Iran and the Logic of Limited Wars – Foreign Policy

The Israeli air war against Iran has ended – the “Assad’s rise” – but the controversy surrounding the attacks live. One of the main questions is whether the American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordo, Natans, and Spohan, which was called the “midnight”, succeeded in blurring the buried Fordo site deeply or just unable to do it for a few months. Of course, the extent of damage to the Iranian nuclear program is important from a operating perspective. But the wider criticism-that the 12-day air campaign was somewhat fool because it may not have always destroyed the Iranian nuclear program-raising this point.

The RISING Lion operation was a limited war with limited means for a more limited period – all of which in turn means that the campaign’s goals were also limited. Therefore, the campaign must be judged against alternative strategies – compression in a longer and taller campaign or do not do anything military and adhere to diplomatic options. With this procedure, the process was successful.

The Israeli air war against Iran has ended – the “Assad’s rise” – but the controversy surrounding the attacks live. One of the main questions is whether the American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordo, Natans, and Spohan, which was called the “midnight”, succeeded in blurring the buried Fordo site deeply or just unable to do it for a few months. Of course, the extent of damage to the Iranian nuclear program is important from a operating perspective. But the wider criticism-that the 12-day air campaign was somewhat fool because it may not have always destroyed the Iranian nuclear program-raising this point.

The RISING Lion operation was a limited war with limited means for a more limited period – all of which in turn means that the campaign’s goals were also limited. Therefore, the campaign must be judged against alternative strategies – compression in a longer and taller campaign or do not do anything military and adhere to diplomatic options. With this procedure, the process was successful.

First of all the option of a longer war: there was definitely more goals in Iran when US president Donald Trump described the end of the war. Although the full public accounting of the effects of attacks will take time, the Israeli military claims that he spent nearly 1,000, or 40 percent to 50 percent of Iranian ballistic missiles; 250 (or nearly two -thirds) of the missile launchers in Iran were destroyed; Several dozens of senior Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists have been killed; The nuclear program was appointed again as “years”. In other words, even through the estimates of the Israeli army, the Iranian nuclear program is not demolished, most of its missiles are kept, and most of its military leaders are still not touching.

However, the question is whether the Israeli military operations have reached a point of decreasing returns. There is some evidence that this is the case. For beginners, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Israeli and the United States have caused severe damage to Iranian nuclear facilities in Asfahhan and Natanz. To the extent that the underground facilities such as those in Ford are partially sound, it is not immediately clear what Israel could do from the air raised by bombs worth 30,000 GBU-57 pounds “penetration of huge munitions.” After all, Israel lacks such weapons and strategic bombers to connect them.

While prolonging the air campaign is likely to enable Israel to target more Iranian missile capabilities and the Supreme Command, additional operational advantages must be judged for potential costs. Despite the suppression of Iranian missile launchers, Iran continues to kill more than twenty Israeli citizens, injured more than 3000, and caused damage to $ 3 billion. Through a mixture of skill and good wealth, Israel avoids the loss of any pilot over Iran, but with enough time and sorting, Israel would have been running out, which may hand over Iran a valuable bargaining segment in this process. While the Jewish Israelis were largely supporting the preventive war, the Americans were mixed with a direct role. This was a political dynamic, as Israel would be left without the supporter of the superpower.

Ultimately, it was the only way that Israel or the United States could have forced a possible end to the Iranian threat to change the system. There is no doubt that such a decision is not without appeal. For nearly half a century, the Iranian regime was killing the activity of the Americans and the Israelis with its employees, while “death to America” and “death to Israel” chanted. Only if anyone misses this point, it even set up the countdown hour to destroy Israel in the center of Tehran. But as the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have proven, changing the regime is always chaotic, and it can lead to unpredictable results, and requires a long -term commitment to doing properly. It is understood that Israel or the United States felt in particular to make the regime change the goal of the war.

At the same time, it was not the second alternative – which does not believe Iran but left the diplomacy and the sanctions that manage its path – was not more attractive than the first. Despite the Iranian protests that are not interested in nuclear weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency noted that Iran was enricating uranium after the point for good uses. If anything, the Iranian program was accelerating before the strike. According to the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has raised its inventory of uranium near the bomb by about 50 percent from February to May alone. Moreover, if Iran is really a benign intention only, then its nuclear positions will be surrounded by air defense or the burial of facilities in the depths of the Earth. For example, the Fordow enriching facility is designed about 80 to 90 meters in the mountain.

