Afghanistan’s Taliban Play a Growing Role in India-Pakistan Rivalry

If geography is destiny, nowhere is this equation more harsh than on the northwestern borders of the Indian subcontinent. Since the partition of British India in 1947, two patterns have remained constant: hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and warmth between Afghanistan and India. Regardless of who rules Kabul – royalists, communists, or Islamists – this pattern will continue. Pakistan helped create and nurture the Taliban to end these patterns once and for all; Today, the Taliban is fighting Pakistan and looking to India for balance.

Renewed clashes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in October fit this historical rhythm perfectly. The irony here is clear: the same Pakistan that helped the Taliban rise to power finds itself locked in an escalating conflict with them – and is only negotiating through third parties.

If geography is destiny, nowhere is this equation more harsh than on the northwestern borders of the Indian subcontinent. Since the partition of British India in 1947, two patterns have remained constant: hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and warmth between Afghanistan and India. Regardless of who rules Kabul – royalists, communists, or Islamists – this pattern will continue. Pakistan helped create and nurture the Taliban to end these patterns once and for all; Today, the Taliban is fighting Pakistan and looking to India for balance.

Renewed clashes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in October fit this historical rhythm perfectly. The irony here is clear: the same Pakistan that helped the Taliban rise to power finds itself locked in an escalating conflict with them – and is only negotiating through third parties.

Amid border tensions with Pakistan, Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Mottaki traveled to India for a week-long visit in October and reiterated Kabul’s interest in strong ties with New Delhi. As for India, which once declared that there is no such thing as a good Taliban and denounced the group as a strategic asset for Pakistan, it could not hide its joy. Within days of the visit, New Delhi upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full-fledged embassy and became one of the first countries to normalize relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

It did not require an exceptional diplomatic effort to bring the two together. Most of the heavy lifting of the logic of history and geography was carried out in the frontiers. Now the natural alliance between Kabul and New Delhi is beginning to assert itself again, but with new actors.

The trilateral dynamic between the three countries is as old as Pakistan itself. Every Afghan regime, regardless of its ideology, will sooner or later clash with Pakistan. One of the structural problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the Durand Line, the 1893 border agreement between British India and the Emir of the Emirate of Afghanistan, Abdul Rahman Khan, which runs through Pashtun and Baloch lands. When the newly created Pakistan inherited this colonial line in 1947, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations because it refused to recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate border.

It was one thing to accept the boundaries imposed by the British Empire, but quite another to accept them from what Kabul saw as a “little state” of the Raj. Successive governments in Afghanistan have toyed with the idea of ​​a Pashtunistan state that would unite Pashtuns on both sides of the line – an irredentist nightmare for Islamabad that persists to this day.

Pakistan does not view the problem of its borders with Afghanistan as just a cartographic problem, but rather an existential problem. The fear of the emergence of a two-front situation against India and Afghanistan has created a state of extreme anxiety within the Pakistani security establishment.

The Pakistan Army inherited the geopolitical idea of ​​strategic depth from the Raj. Like the British, Pakistan wanted Afghanistan to be a buffer state run by a friendly and flexible regime. From the 1950s onwards, Pakistani rulers, from Ayub Khan to Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, attempted to shape Kabul politics by supporting tribal militias and Islamist proxies. Every attempt backfired.

By the late 1970s, Islamabad found a new tool: jihadi militancy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the ensuing proxy war between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan against Moscow, gave Islamabad unprecedented influence. If Washington wanted to bleed Soviet blood in Afghanistan, Islamabad wanted to kill the ethnic concept of a Pashtunistan state with an Afghan identity.

When Najibullah’s Soviet-backed regime fell in 1992, Afghan mujahideen trained by Pakistan took power. But the new Islamist rulers, who had previously condemned India’s support for the pro-Soviet regime, have now turned to New Delhi to balance Islamabad’s interference in Kabul’s affairs.

With the mujahideen divided and turning against each other at home, Pakistan strengthened the Taliban in the early 1990s to restore order. By 1996, they had captured Kabul, seemingly giving Islamabad long-awaited strategic depth.

However, even at the height of Pakistani patronage, the Taliban never surrendered. They signaled independence and openness to a positive relationship with India. Even if Pakistan hoped that the Islamists – whether from the Mujahideen or from the Taliban sect – would abandon their policy. Pashtunistan Claims and acceptance of Durand’s line, then he was disappointed.

Since returning to power in 2021, the Taliban have been determined to assert Afghan sovereignty. Relations with Pakistan have deteriorated rapidly. Cross-border attacks, Pakistan’s construction of the border fence on the Durand Line, and Islamabad’s accusation that Kabul is harboring the Pakistani Taliban (an extremist group also known as the Pakistani Taliban) were all reasons that pushed the two sides into open confrontation. The Taliban is also upset by Islamabad’s expulsion of Afghan refugees and its attempts to dictate its terms.

Against this background, the Taliban’s outreach to India was not surprising. India’s re-engagement with Kabul since 2021 has been deliberately cautious, pragmatic and quiet. It has restored humanitarian aid and signaled openness to engagement as long as the Taliban promised not to allow their country to be used as a refuge and launching pad for anti-India terrorists.

The Taliban was happy with this offer, and India was keen to support Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. With Pakistan taking control of Afghanistan Access to Indian Ocean Possible land routes to India, New Delhi And he sought To help By developing alternative routes through Iran and building India and Afghanistan Air bridge to promote trade.

An important element of Mottaki’s trip to India was his visit to an Islamic seminary in Deoband, a town in the state of Uttar Pradesh not far from New Delhi. Darul Uloom Deoband, one of the most influential centers of Islamic learning, helped shape Islamic thought throughout South Asia. The Deobandi school of Islam was the basis of Taliban ideology before it transformed into a more virulent form in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

During his visit, Mottaki obtained a certificate of teaching hadith and the right to use the title “Al-Qasimi.” This was a big break for the Taliban, whose religious cadre was trained in Pakistan, especially Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akura Khattak. By reconnecting with Deoband, Mottaki was also signaling the Taliban’s religious independence from Pakistan.

However, India’s improved political fortunes in Kabul do not mean a serious competition with Pakistan over Afghanistan. India’s lack of a border with Afghanistan means New Delhi can never compete with Islamabad, which has nearly 1,600 miles of shared border. Pakistani intelligence agencies have been heavily involved in the Afghan wars over the past five decades.

But India does not have to compete with Pakistan in Afghanistan. Its natural alliance with Afghanistan depends on patience, a little development aid, and respect for Afghan sovereignty. Afghanistan will be lost to Pakistan, and India does not need to do much to keep Kabul on its side.

It is easy to see the tragedy that Pakistan is experiencing. It is the most important outside player in Afghanistan and has the ability to disrupt any regime there. But unlike the British rule, he did not have the resources to build a permanent and friendly edifice in Kabul. Pakistan’s quest for hegemony in Afghanistan will remain elusive, but it is unlikely to surrender. Pakistan may be trying to divide the Taliban in an effort to bring about regime change in Kabul. But no matter what Pakistan does, whether it succeeds or not, it cannot change the geopolitical logic on the Afghan border.