How to Manage Global Order Without the United States

The United States hasn’t always been an ideal champion of international cooperation. It tended toward isolationism when it was a rising power and unilateralism when it became a superpower. But Trump’s approach to reshaping the world order offers a new and dangerous mix of isolationism and aggrandizement. He is contemptuous of multilateralism and fixated by the raw exercise of power. So are his supporters. This likely means that whatever happens in Washington, Trumpism will outlive a president who turns 80 this year.

Pundits and political scientists have long anticipated the end of the United States’ unipolar moment and the rise of a more multipolar order. Trump is often cited as an accelerant in this process. The reality is that he has given rise to something altogether different. The United States will remain the most economically and militarily powerful country in the world for several more years. But it will be absent from, if not actively hostile toward, the existing international order. This unique configuration is not multipolarity but rather the world minus one.

The question then is how the international community should respond. Maintaining global cooperation in spite of Washington will be difficult. To survive Trumpism and emerge stronger, existing multilateral institutions must adapt, reform, and redouble their efforts. If they do so successfully, the United States will one day be compelled to rejoin on more egalitarian terms.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously described the United States as the indispensable nation, without which the creation or maintenance of international cooperation would not happen. This assumption has underpinned fears that as Washington abandons its commitment to the global order, the world will grow less cooperative and more violent.

The history of international relations tells a different story. As scholars such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane contend, a globally dominant hegemon is not necessary for economic openness and political cooperation to prevail. Once formed, international institutions are sticky. They exist not because of collective altruism but because they serve the core interests of their members. If these core interests persist, cooperation will as well. This means multilateralism can survive even when a hegemon abstains, withdraws, or opposes cooperation among others.

In fact, the history of the 20th century shows that some of the most fundamental elements of the current international order emerged without the backing of any hegemon. Decolonization and racial equality, for example, became global norms not with the United States’ indispensable support but rather in the face of Washington’s initial resistance.

At Versailles in 1919, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson opposed Japan’s push to include a racial equality clause in the foundational principles of the League of Nations. Wilson was acting out of his own racist convictions while also trying to appease domestic politicians alarmed by Japanese immigration as well as Western allies such as Australia. Yet, despite this opposition, what we now popularly know as the global south continued to champion the idea, as seen most prominently at the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia.

In addition to its advocacy of racial equality, the Bandung Conference also demanded the immediate decolonization of Asia and Africa. Here, too, U.S. support was half-hearted at best. Washington, with the help of its main ally Britain, pressured countries participating in the conference to reject the call for decolonization, fearing that it would encourage communist takeovers of the newly independent countries. Of course, the fight for decolonization continued, creating the world of 193 sovereign United Nations member states that exists today.

Indeed, since the end of World War II, Washington has consistently shown itself to be a passive-aggressive actor on the global stage. It has created institutions and rules, respecting them when they suit U.S. interests but ignoring them when they don’t. While the United States remains part of many multilateral treaties, it is vigilant of any consequences it does not like. In extreme cases, Washington has even resorted to bullying, boycotting, and sanctioning institutions whose actions it objects to.

Three recent examples—the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the International Criminal Court (ICC)—show how multilateral institutions and agreements can survive when the United States is absent, noncompliant, or even actively hostile.

After participating in the third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Washington nonetheless refused to sign the resulting convention when it was concluded in 1982. Despite this, UNCLOS has been broadly effective in establishing a stable global legal framework for maritime zones and navigational rights. It has promoted trade and offered a mechanism for peaceful dispute resolution. It has served U.S. interests, too. Washington continues to invoke UNCLOS tools against China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Yet U.S. obstinance on formally joining UNCLOS has given China grounds to accuse Washington of hypocrisy. The U.S. decision to act in a manner consistent with UNCLOS even as it refuses to join represents the best-case scenario for the world minus one, where Washington keeps observing international norms even after formally rejecting them.