It is recognized that there is an active debate about Iran’s proximity to a bomb before the war. Both Israel and IAEA estimated that Iran could have produced enough enriched uranium for 15 bombs within weeks. Facing the American assessments that affected uranium alone is not enough for a surrender device. It can take up to three years old bomb.

But it should be noted that the estimation of the nuclear collapse is difficult, and the United States has been surprised before. During the first Gulf War in 1991, for example, the United States was surprised by the progress of the Iraqi nuclear program – and was surprised again not to progress during the second Gulf War. The United States has not accurately predicted the extent and speed of nuclear and missile programs in North Korea, and it has reduced the speed of China’s nuclear accumulation.

Nevertheless, though, it is not important if Iran is several weeks or several years away from the bomb. There is little evidence that diplomacy and economic coercion would have forced Iran to end its nuclear program in the absence of military pressure. The “maximum pressure” campaign raised the first Trump administration a lot of economic pain on the Iranian population, but it failed to change Iran’s nuclear position. This is not surprising, because economic sanctions have a busy record in forcing countries to abandon basic security concerns, such as nuclear weapons. There is not much indicating that the similar economic pressure will be more successful.

There was no diplomatic solution in the future. After all, the Trump administration tried to mediate in a new deal shortly after reaching his position. According to press reports, the table had no similar deal to the joint comprehensive work plan – the Iranian nuclear deal of the Obama era. This deal had a set of restrictions – including sunset rulings, the lack of any restrictions on the Iranian missile program (the potential delivery mechanism of the bomb), and the failure to address the agent network in Tehran. Even this deal has proven a bridge away from the Iranian regime.

The unpleasant reality is that there was no diplomatic or economic option that is applicable to reduce Iran before the Israeli military action. Given Iran’s past willingness to attack Israel’s nuclear armed and American origins in the region, nuclear armed Iran, even less deterrent, was unaccounted for Israel and the Trump administration. Even the deduction of the actions of Iranian agents, Iran struck direct rules Host us Forces in Iraq with rockets in 2020, after the United States was killed by a senior leader. Recently, Israel struck with a barrage of missiles and drones in April 2024, then another sulfo in October 2024, and expanding the Middle East war that followed the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, on Israel. One can hope that Iran will be more restricted by Trump’s nuclear card, but there is nothing that guarantees this is the case.

If it is a longer and longer war of risks and is not likely to be catastrophic, then insurance is virtually, we are left with a limited war resolved for the deterioration of the Iranian nuclear program and the purchase of time to change conditions. In the case of Israel, this strategy tried twice before – the depletion of the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the Syrian Kibar reactor in 2007. Both strikes proved success, at least as much as each of them bought enough time to allow other geopolitical activities that reveal the ban of Iraq and Siria of the nucleus. But the Iranian program was more advanced in the time of the attacks, so it does not in any way confirm that Israeli and the United States will lead to similar results. At least, the war may have bought Israel and the timing of the United States.

But more importantly, limited wars can determine the way for diplomacy. The Nobel Prize -winning economist, Thomas Sheling, also pointed out that violence could be a form of diplomacy. Power is a tangible measure of strength and one side solution for the opponent. Within weeks, Israel and the United States proved that they have the power and willingness to strip Iran of its nuclear capabilities. These countries should give power bargaining for a nuclear agreement in the future, especially because they indicated that they will strike Iran again “undoubtedly” if their program is re -operated. Whether this leverage is ultimately turning into a new nuclear deal-an improved version of Obama’s era-is seen, but the RISING Lion process re-setting the diplomatic stadium. This is in itself a great success.

It appears that after years of complaint about “endless wars” in the Middle East, some of the same voices are now complaining about their fight for 12 days. But he refers to the broader need to re -learn the logic of limited wars and what they can and cannot achieve it reasonably. In itself, they rarely provide a permanent solution, but they can buy time, transform geopolitical dynamics, thus paving the way to something more permanent. To really obtain the issues of national burnt security – such as the Iranian nuclear program – it is possible that it can be the best that it can hope for.