Netanyahu’s Policies Since Oct. 7 Risk Ties With Egypt

Hamas’s sudden attack on October 7, 2023, began in a new era of instability of Israel’s regional relations. While international attention focused on Gaza itself, the final tremors extended beyond its borders. This is especially true for Egypt, the most important Arab neighbors in Israel and a decisive partner since the signing of the Camp David agreement in 1978-1979.

Within almost two years since the start of the Israel-Huslas war, Israeli decisions have strained bilateral relations with Cairo. This growing friction is not only limited to strengthening the regional security of Israel, but also undermines its broader strategic location in the Middle East. On the eve of its expected military action in Gaza City, Israel must re -calibrate its approach in Egypt before causing permanent, but careful, but careful peace.

Hamas’s sudden attack on October 7, 2023, began in a new era of instability of Israel’s regional relations. While international attention focused on Gaza itself, the final tremors extended beyond its borders. This is especially true for Egypt, the most important Arab neighbors in Israel and a decisive partner since the signing of the Camp David agreement in 1978-1979.

Within almost two years since the start of the Israel-Huslas war, Israeli decisions have strained bilateral relations with Cairo. This growing friction is not only limited to strengthening the regional security of Israel, but also undermines its broader strategic location in the Middle East. On the eve of its expected military action in Gaza City, Israel must re -calibrate its approach in Egypt before causing permanent, but careful, but careful peace.

Since the beginning of the war, Egypt has seen an Israeli invasion of Gaza a direct threat to its national security. The repeated Israeli efforts – sometimes veiled, and sometimes explicit – to pressure Cairo to accept the Palestinians from Gaza to Sinai, were constantly met with Egyptian resistance. Egyptian president Abdel Fahia Al -Sisi, who is not shared by Hamas, explained that participating in the forced displacement of Palestinian refugees will constitute a red line, nourish local instability and undermine Egypt’s long demand to defend Palestinian rights.

Egypt also tried to build consensus in the Arab world about the “day after” plans as an alternative to Gaza that would enable the Palestinian technocratic administration. Consequently, the continuous promotion of Israel for “volunteer immigration” was explained by the “Riviera” plan in the Trump administration in Cairo, in Cairo not simply deaf, but also a intentional provocation that threatens the stability of the regime. It is not a coincidence that Sisi has not yet visited the White House during the second period of Trump.

The war also came at a very cost to Egypt. Tourism has suffered while the Houthi attacks have re -directed global shipping corridors away from the Suez Canal, another source of critical to Cairo. There was also a periodic suspension of Israeli natural gas flow. These people have harmed the arrival of Egypt to the foreign currency, the amplification of chronic issues of inflation, thus expanding the financial gaps in the country and exacerbating excessive dependence on international loans.

In addition to these current challenges, Egypt is also concerned about the economic impact of the economic corridor in India and the proposed Mediterranean, which-through creating alternative regional trade routes across Israel and Jordan-can leave Egypt high and dry.

The military acquisition of Israel at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza in May 2024 and its continuous operations along the Philadelphi Corridor created some severe crises in relations in decades. From Cairo’s point of view, these moves violated elements of Camp David that are compatible with Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai. Egypt responded by closing the Rafah crossing, stopping cooperation on aid flows, and hardening its speech towards Israel. During this period, American mediation was extremely important in enabling the continuous flow of assistance and ensuring that Israeli and Egyptian officials maintained communication lines.

Recently, while he was in the direction of a large -scale military operation in Gaza City, Israel has hinted to threaten its economic relationship with Egypt as a way to secure cooperation from Cairo. According to what was stated, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Energy Minister Elie Cohen intends to study the $ 35 billion natural gas agreement with Egypt by partners participating in the gas field in the Mediterranean (including American Sipran Chevron). according to Israel HayoumThis happened “against the background of reports in the media that Egypt violates the peace agreement with Israel.” These statements reflect a wider direction for senior Israeli officials who are increasingly doubts about Egypt’s reliability as a partner and its commitment to Camp David’s approval.

These measures are risked by sending Israel’s relations already with Egypt to a full tail, exposing anchor to the entire regional architecture.