Even in instances where the United States withdraws from and violates multilateral agreements, cooperation can survive. To be sure, Washington’s exit from the Paris Agreement will have detrimental effects. Some will be domestic, such as the rollback of climate regulations and the subsequent increase in greenhouse gasses. Internationally, the U.S. withdrawal could undercut financing for climate regulations, such as compensation for countries that assume emission standards at the cost of their economic growth.

But while the loss of U.S. financial support will undermine the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement, other countries are still pledged to achieve its net-zero carbon emissions target. China, the world’s largest polluter today, has pledged to reach this goal by 2060. The European Union, the world’s fourth-largest polluter, has pledged to achieve net zero by 2050, as has Japan, while India has agreed to achieve this target by 2070. In fact, whatever the United States does, the remaining Paris signatories still have an obligation to revise and improve on their nationally determined carbon reduction targets every five or 10 years. And as wind and solar technologies become cheaper and proliferate, they may yet surpass these targets.

Finally, there’s the example of the ICC. In 1998, Washington voted against the Rome Statute, which created the court, out of concern that it would endanger U.S. citizens, diplomats, and soldiers. More dramatically, the United States has now retaliated against the ICC for bringing charges against Israeli leaders by sanctioning its judges and prosecutors. But U.S. allies including Britain have continued to support the court’s independence and refused to follow suit. As a result, the ICC remains a check on leaders’ impunity and a deterrent to humanitarian crimes.

U.S. President Donald Trump departs after speaking during the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Sept. 23.Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Since 2016, Trump has withdrawn or announced plans to withdraw from multiple multilateral agreements and institutions. These include the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, the U.N. Human Rights Council, and the Treaty on Open Skies, among others. In addition, the second Trump administration has announced its intention to withdraw from the World Health Organization and quit UNESCO again.

Then there are Trump’s planned cuts to the U.N. budget. Most prominent is his slashing of $800 million from U.N. peacekeeping operations, which involves funds already appropriated by congress. While the administration has agreed to provide some targeted funding for specific peacekeeping missions it supports, such as those in Haiti, Lebanon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its broader cuts have led the U.N. to reduce its global peacekeeping force by 25 percent. Trump is also withholding Washington’s mandatory contributions, leading to estimates that his total cuts to the U.N. budget will amount to more than $2 billion. As a result, the U.N. is now looking at slashing its budget by more than $500 million and cutting nearly 20 percent of its staff.

Ironically, while Trump is publicly demanding a Nobel Peace Prize, he is undercutting U.N. peacekeeping, which, despite its flaws, has been instrumental in easing conflicts and saving lives.

But this destruction is not the full story. Even as Trump cements the United States’ reputation as the world’s absentee- or defector-in-chief, international cooperation has survived. We are now seeing rising powers rebuff Trump’s tariffs and threats, often using multilateral forums such as BRICS, the G-20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as mechanisms to do so.

Several BRICS countries, particularly the original members, have openly defied Trump despite heavy tariffs. In Brazil’s case, the trial of former President Jair Bolsonaro continued despite White House pressure to absolve him of his crimes. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa went to the White House and publicly rejected Trump’s claim that white South Africans were being persecuted. China has used its dominance in critical mineral supply chains to outmaneuver Trump in the trade war. India has no such natural resource cards, but here Trump has generated a backlash closer to home: The U.S. policy community is now baffled and outraged that the White House has alienated a key strategic partner against China that had been a linchpin of Trump’s first-term Indo-Pacific strategy.

In December 2024, Trump as president-elect threatened 100 percent tariffs on any BRICS member that did not abandon its efforts to replace the U.S. dollar. In July 2025, when the BRICS summit was being held in Rio de Janeiro, Trump announced an additional 10 percent tariff on goods from any country aligning with what he termed the “Anti-American policies of BRICS,” adding that there would be “no exceptions.” In response, some BRICS members, such as Brazil, have since downplayed their plans for a common currency. But Trump’s pressure might also backfire, making their desire to develop alternative payment systems and reduce their reliance on the dollar even stronger.

