India Won’t Abandon Russia – Foreign Policy

Last week, US President Donald Trump imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on most Indian imports of the United States, thus reaching a total tariff for India to 50 percent. Secondary taxes on the surface aims to urge India to end its purchases of Russian oil, which Trump says is nourishing the war in Ukraine. The United States has previously granted the approval of oil purchases in India from Russia if a price ceiling is preserved.

Despite the clear costs that Trump’s tariff is likely to put on the economy in India-even if it eventually agreed to expand its oil imports-Delhi will not abandon its long partnership with Moscow. There are at least four convincing reasons.

Last week, US President Donald Trump imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on most Indian imports of the United States, thus reaching a total tariff for India to 50 percent. Secondary taxes on the surface aims to urge India to end its purchases of Russian oil, which Trump says is nourishing the war in Ukraine. The United States has previously granted the approval of oil purchases in India from Russia if a price ceiling is preserved.

Despite the clear costs that Trump’s tariff is likely to put on the economy in India-even if it eventually agreed to expand its oil imports-Delhi will not abandon its long partnership with Moscow. There are at least four convincing reasons.

First, although estimates are different, more than 60 percent of India’s India’s arsenal in India either of Soviet or Russian origin. There is no doubt that this has sought to diversify weapons acquisitions in recent decades, but New Delhi cannot withstand the costs of suddenly ending the relationship of weapons transporting with Moscow without endangering its security or without a severe cost of its cabinet. Despite the military needs of Russia amid its war in Ukraine, it is still a vital resource for both advanced military equipment and spare parts to India.

Moreover, according to many at the Indian Security Policy Foundation, Russia places few restrictions on the military equipment it provides to India, unlike the United States. The United States has restrictions on dual -use technology, as well as re -exporting sensitive defense technologies for third parties.

Second, India is sincerely afraid that itself will deny Russia a diplomat that may require great strategic costs. New Delhi is cautious about the growing rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, its hierarchy in the long run. Indian officials believe that any sharp step leads to lukewarm relations with Russia that will contribute to increasing the warmth between Moscow and Beijing. Such a result will leave India in harsh straps, given the strategic asymmetry that it already faces in its bilateral relationship with China.

Third, India and Russia participate in a long history and most of the collaborators have survived fluctuations before and have proven that they are two struggles dating back to the Cold War. Especially since 1971, when India and the Soviet Union signed a 20 -year treaty of “Peace, Friendship and Cooperation”, Moscow has been a major security partner in New Delhi. At a time when India was lacking in many friends on the world stage, Russia itself has proven to be a strong and reliable supporter. The mutual benefits of this partnership were multiple.

From a diplomatic point of view, India can rely on the Soviet Union to use its veto authority in the United Nations Security Council to prevent any hostile decision on Kashmir’s conflict with Pakistan. In turn, Moscow can rely on New Delhi to reduce the influence of the United States in South Asia. It can characterize her friendship with India – then a strong democracy – the developing world. The Soviet Union has found that it is appropriate to have another major Asian power to southern China that has remained at odds with Beijing, given the rift in the Sinovisual relations since 1969 on the rookie. New Delhi knew that it could depend on Moscow to connect Beijing in the event of military tensions along its vast Himalayas border.

It is recognized that partnership with the Soviet Union was not free of cost to India, especially in terms of reputation; It was the only democracy of the result that refrained from criticizing the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan throughout the eighties.

However, a great relationship has strengthened the transfer of weapons this diplomatic rapprochement. The Soviet Union was ready to provide India with the most advanced traditional military equipment in its arsenal, not only at prices other than the market but also on the basis of the rupee trade. When India was less than hard currencies due to anemia economy and its lack of integration with global trade, this arrangement was decisive to military modernization efforts.

Finally, from the point of view of most of the Cold War governments in New Delhi, the Soviet Union played an important role in the local policy in India that formed the present. The Soviet political leadership can be relied upon to curb the revolutionary party of one of the Communist Party in India, the Communist Party in India, which is looking forward to Moscow for ideological and political guidance. The Communist movement in India is of limited importance today, but the main individuals in the Indian Foreign Policy Foundation have memories dating back to the era of the Cold War and remain grateful for the role played by Moscow.

Although all of this helped formulate a multi -faceted relationship, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia initially distanced from India. But the shift proved that it is short -lived, as both parties decided that there is sufficient hermia for the relationship to preserve it. The exciting period of the American Mono -control, especially in the 1990s, led to calls from New Delhi, Moscow and other places for a multi -polar world. When Yevgeny Primakov, who later served as Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, reinforced this idea, he found an echo in New Delhi.

India’s long association with the Soviet Union during the Cold War left an important legacy and almost not erased in the foreign political circles in New Delhi-reference to other places as “nostalgia for the Cold War.” As a bone, this opinion sees that Russia, the main caliph country of the Soviet Union, is still a fixed partner of India in an uncertain world.

With Trump’s stability in his second term, mercury policy options are strengthened by security policy societies in India about the lack of reliability and lack of confidence in the United States. The consensus of the two parties on relations between the United States and India is forged from the days of retreating the Clinton administration and strengthening in the aftermath of the 2008 American civil nuclear agreement, and it seems that it is now at great risk.

Facing the possibility of being thrown nearly two decades, which seemed to be an increasing rapprochement in interests with the United States, India has decided that the shift towards Russia provides it with a safe port.