The Deep Roots of Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Violence – Foreign Policy

Welcome to Foreign policySouth Asia Brief.

Highlights this week: Afghanistan and Pakistan Reaching a fragile ceasefire after a deadly wave of violence on the border, India’s imports of Russian oil It remains a sticking point for US President Donald Trump, and India is close to officially reopening Embassy in Kabul.

Afghanistan and Pakistan do not agree on their borders

Afghanistan and Pakistan reached a ceasefire agreement on Sunday, ending more than a week of fighting between the two countries, following talks mediated by Qatar and Turkey.

The violence has been the worst between the two countries since the Taliban returned to power in 2021: Pakistani counter-terrorism strikes and Afghan retaliation against Pakistani forces on the border have left dozens of people dead. Afghanistan says Pakistani raids killed civilians, including three cricketers, while Islamabad says it only targeted militants.

From Pakistan’s perspective, the good news about the ceasefire was quickly spoiled by a related announcement: the Qatari government, perhaps under pressure from the Taliban, revised its general statement on the truce to remove reference to a reduction in tensions on the Afghan-Pakistani border.

This was not just a grammatical modification, but rather exploited the profound differences between the two countries’ interpretations of their rugged border, known as the Durand Line. To be sure, cross-border terrorism has long been the direct cause of tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the recent crisis. But it is important not to overlook the issue of borders themselves, which is arguably more complex.

The Durand Line was drawn in 1893, after negotiations between Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of British colonial India, and Abdul Rahman Khan, the Afghan leader appointed by Britain after its brief occupation of Afghanistan. The line represented the border between Afghanistan and India. After the partition of India in 1947, the partition was between Afghanistan and the new state of Pakistan.

Pakistan has long accepted the border, as has the international community. However, no Afghan government – including the current Taliban regime – recognized the matter as such, and dismissed it as a decision imposed on the Afghans by the British. In recent years, this difference has manifested itself in various ways, from Afghan militants attacking Pakistani soldiers working on the border fence, to Pakistani concerns about irredentism.

The Durand Line also divides ethnic Pashtun communities, and has inspired movements for the independence of “Pashtunistan” – which Pakistani officials and some researchers say are sponsored by Afghan intelligence. Today, many Afghans still claim Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. (This is one reason why the Pakistani security establishment does not trust Pashtun rights activists, even as they focus on discrimination, state-sponsored violence, and internal grievances.)

The ceasefire may not hold. The Taliban never turns against its closest militant allies, even under pressure. Among those groups is the Pakistani Taliban, which has intensified its attacks on Pakistan from its bases in Afghanistan. If the Pakistani Taliban and other terrorist groups based across the border continue to strike Pakistani security forces, they will likely not hesitate to carry out new attacks.

The border issue exacerbates this challenge, generating deep mistrust that will make it more difficult to reach understandings between Afghanistan and Pakistan on other sensitive issues, including cross-border terrorism.

In addition, eradicating terrorism will not resolve the border dispute, a worrying reality for both countries. The inevitability of bilateral tension in the long term would undermine Afghanistan’s economic interests; Pakistan is a major source of employment, education and healthcare. Meanwhile, Islamabad will continue to face a triple border challenge: Afghanistan to the northwest, India to the east, and Iran to the west.

What we follow

Trump says India will cut off Russian oil. Last week, US President Donald Trump said that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi informed him that India would stop importing Russian oil. New Delhi quickly indicated – very diplomatically – that the two leaders had not spoken. But on Tuesday, Trump called Modi to extend his Diwali greetings, and said afterwards that the Indian leader had assured him that the country “won’t buy a lot of oil from Russia.”

If true, this represents a major development for a major source of tensions between the United States and India. In August, the Trump administration imposed a 25% tariff on India in response to its continued imports of Russian oil. However, Trump’s claims are questionable: a sudden halt to New Delhi’s energy imports would be too much to believe.

India stopped imports of Iranian oil several years ago to avoid the risks of US sanctions, but Tehran is not as close a friend of New Delhi as Moscow. India also had immediate alternative suppliers to Iran (including Saudi Arabia); It would likely be more willing to reduce its imports of Russian oil if it could find an alternative at the right price point.

It is also possible that New Delhi will offer to cut some imports as a bargaining tactic in trade talks with Washington, as some Indian reports suggest. Either way, the two leaders may soon have the opportunity to discuss the matter in person: Trump is expected to attend an ASEAN summit in Malaysia next week, and Modi will likely be there as well.

To learn more about the ASEAN summit and the world leaders who may meet on its sidelines, read this week’s article Southeast Asia Brief From Jakarta-based Joseph Rachman.

India is close to reopening its embassy in Kabul. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced on Tuesday that its technical mission in Kabul had been upgraded to that of an embassy “with immediate effect.” This means New Delhi is close to officially reopening its embassy, ​​which was officially closed when the Taliban returned to power in 2021.

Since June 2022, the facility has been used to maintain a small technical team focused on humanitarian aid and consular assistance. India’s decision to reopen the embassy was one of the major outcomes of Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Mottaki’s week-long visit to India which concluded last Thursday.

That India moved so quickly to implement change demonstrates how keen it is to continue to intensify engagement with the Taliban. New Delhi will soon appoint a chargé d’affaires to head the embassy, ​​with an official ambassador to be appointed at a later time. However, India has not indicated that it has any plans to formally recognize the Taliban government.

Prime Minister of Nepal hosts an inter-party meeting. Last Tuesday, Nepal’s interim Prime Minister Sushila Karki hosted a meeting on the country’s March elections with leaders of a group of parties in the now-defunct House of Representatives. Little information has been published about this meeting, although it bodes well for the country’s immediate political future.

Nepal has been experiencing instability since anti-corruption protests last month ousted Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Karki will assume the position of Prime Minister until the elections are held. Its holding of the talks indicates a desire to ensure political consensus around the elections and reduce the risk of further instability.

The move also appears to reflect an attempt to avoid the more turbulent path taken by Bangladesh, where a mass movement ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. There, the interim government took a year to decide on elections, now scheduled for February — and politics remains polarized.

FP Most Read This Week

Under the radar

This month, the US State Department reissued a travel advisory for the Maldives, urging travelers to be aware of the risks of terrorism. The travel advisory level remains unchanged at Level 2 (heightened caution), and it is not clear whether the new information has prompted the US to reissue the warning or whether it is just a routine reminder.

Level 2 is relatively moderate for South Asia. Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan are currently at Level 3, and Afghanistan is at Level 4. However, given the Maldives’ fragile economy and its heavy reliance on tourism revenues, the new warning will not go unnoticed by officials in Male.

The Maldives has faced some terrorist challenges, including its status as a major recruitment center for the Islamic State. Last year, Israel issued its own travel advisory for the Maldives, citing specific threats and hostility toward Israeli tourists. However, in April, the Maldives announced a ban on Israeli passport holders visiting the country in response to Israel’s belligerent behavior in Gaza.