Trump’s aggressive push to roll back globalisation

In 1987, Donald Trump obtained a declaration of all pages in the New York Times and other complaints of how to accumulate the global system against the United States.
In an open speech that still defines his view of the world, the 41 -year -old real estate developer objected to the impact of the strong dollar on manufacturing, trade surplus in Japan and the cost of military aid to the allies. “End our tremendous deficit, reduce our taxes, and let our economy grow,” he wrote.
Nearly four decades and his popular victory encouraged him to vote in the November elections, Trump feels that in a position he finally allowed to enact this agenda and try to reflect the course of economic history.
Despite all the absurdity of the “Liberation Day” speech in Trump – from the giant blue cards that define the new definitions to a fake formula that is scattered with the Greek letters that were used to justify the numbers – the advertisement is a distillation of the basic motives for the long -time trade.
The extent of rupture cannot be exaggerated: Trump wants to relax on a multi -contract process of integrating the global economy.
For a large part of the rest of the world, America’s global trading system helped to become the most prosperous and successful nation in history. But for Trump, the United States is a victim.
Over the past five decades, as the president claimed on Wednesday in the garden of roses, his country “was looted, looted, raped and looted” by both friends and enemies. “Now our role is to prosper.”
Some investors were working on the assumption that Trump was deceiving the definitions. But since Thursday, the markets have witnessed a fierce sale, which is driven by the risk of reckless American economic policies that drive the economy to recession and shed global growth.
“It seems to be panic in the old market,” said Andrew Biz, the chief investment strategy in Russell Investments, on Friday, as global shares drop for the second consecutive day.
The tariff announced by the Trump attack on Wednesday – if it is fully enact – in some respects, the global trading system dates back to a century or more, which pushes the average effective tariff for American imports to its highest rate since 1909 according to the budget laboratory, a research organization.
Reza was replaced by Trump’s plans with a series of urgent questions. What kind of global economy does Trump really want to see? Is there a real plan that exceeds the bomb and the victim’s speech? Will it retreat? How dangerous is the global economic and political consequences of views?

Trump’s anger often focuses on the rapid globalization period that started in the late 1980s, and was driven by China’s joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. It seems that he wants to restore the United States to a kind of economic first he enjoyed during his childhood in the fifties, before Germany, Japan or later, China began to seriously put America in the world’s health.
But Gary Richardson, a professor of economic history at the University of California at Irvin, says that the policies that Trump defended on Wednesday carries more similar aspects with those in America in the nineteenth century, when customs duties instead of income taxes were the main source of government revenue.
Others are similar to the threat that now hangs over the global economy until the 1930s, when the SMOOT-HWLYY definitions in the United States were similar to a series of international revenge reaction, and often blames depression.
In some respects, the current risks can be greater. Trade is not only more important than it was in the 1930s, but the global economy today is based on complex supply chains that see goods and parts flow through multiple limits-and each is a framework for international cooperation rejected by Trump.
“It is just a huge gambling, and historical measurement indicates that things may really go well,” says Richardson, a specialist in the history of depression and federal reserve. “It is a scary type.”
In his assault on globalizationTrump was pushing on a door that was already a rent. The loss of manufacturing functions against Mexico, China and other less developed countries and the global financial crisis has affected the public in the public in the economic Orthodoxy after the war.
China also turned political opinion. If Beijing was a counter -opponent of Washington, it may be logical that the United States would seek to slow Chinese economic growth – a policy that he passed passionately during the years of former President Joe Biden at the White House.


