Israel and Syria Should Prioritize Security Cooperation Over Peace Deal

“I want to swim in Lake Tiberia,” then the Syrian leader, Hafez al -Assad, told US President Bill Clinton in March 2000, months before his death. It was an amazing observation during the final extending of the Israeli clinical peace talks-which were listening to optimism in Washington and Jerusalem. Israel had indicated the willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights, which is the strategic plateau that seized it in 1967, but it was allowing to reach the Lake Tiberia (also known as Bahr al -Galil). In the end, the talks collapsed.

Now, US President Donald Trump has chosen as Clinton stopped, and Syria and Israel have pushed peace negotiations. However, this time, the lion is not on the table; Ahmed Al -Shara, the former leader whose forces overthrew Bashar al -Assad in December 2024.

“I want to swim in Lake Tiberia,” then the Syrian leader, Hafez al -Assad, told US President Bill Clinton in March 2000, months before his death. It was an amazing observation during the final extending of the Israeli clinical peace talks-which were listening to optimism in Washington and Jerusalem. Israel had indicated the willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights, which is the strategic plateau that seized it in 1967, but it was allowing to reach the Lake Tiberia (also known as Bahr al -Galil). In the end, the talks collapsed.

Now, US President Donald Trump has chosen as Clinton stopped, and Syria and Israel have pushed peace negotiations. However, this time, the lion is not on the table; Ahmed Al -Shara, the former leader whose forces overthrew Bashar al -Assad in December 2024.

But despite the change in driving, peace making will not be easy. In fact, it may not be possible. Fortunately, this does not exclude limited forms of security cooperation. Today, Syria and Israel can find a joint ground in the face of common threats – especially Hezbollah and other Iranian agents who work near their borders. The negotiations that give priority to these modest goals will be more likely to achieve concrete results.

The structural facts that governed previous negotiations remain in place and only worsened through new challenges. For the Israelis, led by Hamas on October 7, 2023, the massacre hardening the national consensus against the abdication of any strategic area. For Syrians, the waiver of the loss of the Golan – which was presented as a symbol of national dignity – cannot be visible politically.

Fifty-eight years after Syria lost the Golan Heights, it is still engraved in the national soul-not as a sector of the land but as a symbol of loss and identity. For many Syrians, the Golan is a wound that is how they see their country. The Syrian curricula framing the Golan historically as a “Syrian -Arab land” that Israel seized, while teachers portrayed concepts such as Israel’s resistance as a noble act. The textbooks were identified in the twelfth grade until modern jihad through the lens of the resistance in the Golan, where the struggle was delivered to restore this as a sacred duty.

The Golan is the most obvious obstacle – but it is not the only one. Shara governs a country that is still reeling from the civil war, with fragile institutions and skeptical audience. Israel was already unpopular in Syria, and recent events exacerbated the situation. After the fall of the Assad regime, Israel launched an air and land campaign to destroy the military infrastructure of Assad and sent the forces to southern Syria, and occupied locations inside the descending area after the Israeli war in 1973. The ordinary Syrians also witnessed pictures of the Gaza war that plays on television for the year and a half, which increased the complexity of Shara’s ability to follow any negotiations.

On this background, even symbolic gestures towards the reaction of peace risks from citizens and jihadist groups alike. As a result, the obstacles facing the Israeli Normalization Agreement Syria outweigh the incentives of Shara.

Even if Shara is ready to settle on the Golan and follow the peace treaty against incentives – such as expanded sanctions on relief or guaranteed foreign investment – a broken state challenges its ability to connect a deal.

This stands in a flagrant contradiction with the relative force of other regimes that made peace with Israel. Anwar Sadat and King Hussein in Egypt were not only able to sign peace agreements, but to ensure their continuation. Yaqoub Abadi from the American Air Force Academy also noted, “in order to suppress the opposition of the separate treaty … the king [Hussein] I had to take the personal initiative in the campaign and show the Jordanian public that this was “the peace of the king.” Likewise, Sadat used over 1981 to neutralize the opposition against Camp David agreements.

Shara was not, compared to power for only six months, and while the majority of Syria rules, there is still a lot out of his will. It does not have institutional depth or forced ability to apply such a controversial decision. Post -Assad institutions in Syria are still fragile, and his ruling alliance includes factions, although currently sincere, it can oppose him if he moves towards normalization with Israel.

Some of the foreign fighters who helped Shara the lion fire already turned against him. Their anger is not only from his refusal to impose strict Islamic law, but also allegations that he cooperated with the United States to target extremist factions. These fighters, many of whom have a rigid ideological beliefs, have condemned the new SR government as “non -Islamic” and criticized its communication with Western officials. In addition to this tension, he praised the numbers within his own collection, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS)-including Mazhar Valley, Minister of Justice in Shara-publicly to the October 7 massacre and referred to Hamas fighters as “stretched from justice and Jihad.” HTS’s political office also announced its firm support for “the Palestinian people to restore their lands.” While these statements were made before the authority officially took over, they indicate that the main members of the SR government are still very hostile to Israel and could hinder any attempt to reach a deal.

When all these factors are weighted, a complete peace agreement between Israel and Syria is now far. This is why the United States should mediate within the first security framework that reduces tensions and builds confidence. He should also avoid the pushing of Shara to political concessions.

Indeed, Syrian officials have sought to alleviate Israel’s concerns about the new leadership. “He will not seek any conflict, whether with Israel or anyone else, and we will not allow Syria as a base for such a fight.” The ruler of Damascus, Maher Marwan, also indicated that the new administration does not fear Israel and does not want its security at risk.

Negotiations should rely on this to pay more security measures. As a first step, Damascus should be asked to expel all Palestinian factions and leaders who have worked on Syrian soil for the days of Haviz Assad and seizing the property they collected. Until now, Damascus has only created a monitoring mechanism and targeted a selective supporting Palestinian groups.

Second, Syria must coordinate with Israel to dismantle the militias backed by the Merseuled Iran in the south, such as the so -called Islamic Resistance Front in Syria.

Most importantly, there is room for intelligence cooperation against Hezbollah. Despite the fall of the Assad regime, Hezbollah may still try to use Syria as an arms corridor from Iran to Lebanon. With Israel’s intelligence capabilities and Syria’s goal of curbing Hezbollah’s activities in its territory, both sides have a common attention in closing this supply line.

In the end, the normalization deal is wide between Syria and Israel-on the model of Ibrahim’s unrealistic agreements in the short term and should not be transferred. Pressing a quick penetration can bring in reverse results and overwhelming purchase, which prompted him to completely abandon the process. Instead, Washington must slow a gradual approach.

At the same time, the United States should reassure Israel that these initial steps are not in itself but rather a path towards complete normalization – a goal that Israeli officials have affirmed in recent weeks. For Sharaa, it provides a slower pace for a larger breathing space. He realizes that rushing into the process can destabilize his fragile grip on power. However, if you are given time to prove stability, the possibility that Shar and Syrians adopt normalization.