India’s Air Force Is in Crisis – Foreign Policy

After more than two months of engaging in short combat operations with Pakistan, the Indian Air Force (IAF) finds itself in a crisis. There were clear deficiencies in its performance during the Mayo-particular conflict compared to its role in the wars of India with Pakistan in 1947-1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999.

IAF has a powerful power of 42 operating beds, but their actual capabilities have shrunk to 31 families at best due to the slow defense seizure in India. Worse, in recent months, at least three of the three combat aircraft in the British Jaguar in IAF have been shattered during training operations, including in an accident on July 9 that killed two pilots. Jaguars was inserted into IAF in 1979, and India is still dependent on them due to cost considerations and other obstacles.

After more than two months of engaging in short combat operations with Pakistan, the Indian Air Force (IAF) finds itself in a crisis. There were clear deficiencies in its performance during the Mayo-particular conflict compared to its role in the wars of India with Pakistan in 1947-1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999.

IAF has a powerful power of 42 operating beds, but their actual capabilities have shrunk to 31 families at best due to the slow defense seizure in India. Worse, in recent months, at least three of the three combat aircraft in the British Jaguar in IAF have been shattered during training operations, including in an accident on July 9 that killed two pilots. Jaguars was inserted into IAF in 1979, and India is still dependent on them due to cost considerations and other obstacles.

IAF problems did not violate the comment from senior military officials. Noting a noticeable moment for its frankness, at an air exhibition every two years ago in Bangaluru in February, the Indian president of AP Singh assembled officials from Hindustan Air -owned state -owned (HAL) for what he described as their failure to deliver aircraft in a timely manner. Singh specifically expressed his frustration with the delays of purchases of the Tejas MK-1A.

The Tejas program arose in the eighties, but the first variable engine – the first to be developed locally in India – was unable to generate enough impetus and was abandoned. India has been forced to get the General Electric F404 an alternative, which still depends on the current Tejas models. Even today, another Tejas has not yet been subject to the required operational experiments before delivering them to IAF.

It is clear that Hal’s alleged lapses, which include design failures, delaying production, and questionable demands about making India self-sufficient to produce aircraft-test IAF patience. This was not always the case. In his early years, Hull worked with a German engineer to develop a faster fighter, HF-24; It also manufactured a fighter on a loudlyard with a license with the British Voland Airlines. Both planes proved their value during India’s wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.

What happened to Hal in the decisive years is still a puzzle, but it is clear that its dependence on government contracts, the lack of local competition, and the company’s reliance on licensed production of foreign aircraft, all of which contributed to its decline. Since IAF depends heavily on Hal, it finds itself less than the full aircraft supplement.

This is not the only obstacle to IAF. In addition to its advanced fleet in Jaguar-some countries on aircraft in museums-the Air Force is still flying Mig-21 in the Soviet era, which was scheduled to retire last year after 60 years of service. The Mig-21S, which is naively referred to as “Air Capture”, has seen 104 non-compact and 73 pilots in the past decade. IAF is now planning to plan it by December.

Another major problem that escapes from the Air Force – along with other military branches in India – a functional weapons purchase. Despite rapid economic growth, India still devotes less than 2.5 percent of GDP to defense. Even this number is misleading, although India has the fourth largest defensive budget in the world ($ 78.7 billion), but it spends an inconsistent amount of that on wages and pensions. This leaves little for the capital expenses that affect the need and update.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was ready to provide India with its most advanced weapons on the basis of a riding rupee trade at the price of the deal. Today, Russia is ready to provide India with advanced aircraft and weapons systems – but it does not provide fatal conditions. Although it depends on Russian spare parts for its arsenal in the Soviet era, India has sought to diversify the sources of weapons acquisitions in recent years. However, the exceptional costs of advanced weapons and modern combat aircraft are still a problem.

An example of this is India’s decision to obtain a French -built Dassault Rafale Combat plane in 2015. Although IAF operational requirements originally called for 126 combat aircraft, New Delhi bought only 36. India has also signed a deal this year to acquire 26 Dassault Rafales, which may connect a gap in terms of maritime aviation capacity but still serve as the Stopgap scale, and IAF in the process of obtaining 40 others.

Finally, political considerations and reservations also undermined India’s ability to maintain the advantage of the deadly air force. In 2016, Lockheed Martin offered the transfer of the F-16 production line from the United States to India-but the political leadership in New Delhi rejected the offer without little explanation. It is widely believed that the decision stems at least partly from India uncomfortable with the same combat aircraft that Pakistan was in its stock.

To save this offer was at least twoe. From a political point of view, India has lost a major opportunity to enhance its security partnership with the United States. It was also a strategic mistake: obtaining the F-16 production line would have strengthened the defense base in India.

All of these factors have brought IAF to their terrible state. In the face of non -explosive trivis – Pakistan as well as China – and the struggle with a group of local restrictions, IAF face demands that weaken its military edge in the foreseeable future. In the absence of major local security reforms, the Air Force faces an irreparable puzzle.