Iran’s Foreign Policy Is Pivoting to China

When Ayatollah Ali Khawni, the supreme leader of Iran, spoke at an event in late August, and he refused calls for direct talks with Washington as “superficial” and declared the conflict with the United States “unsuccessful”. He said that the real American goal is to make Iran “obedient” – insulting the Iranians will resist “with all their strength.”

Khamnai’s words, although they are influential and leaders, are only a single grain of post -war policy in Iran. In Tehran, the competing factions rushed forward with data and proposals on how the country responded to destruction: thousands of losses, shattered defenses, and a badly damaged nuclear program but not destroyed.

When Ayatollah Ali Khawni, the supreme leader of Iran, spoke at an event in late August, and he refused calls for direct talks with Washington as “superficial” and declared the conflict with the United States “unsuccessful”. He said that the real American goal is to make Iran “obedient” – insulting the Iranians will resist “with all their strength.”

Khamnai’s words, although they are influential and leaders, are only a single grain of post -war policy in Iran. In Tehran, the competing factions rushed forward with data and proposals on how the country responded to destruction: thousands of losses, shattered defenses, and a badly damaged nuclear program but not destroyed.

Under the hustle and lies a deeper question: What is the real option that Washington has provided Iran out of pressure and hostility? From this internal Iranian debate, an initial field ground appeared – Iran is moving further than any hope of exploring with the United States and Europe and closer to a more fundamental axis towards China.

In this unstable political scene, the Reform Front – the alliance of Iranian reformist parties – appeared as a pivotal dialectical point. With the presence of roots in the movement that carried Muhammad Khatami to the presidency in 1997, it called for democratic change for a long time at home and improving relations with the West. Despite the years of repression, it is still influential, after Masoud Bzshkian supported the presidential elections last year after the death of conservatives Ibhama Rizi in a helicopter accident. On this background, the “National Reconciliation” statement of the Reform Front fell unusual with an extraordinary force: He called for the issuance of political prisoners, government media reform, restoring the confidence of the public, and – in most cases – the suspension of uranium enrichment in a Khaled in exchange for full sanctions.

The immediate reaction was immediate. The steel line outlets described the naive statement, “surrender”, until betrayal. Abdullah Ganji, the pioneering conservative journalist, described it as a “joint intersection” with US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in refusing to enrich. Mahdi Mohammadi, adviser to parliament Speaker Mohamed Prague, went further, and led him as a “historic betrayal” and “a statement of the army of the Israeli regime.” Such a letter was just asking for opposition, but to criminalize the idea of ​​settlement to enriching uranium.

Criticism was not limited to militants. PEZSHKIAN government – despite the correctional background of the president – distanced directly from the statement. Promise and prominent reform characters did the same. Mohamed Reda Galipur, the increasing sociologist and political voice that works as a deputy at the President’s Strategic Affairs Office, argued that the text has reduced Iran’s options to “surrender or war”, warning that complete surrender to enrichment will not protect the country from future attacks “itself.”

However, the reverse reaction to the reformist statement was just one side of the changing scene. Through the spectrum, political numbers are a maneuver, and the official institutions are subject to deeper operations, indicating a broader re -calibration of the post -war policy in Iran. Former President Hassan Rouhani has re -implicit criticism of the revolutionary guards and the trustee council – the non -elected body of his position candidates – “We must return the armed forces to their fundamental duties. The economy is not the work of the armed forces.” However, this call for local reform was linked to Sharp’s reprimand in Washington and Europe, on the pretext that they have repeatedly demonstrated and repeated negotiating partners.

Also on the institutional level, change takes place. Ali Larijani, the former Speaker of Parliament, was appointed twice from running for the presidency, as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and the chief decision -making body in Iran for foreign and defense policy. Inside it, the new “Defense Council”-the first since the Iran-Iraq war was established from 1980 to 1980-until Tehran is not only limited to digesting the past conflict lessons, but also preparing actively for the other.

These maneuvers and reorganization are revealed against an extraordinary uncertainty about what Washington already wants from Iran. Since he started his second term, Trump launched a barrage of contradictions: calling for negotiations without clear basic lines and then joining the Israeli war against Iran; Issuing TEHRAN’s evacuation orders one day and indicating the cancellation of the escalation the next day; Requesting “unconditional surrender”, only to search later on the ceasefire after the boasting that the Iranian nuclear program had been blocked. In the face of such volatility, Tehran’s leadership has not seen a major reason for changing its long -term position.