Egypt was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, according to which it kept calm along its common borders for more than four decades. This feeling of stability allowed Israel to focus resources on other threats, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Iran’s activities throughout the region. There is no doubt that Egypt, through its appealing from Hamas, was not an ideal neighbor, and Cairo bears its own share of responsibility for the circumstances that led to the October 7 attacks. However, Camp David gives the risks to re -introducing strategic uncertainty on the southern border of Israel, an unnecessary burden on the top of the extensive responsibilities of the Israeli army.

Egypt is still a major mediator in Arab diplomacy. The role of mediation with Hamas and other Palestinian factions was incomplete, but indispensable. The alienation of Cairo weakens Israel’s ability to succeed in hostilities in the future and ceasefire, as well as regional diplomacy on a broader scale.

Moreover, the Arab countries that are considering normalization with Israel – especially Saudi Arabia – are well monitored how Israel treats its current regional partners. If relations with Egypt deteriorate, others will conclude that Israeli obligations are unreliable.

This also extends to economic cooperation, as Cairo – in the era of boycott and abstraction – has in fact committed to the import of Israeli natural gas. Cagabilities may indicate the lack of acute energy in Egypt as evidence that recent agreements only reflect a narrow set of interests. But the fields of natural gas Levichan and Tamar are, in fact, the strategic assets that link Israel not only to Egypt but also in the regional energy markets. It may provide it to a short -term crane bargaining chips, but the strategy will ultimately lead to the erosion of long -term confidence needed for energy cooperation and the speedy research in Cairo for additional natural gas suppliers.

Energy cooperation proves mutual dependence. Just as an Israeli threat to stop the tap will harm the Egyptian regime, if Egypt succeeds in diversifying away from Israeli gas, Israel will lose economic revenues and regional communication. “Egypt needs all the gas you can get.”.

For its part, Egypt has taken many steps that strained the relationship. Starting this spring, she made a frozen ambassador, and she refused to agree to the new Israeli envoy to Cairo and withheld its ambassador to Israel. Egypt also joined the issue of genocide in South Africa against Israel in the International Court of Justice in 2024.

However, during a period of time Israel became increasingly isolated in the international arena, it should be noted that, amid the fluctuations of the war, Egypt managed to balance its economic and security cooperation with Israel in terms of its opposition to Israeli policy over the other. This may be the biggest proof that Egypt believes that its fate is linked to the David camp and fears the possibility of the peace treaty.

The alternative raises anxiety. If it really wants to harm the Israeli national security services without raising international warning bells, Egypt can simply relax its security cooperation with Israel. This would harm Israel’s strategic depth on its southern front and expose its borders of 206 km (128 miles) with Egypt for possible threats.

In conclusion, while the peace treaty is still intact, the fabric that has maintained the Camp David agreements since 1979 has spanned, and there is the absence of mutual trust. If Israel pushes far away, it will not only risk the bilateral relationship, but also harm the Egyptian regime. Instead, Israel needs to restore calibration: stop pressure on Egypt in the issue of Gaza’s transfer, and to reach the terms acceptable in a mutual manner with regard to controlling security along the borders of Egypt Gaza, protecting energy cooperation, and enabling the role of continuous mediation in Egypt instead of undermining it. The re -establishment of confidence with Cairo will also refer to other regional actors that Israel is able to settle and restrict.

There is also a role here for third parties as well. More importantly, the United States, which mediated the Camp David agreement and has been the main mediator between Israel and Egypt in decades since then. But European and Arab neighbors, who share a common attention in strong Israeli relations, should also help.

This begins by transferring clear signals to support the Egyptian regime. It also includes overcoming Gaza’s imagination, Riviera, as it seriously addresses Egypt’s proposed plan “after a day” of Gaza, and to follow the efforts of the back channel to fill the security gaps between Israel and Egypt.

The peace of Israel with Egypt is not the remains of the past, but rather to be a neighborhood, which develops in the regional security of Israel. Strong relations with Egypt strengthen Israel’s economy, reduce the diplomatic isolation of Israel, and strengthen Israel’s defense. Their disperse will be a historical mistake.