The August 2025 SCO summit in Tianjin, China, provided another forum for displaying multilateral resistance to Trump’s policies. Here, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met and declared New Delhi and Beijing to be partners, not rivals.

But it’s not just the SCO. The G-20 has also given countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa an opportunity to enhance their global leadership. In 2022, Indonesia’s summit helped the bloc manage disarray over the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In 2023, India’s summit helped secure the African Union’s membership in the G-20, thereby expanding the role of the global south. The November 2025 G-20 summit in Johannesburg was another milestone. It was the first such summit held in Africa, and despite being boycotted by Washington, it centered issues such as diversity, inclusion, and equality. No other member followed the U.S. boycott, thereby further highlighting Washington’s global isolation.

In addition to the solidarity displayed in these global forums, there has also been a trend toward regionalism. Over the past two decades, African-led peace operations have proliferated. The AU and subregional institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States, as well as smaller ad hoc coalitions, are now undertaking 10 operations across 17 African countries. African-led peace operations have achieved a measure of success in containing conflicts fueled by insurgents in the Chad Basin, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Despite a mixed record, these peace operations have shown unique features such as localized and context-specific responses to insecurity and a willingness to undertake a broader range of operations than the U.N. Crucially, these projects have been largely funded by the EU, with the United States playing only a minimal role.

Alongside all these bodies, the U.N. remains a key site for cooperation. The United States often criticizes the U.N. for its failure to protect human rights or uses it as a venue to score political points against authoritarian rivals. But it has survived as a venue in which democratic and undemocratic countries have worked together effectively to promote humanitarian relief.

Notably, China’s contribution to the organization has increased significantly over the past two decades. While the United States contributes 22 percent to the organization’s regular budget and 26.2 percent to peacekeeping, China is now the second-largest contributor, paying 20 percent to the regular budget and 23.8 percent to peacekeeping. China also provides the largest number of peacekeeping troops among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. China’s voluntary funding for U.N. humanitarian agencies remains relatively low, but if Beijing wants to take advantage of U.S. disengagement, this contribution could grow rapidly.

A Chinese flag flies near container ships, cranes, and stacked shipping containers in Shenzhen, China, on April 12. Cheng Xin/Getty Images

China’s response will be especially crucial. Inevitably, Beijing will be guided by self-interest, trying to gain influence at Washington’s expense. But if China acts with wisdom and restraint, this will result in strengthened global cooperation rather than a push for a Chinese-dominated world.

The Asia-Pacific region, traditionally dependent on the United States for security, might well become the hub of the world-minus-one order. Here, two trade agreements deserve special attention: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The 15-member RCEP, which initially took effect in 2022, is emerging as the world’s largest trade group in terms of both GDP and population. Bringing together China, Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN nations, it currently accounts for some 30 percent of the world’s GDP. RCEP aims to remove more than 90 percent of tariffs within the bloc over 20 years and create common rules in contentious areas such as e-commerce and intellectual property.

CAFTA, which came into force in 2010 but was upgraded in 2015 and again in October 2025, is advancing cooperation between China and ASEAN in areas including the green economy and supply chain connectivity. Some observers have presented this as a clear strategic win for Beijing, as Washington has pressured ASEAN nations to decouple from China and comply with punitive U.S. tariffs against Chinese transshipments. But the truth is more complicated. ASEAN nations were never going to side completely with Washington. Instead, they are already using agreements such as CAFTA to advance their own interests and address their own concerns over Chinese influence. Indeed, it is pressure from ASEAN nations that has led Beijing to limit its economic gains, engage with these countries multilaterally, and pursue a relationship conducive to free trade and an open, inclusive regional order.

The EU is another major player whose response to the world-minus-one moment will be crucial. In 2021, the bloc launched its $300 billion Global Gateway plan, which combines infrastructure, energy, and climate protection projects to help counter China’s influence around the world. In Africa, for example, Global Gateway has sponsored the SoutH2 Corridor hydrogen pipeline from North Africa to Europe as well as projects to enhance food security in East Africa. The EU is also currently finalizing a free trade agreement with Mercosur countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—to remove tariffs on most goods, expand investment, and ensure sustainability.