The official line remains significantly: Iran insists on its right to enrich and refuse to negotiate non -nuclear issues. Senior officials, from Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, have repeatedly reported that Tehran would not accept any deal that requires her to abandon the entire enrichment. Meanwhile, hints of flexibility remain with the Deputy Foreign Minister recently reaffirming the long -term Iranian position as “it can be flexible on the capabilities and boundaries of enrichment.” But as Larijani said in a publication on September 2 on X, while “the path of negotiations with the United States is not closed,” the demands such as missile restrictions “negate any talks” only.

Despite all this, there is no evidence that Iran is wandering in a bomb. Instead, its nuclear program is now full of mystery, with no international control over damaged installations or vision in its uranium and central expulsion stocks. Iranian analysts frame this outstanding as a strategic origin, which enhances deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold. Since the most crucial transformation is revealed, however, it is in the long -term strategic orientation of Iran. While the company’s Tehran holds the company to the bottom of the enrichment and missiles, the Tehran is now more decisive towards the non-Western powers-well in all China-where this partnership is clarified as the cornerstone of the post-war path.

Unlike a lot of Western analysis, Iran has not fully decided China – even after Trump exited 2018 from the nuclear deal. As the governor FARHIKHTEGAN The newspaper recently noted that Tehran has long dealt with Beijing as a reserve, as it abandons the main proposals whenever transient openings arise with the West. The paper confirms that Xi Jinping offered an investment package of $ 40 billion in 2016, but it was not anywhere, while the 25 -year -old cooperation map, which lasted, remained largely symbolic, because the Iranian initiative was not found.

In fact, in the brief window of the penal relief after the 2015 nuclear agreement, Tehran handed over profitable contracts for Western companies such as Total, Airbus and Boeing – Chinese companies. Hussein Qahiri, head of Iranian strategic studies and intellectual strategic studies, also acknowledged: “Repeated and repeatedly, for short-term gains, we abandoned China-and the Chinese repeatedly said that they have no strategic confidence in Iran.”

The effects of the war and “Snapback” for the United Nations sanctions of Tehran have forced to rethink its approach: if it wants China to invest in infrastructure and defense, it must begin to act like a real long -term partner, and not only the shift to Beijing in times of crisis. Even many reformists now repeat this opinion. For example, Jalaeipour argued, while pressing for broader democratic reforms at home, similarly that Iran should show consistency and reliability if it expects China to invest on a large scale.

The message put the Scheghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, which has provided the strongest index so far to a decisive axis towards Beijing. For Tehran, the timing was crucial. She is still suffering from a 12 -day war and is facing Snapback sanctions, as it has gained a rare diplomatic cover as SCO leaders condemned US -Israeli strikes. At the same time, Araghchi joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts in a common message to the United Nations and Snapback rejected the legal and political aspects of the political.

Pezeshkian also used the summit to publicly compatible with Beijing’s agenda, with the hands of calls for global governance reform, abolition of inhibition, and new crises response mechanisms during the dumping of Shabhar, the Iranian Indian Ocean port, as Linchpin to connect China with Central Asia and beyond. In Beijing, Xi pledged respect for Iranian nuclear rights, sovereignty and dignity, and the two sides agreed on the “maximum implementation” of their 25 -year agreement. Most of them were the Beijing Given Children: Point Iran – but not the United States, most Europe, Israel, or some Gulf states – to the military procession “The Day of Victory” in World War II, which indicates the location of Tehran in the multi -floors of Chinese regime. Aragici said, “The president’s journey to China as one of the most important in our history will decrease,” Aragici said.

On this background, the statements of the August Cyt also carried a remarkable support for Buschakian. He urged the Iranians to “support the country’s slaves, support the president”, describing him as “diligent, diligent, and continuous.” In the aftermath of the war, this message of unity aims to present a consensus at the top. For Washington and Europe, it represents a turning point. Continuing to pressure and conflict risk Iran to the orbit of China and deepening its nuclear challenge. The alternative is to test whether dangerous incentives can withdraw Tehran again towards a more balanced cycle and create space for the renewal of participation.