How Will the United States’ Democracy Recover After Trump?

Many Americans, who are concerned about their democracy during the era of US President Donald Trump, began to wonder whether he could recover as soon as he left his position. While it is very early to know the shape of the political scene in 2028 and beyond, the United States can already learn from the experiences of other countries that have tried to recover democratic. Recent developments in Poland and Brazil light – despite the sober – in this regard.

In the presidential elections of Poland earlier this year, conservative politician Carol Noruki defeated liberal candidate Rafal Tarsinski. The Noruki campaign was supported by law and justice-the party that led the erosion of democratic institutions and standards in Poland after its arrival in power in 2015. To many, the 2023 electoral defeat appeared to move to Polish democracy. But Noruki’s victory is the most popular and influence of non -liberal forces inside the country.

Many Americans, who are concerned about their democracy during the era of US President Donald Trump, began to wonder whether he could recover as soon as he left his position. While it is very early to know the shape of the political scene in 2028 and beyond, the United States can already learn from the experiences of other countries that have tried to recover democratic. Recent developments in Poland and Brazil light – despite the sober – in this regard.

In the presidential elections of Poland earlier this year, conservative politician Carol Noruki defeated liberal candidate Rafal Tarsinski. The Noruki campaign was supported by law and justice-the party that led the erosion of democratic institutions and standards in Poland after its arrival in power in 2015. To many, the 2023 electoral defeat appeared to move to Polish democracy. But Noruki’s victory is the most popular and influence of non -liberal forces inside the country.

Likewise, the recent events in Brazil showed that the electoral victory of the explosion in Gei -Bolsonaro over Jair Bolsonaro has never secured a single democratic recovery and recovery. In February this year, Polsonaro supporters mobilized tens of thousands to protest against his accusation of organizing a coup attempt at the end of his presidency. Bolsonaro has publicly insisted that he will contest the presidential elections in Brazil in 2026, although he was prevented from office until 2030 because of his wrong allegations about voters’ fraud. On Monday, the Supreme Court ordered his arrest while arresting him while trying to try the alleged coup in 2023, but it is clear that the forces and feelings that prompted the strong non -liberal man to office are still strong today.

Combating, these cases provide three valuable lessons for the United States as they are preparing for the post -Trump era.

1. The boundaries of the pro -democracy coalitions

First, it is difficult to transform the pro -democracy electoral alliances into effective political leadership.

In the 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland, multiple alliances of the parties that extend to the middle of the left during the middle-the civil alliance, the third alliance, and the left coalition-include the provoking law and justice. Together, this opposition won 54 percent of the votes and successfully formed the current government -led government.

But maintaining a unified front has proven a challenge, especially with regard to ideological charges. For example, last year, a procedure that was put forward by the ruling coalition failed to alleviate the abortion laws after the parties clashed inside the coalition, with one vote against it. The presidential elections for this year rocked the coalition: The members blamed Tusk for the mismanagement of the TRZASKOWSKI campaign, and the third alliance is divided into operation independently in the future elections after its moderate platform performed a bad performance.

For the Brazilian election campaign for 2022, Lula formed a wide alliance for politicians from all over the political spectrum and chose a right -wing politician in the center, Geraldo Alkain, as his friend. While this alliance succeeded in bringing Lula to power, it has proven that it was less effective as a ruling alliance, with the parties that supported Lula now not agreed to it now on various political issues and a sense of frustration with giving priority without the Labor Party. This has been translated into the lowest level of legislative support from Congress allies of a Brazilian president since 1995, where he has installed the policy industry agenda in Lula.

In both cases, these pro -democracy coalitions lacked a strong joint political agenda that exceeded its opposition to the current concern. Once he reached power, the new leadership quickly found by these same groups in its efforts to formulate the promised policies and their age.

2. The challenge of delivering the audience

These cases also show how difficult the leaders are to balance the restoration of democratic operations and institutions while meeting the needs of citizens and the most urgent demands.

In Poland, the Tusk government has focused a lot of its early capacity on the task of delegating law and the grip of anti -democratic justice on various institutions, such as the public media and the judiciary. This batch that restores democracy, although it is certainly understood, came at the expense of other political priorities.

The Tusk government has faced great criticism for its failure to implement its promises to its campaign on progressive policy issues, including abortion and women’s rights. At the same time, the government did little to search itself for Polish citizens who fall outside the traditional Tosk base-including rural societies, educated voters or young people. And through the political spectrum, there is an increasing fatigue with the government’s focus on holding the previous laws and justice at the expense of issues directed towards the future.

In Brazil, likewise, it has become a record without mixed on social and economic issues to determine his presidency.

Early in his mandate, he served a positive turn in Brazil’s economy, if not for well. His promise to return his previous presidency seemed to be applied, and he expanded the social programs that he had previously defended. But while Brazil’s economy is still in a relatively good condition, if it were not able to provide the economic opportunities that the large working class in the country expected. While fears grow about high inflation, crime, social and economic illness, the Brazilians grow in a non -leadership.

The result is a vicious cycle. General concerns about democratic slippage pushes new leaders to power. But when these leaders fail to fulfill the basic economic and political promises, voters and political allies rush to their employment – while realizing their legislative power or electoral support – which in turn weakens their efforts to restore democracy.

3. Continuing poisonous polarization

The third lesson relates to the difficulty of reducing political polarization, which, in both Poland and Brazil, non -liberal leaders feed conspiracy theories and the abolition of party opponents. Although he is no longer in power, these leaders continue to cultivate divisions, which makes it difficult for the new leadership to restore democratic standards that were inherent in political tolerance and moderation.

In Poland, for example, polarization surrounding the judicial system – which is reinforced by law and justice in power – has made the complexity of the Tusk government’s attempts to restore the independence of courts and other institutions. On a wider scale, law and justice has published polarized accounts about almost every reform procedure that the new government has sought to advance. The presidential elections for this year were also plagued by political polarization – with decreased general confidence in institutions, severe media bias, and inflammatory messages by politicians.

The same applies to Brazil, where Bolsonaro and his followers continue to publish extremist accounts regarding the Brazilian judicial authority, the integrity of Lula, and political life in general. Although the national elections are still a year away, the atmosphere of poisonous polarization actually suffocates the daily political life of Brazil, which distorts discussions on accountability and the rule of law.

In the United States, the story is not much different from the story in Brazil and Poland.

President Joe Biden came to his post in 2021, determining to reform the damage to the democracy that Trump caused during his first term. However, he struggled to prevent splits from his widespread alliance to combat Trump, especially between black and Latin voters. While the administration has made progress in terms of democratic recovery, its economic registry had a greater impact on the results of the 2024 elections. Moreover, despite Biden’s efforts to reduce the daily policy temperature, poison polarization only enlarges during his presidency.

Avoiding these pitfalls will not be easy for leaders who hope to rebuild American democracy as soon as Trump leaves the political stage. Understanding how their counterparts abroad followed similar positions – and wherever they made a mistake – it will be a good start.