Ideally, Europe and China can engage in regions such as Africa and South America in a manner that is complementary rather than zero-sum. In Africa, for example, China has been willing to align with the EU’s Global Gateway initiatives. Crucially, this attitude is not driven by European or Chinese magnanimity but rather the result of African and South American leaders demanding it.

India also has a key role in determining how effectively the world responds to Washington’s absence. While pushing back forcefully against Trump’s pressure, New Delhi is rapidly expanding and institutionalizing its own trade ties. These include negotiations to enhance its existing trade agreements with ASEAN and Japan and a new trade agreement with the United Kingdom in July 2025. India also signed a trade deal in 2024 with the European Free Trade Association, which includes non-EU members Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. As with China, India conducts much of its trade with Russia in national currencies. India has also maintained significant security relations with Russia, which continues to supply 36 percent of its arms imports. Even if relations with Washington subsequently improve, New Delhi’s continued commitment to strategic autonomy will dilute both U.S. and Chinese dominance, ensuring the sustainability of a world-minus-one system.

Finally, it remains to be seen whether the U.N. will rise to the occasion by using Trump as an opportunity to carry out long-overdue reform. Since the start of Trump’s second term, the United States has boycotted the U.N. Ocean Conference in France and the fourth Financing for Development conference in Spain. Even so, the vast majority of U.N. members attended these meetings. Washington’s absence did not prevent countries from executing business as usual, by reaching agreements to protect marine life, provide debt relief, and mobilize financial commitments to address climate change.

To build on this success, the U.N. must do more to adapt itself. This should include making budget cuts to focus on priority areas and reduce duplication by dispensing with agencies no longer critical to core missions. A more radical step, suggested by former senior U.N. official and Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and others, would be to move the U.N. headquarters out of New York City. This would cut costs and remove the chance of the United States denying visas to delegates from places deemed unfriendly to Washington. Ideally, every country would respond to Trump’s cuts by providing more support, within or outside the regular U.N. budget, and by pushing the U.N. to mobilize resources and expertise from the private sector. These measures can ensure that the U.N. will not die due to Trump’s hostility.

How should the world respond if and when the United States finally shakes off Trumpism? Much depends on how a new White House goes about repairing the damage. How quickly, for example, will the United States move to reenter institutions, repay lost or withheld contributions, or restore relationships with allies and partners from Canada to India? Whatever Washington does, responses will vary. NATO allies might be eager to restore the alliance to its previous vigor because of threats from Russia and transnational terrorism. BRICS, by contrast, will resist any U.S. attempt to reclaim its previous economic role.

Two scenarios might best describe what Washington’s return to the world order would look like: the prodigal son and the indispensable rogue. Washington’s liberal elite might prefer the former, in which the United States, like the biblical delinquent son, is welcomed back with open arms. But this scenario is unlikely. The world might forgive, but it will not forget the Trump years—as well as previous U.S.-imposed damage to the rules-based order. While public memories can be short and fickle, the United States is unlikely to regain the genuine trust of its erstwhile allies and partners, even within the West.

This leads to the second scenario, in which the United States is no longer the leader of the free world but simply an indispensable rogue. The world will still see U.S. military, economic, and technological capabilities as critical to managing many global challenges. But it will not want Washington wearing the mantle of global leadership.

Put simply, there is no return to U.S. geopolitical dominance or liberal hegemony 2.0. Whether he is followed by a Republican successor who continues his policies or by a well-meaning Democrat who seeks to reverse them, Trump has broken the world’s faith in and dependence on the United States. No one is waiting for another President Joe Biden to tell shaken allies that America is back.

The result will be a more multiplex world order. Washington will find itself living in a more broadly decentralized system, one shaped less by U.S. power or purpose than that of other great and middle powers enmeshed in a web of economic and security ties.

In short, by the time the United States is ready to return to multilateralism, the world will have moved on. It could be that Washington’s only choice will be to rejoin the international order as a weaker entity on more equal terms.