sanctions on Iran listed in UN Security Council Resolution 2231-will end in October. Allowing him to separate would make it impossible to rebuild the international consensus on new sanctions against Iran.

Before the June strike by Israel and the United States against Iran, European countries made it clear that unless their nuclear activities are received, it will summon Snapback by the end of the summer. E3 encouraged Iran and the United States to reach a new agreement to reduce Iranian nuclear activities (which exceeded the limits set under the 2015 deal) and improving access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There was some hope that the talks that take place with Amman could make progress despite the main impact that US President Donald Trump has created on the presence of “zero enrichment” in uranium inside Iran.

However, Israel’s sudden attack on Iran and Trump’s decision to bomb the main Iranian nuclear installations for the first time were diplomacy under the bus. After the fighting stopped, E3 made an offer to Tehran to extend for six months of Snapback. The extension proposal was the correct call to Europe – which preserves the sanctions in the field of lifting while giving Washington political space and Touran to return to the talks.

The extension offer reached a dead end for several reasons. First, the E3 conditions for the tape extension were set very high. They have asked Iran to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency for its full access to its nuclear sites and to take it in the large stock of highly enriched uranium, which can be used to rush to the bomb. In light of this, this reasonable requests that Iran is obligated to perform under the Nuclear Dowry Treaty (NPT), but they ignore the new political facts resulting from the 12 -day war with Israel.

While Israel and Iran stopped the war, there is no little confidence that temporary suspension is solid. From Iran’s point of view, providing transparency on the most sensitive parts of its nuclear program and giving up important information about its uranium stock was the last chips bargaining for future negotiations with the United States. She refused to play these cards as part of the Snapback extending with Europe – which Tehran could not obtain any security guarantees that prevent more Israeli strikes or economic benefits. Indeed, given the increasing US sanctions and commercial restrictions in force since 2018, Iran has already absorbed the economic intention of Snapback.

Second, divisions under Iran’s leadership are undermined. While some in Tehran indicated that they had accepted improved conditions, the government did not provide convincing to the antagonists. Part of the Iranian political establishment even welcomed Snapback, a constant European rifle for their heads. Under this view, by allowing Snapback to manage its path, Europe will use its main sticks that Iran overcomes.

Third, the lack of attention in Trump in diplomacy obtained the deal. After the Iranian facilities were amazed, the nuclear program announced “Basta”, while his envoy, Steve Wittouf, reduced Iran as a priority. Tehran, who feels separated from us, may even see Snapback as a way to cause Washington to force Washington on the table.

Unless these three factors are corrected and an extension deal is reached within a 30 -day window, Snapback will become valid, which leads to the opening of multiple crises. The Security Council will be divided, as Russia and China may hinder implementation. The two countries around the world will face pressure to choose both sides, and Tehran has already tried to mobilize the countries of the Cooperation Organization in Shanghai behind this during this month meeting. Iran will continue to export oil to China, while Russia may challenge the United Nations to transport weapons in exchange for Iranian support in Ukraine.

Snapback will undoubtedly excite Iran for revenge. Tehran may suspend a little cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its hardline parliament, which has already succeeded in restricting the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is now pressing for Iran’s withdrawal from NPT completely. There is no doubt that such movements will encourage the government of Israel hawks – which made it clear that its war with Iran has not yet ended – to restart the attacks.

The renewed conflict is likely to be more bloody and more expensive, which risk the participation of the United States and destroys the region. The strikes of Iran cannot erase the nuclear knowledge. They also forced Iran’s leadership to abandon what it considers the country’s right to enrich uranium. Instead, every argument attack inside Iran is strengthened by nuclear ambiguity – or even worse than nuclear weapons – to secure the survival of the country.

To avoid this result, European countries must intensify high -level diplomacy with Trump and Iran. The immediate goal should be to attract Trump personally to make deals with Tehran as the most durable path to prevent nuclear armed Iran. One of the ways to do this is to combine Trump and Iranian President Masoud Bouchashian at the Security Council meeting during the next United Nations General Assembly. This will be a historic meeting in which the United States and the Iranian president will have.

Trump has long indicated their interest in high -level conversations, but Tehran resisted stubbornly bilateral meetings. Such international preparation will provide a place to provide face to Iran’s leaders and can be justified as an exceptional measure in view of the exceptional times of decision -making between appealed war and solid peace. Europeans must work with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to combine their influence on Tehran and Trump to take this jump.

The second goal should be to obtain an extension deal in the form of a new decision of the Security Council. The timing of the General Assembly interferes this month with a 30 -day window before starting Snapback. In the Security Council, a new decision can be agreed upon, based on three columns. First, it must call for the end of military attacks between Iran and Israel. Second, intense nuclear talks should be urged between permanent members of the Security Council and Iran during the next year. These two factors will provide Iran with some limited assurances that the United States will not light the new Israeli attacks as long as the resuming negotiations make progress.

Finally, this decision should support a 12 -month extension to Snapback’s rule in exchange for diplomatic talks, temporarily stop enriching and enhances transparency by Iran over its nuclear activities. While Iran is likely to protest a temporary stop in enriching uranium, this is a fact that now follows the American strikes and something that Iran may be ready to digest.

However, transparency will need to be a gradual process – and Iran is unlikely to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency to completely reach this to be linked to mitigating concrete US sanctions. One of the ways to enhance transparency in the initial stage of the extension period to the International Atomic Energy Agency is to work exclusively with the Chinese and Russian inspectors (who will obtain information that shares confidence with them) to start calculating its continuous stock.

If E3 benefits from Snapback to raise such a penetration, this will be confirmed again as an influential political actor. This process, of course, will be the beginning of the most difficult negotiation between the United States and Iran aimed at a new comprehensive deal. However, failure will leave E3 to fuel the conflict and abandon two decades of leadership of Iran’s policy.