Trump merged this dissatisfaction with his trade with his psychology. The era of globalization has been defined by the idea of winning Palin-that both sides can benefit from the settlement. But Trump, who is formed through his experience as a real estate developer that provides bids for the land of the Earth, believes that there can be no one winner except in negotiation. He is proud of himself in retreating or showing weakness.
“We are witnessing a mixture of real commercial experiences, shocking ignorance of how the global economy works, and the inception in planning and implementing economic policy,” says Michael Street of the Conservative American Projects Institute.
If there is a unified theory of the issue behind the Trump tariff, parts of it can be found in a wide reading paper from last November by Stephen Miran, and now the chairman of the Economic Advisers in Trump, which determines how definitions can be used to enhance American manufacturing.
An accurate Miran argument, admitting that there is a little possibility to restore jobs in low -value added industries such as textiles. But he believes that the customs tariff can bring advantages of advanced manufacturing in the United States and can prevent more purchase.
He also talks about the need to avoid the customs tariff that is already paying a strong dollar and undermining the American competitiveness, assuming ideas for coinciding with allies to cooperate on the widespread currency policy.

Trump himself was mysterious about the type of jobs he really believed to be returned to the country, despite accidental comments about the importance of steel or cars. Since most economists rushed to reference this week, there are countless problems in the Trump team’s arguments.
The declared goals are often contradictory. Sometimes, customs duties are offered as a tool for reshaping the economy and re -manufacturing, but in other cases it is a way to obtain a diplomatic crane. The economic target of definitions can be to increase revenues from imports or it can be reduced imports by increasing local production – but both cannot be.
It seems that the White House’s strategy reduces the vital role in which foreign products work as American industrialization inputs, although Trump’s decision to exempt Mexico and Canada from the 10 percent foundation tariffs on board indicates some of the late recognition of this reality.
Trump’s speech also ignored the services sector, which constitutes about 70 percent of the American economy. Many customs tariffs contradict the priorities of national security: for example the United States wants to challenge China, but wanders in Japan, a major ally, with 24 percent tax.
The terrifying problem for global investors It is the risk of having a race similar to the thirties of the last century to establish barriers that disturb the stability of the global economy and undermine global cooperation.
On Wednesday, Trump presented a review point of view of that period, and suggested a new argument that depression could never have occurred if the United States remained in place in a system based on customs tariffs instead of switching decades ago to income tax.


Scott Beesen, the US Treasury Secretary, seemed to recognize the dangers of revenge on the definitions, and urged countries to “sit, take them, and let us see how things go.”
Stepter argues that Trump has left a way to alleviate the customs tariff, as the foundation tax is likely to be 10 percent permanent while the administration deals with the additional elements, which are scheduled to enter on April 9. Trump suggested that he is open to cut the customs tariff to return to “phenomenon” offers.
China announced 34 percent special definitions on American goods on Friday. However, the initial response to the European Union and the United Kingdom was the refusal of immediate revenge, in the hope that Trump was convinced of the reduction of measures.
This may be available. This is also the administration in a short period of time, on its way to restore the main commercial partners-from Trump’s threats to the annexation of Canada and Greenland to Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference, when he accused European leaders of entering democracy and freedom of expression.

While Trump seems less than opposite movements in the financial markets from his first term, the White House will find it difficult to ignore the investor’s revolution against his policies. The recession warnings began in relapses in recent days, as the potential lamp economists digested in the US tariff rate to about 22 percent, from only 2.5 percent last year.
History indicates that once it is imposed, it is difficult to remove on customs tariffs. Trump’s ads are a “clean break with commercial policy in the last 60 years or more … We have returned to the environment between the two wars [of protectionism]”This can lead to the decline in other countries,” says Chris Mitchner, a professor at the University of Santa Clara.
Economists warn of commercial conflicts such as those in the 1930s, can be very risky, not only for economies but to lead a broader collapse in cooperation that affects large areas of international politics.
Kirsten Wandchnider, an economic historian at the University of Vienna, who argues that the United States has suffered more than it was believed by the boycott, shares and definitions of other countries that have been in response to Smoot-Hawley measures, “The Trade War is expensive.” “Revenge is something that should not be reduced.”
Richardson, a historian of depression, warns that serious conflicts over trade can leak into a wider global policy, which enhances tensions that can lead to wars. “We can see a decrease in international cooperation through many dimensions,” he says.
“There are many other things that can be released from bars.”
Additional reports by Ian Smith in London
2025-04-04 17:46:00