Rwanda and Congo’s Unstable Peace – Foreign Policy

On June 27 / the deal sparked cautious optimism that the region may eventually be on the way to cancel the escalation after years of conflict. However, while the agreement clarifies a framework for peace, it greatly corresponds to the interests of Rwanda.

For decades, the United States was considered a strategic partner in Africa, and often praises its economic reforms and stability. This perspective is increasingly separate from reality: during the era of President Paul Kagame, Rwanda played a major role in destabilizing the Great Lakes region, especially by fueling the conflict in the Congo by controlling mineral resources and obstructing diplomatic efforts to resolve the long -term refugee crisis.

On June 27 / the deal sparked cautious optimism that the region may eventually be on the way to cancel the escalation after years of conflict. However, while the agreement clarifies a framework for peace, it greatly corresponds to the interests of Rwanda.

For decades, the United States was considered a strategic partner in Africa, and often praises its economic reforms and stability. This perspective is increasingly separate from reality: during the era of President Paul Kagame, Rwanda played a major role in destabilizing the Great Lakes region, especially by fueling the conflict in the Congo by controlling mineral resources and obstructing diplomatic efforts to resolve the long -term refugee crisis.

This continuous stability threatens regional security and undermines American interests. If the United States is committed to the stable, prosperous, and thickening of Central Africa, it must reassess its relationship with Rwanda. This means determining whether the peace agreement will actually lead to permanent regional cooperation or instead perpetuate the ability of the Rwandan leadership to manipulate resources in the name of diplomacy.

Congo produces more More than 70 percent of the world’s cobalt and carry an estimated $ 24 trillion of unexploited mineral wealth and the main reserves of lithium, tantatom, tin, and high -quality uranium. These resources are vital for defense, energy and semi -American industries, but the US arrival is increasingly at risk.

Despite its extensive potential, the Congo is wrestling with insecurity, especially in the east, where more than 120 armed groups operate. The strongest among them, M23, works as an extension of the Rwandan army, providing strategic mining areas to bring them under the real control of Rwanda. While Rwanda officially denies the support of the M23 rebel group, this position contradicts the United Nations investigations.

The developments of the last battlefield of Rwanda allowed to tighten its grip on Congo provinces in the north and south of Kivu. The Robia Co. Collery in North Kevo alone represents at least 15 percent of the Colatian supplies in the world, which is necessary for global technology giants such as Apple and Microsoft.

Although Rwanda’s economic model is often linked as a success story, it is now related to the illegal exploitation of Congolese minerals. M23 control extends beyond the mining sites to the critical transportation corridors, facilitating illegal metal exports to Rwanda. Then these raw materials are washed into international supply chains as Rwandan exports, and to circumvent global tracking measures and benefit from access to American and European markets. Despite the presence of minimal local reserves, Countain’s exports in Rwanda increased by 50 percent from 2022 to 2023 – a variation in United Nations experts.

This practice not only undermines ethical supply chains, but also the defects of legitimate American investments. The ongoing conflict in the Congo on metal resources guarantees the position of Rwanda as a major mediator between the eastern Congo, rich in resources and global markets. For Kagame, maintaining this current strategic situation: peace will weaken its grip on this profitable trade.

Rwanda’s role in weakening the Congo sustains a state of chronic instability. It is systematically incapable of the political authorities in the Congo and prevents the emergence of a strong state capable of confirming control of its lands and resources. This, in turn, benefits foreign actors such as China, which can take advantage of the wealth of Congolese resources without punishment.

China is already controlling vast areas of Congolese land, especially in minerals rich in areas where the country’s leadership has limited power. There, Chinese mining operators extract resources on an industrial scale beyond international scrutiny. For its part, its grip has expanded through dark mining contracts and military partnerships, ensuring that the basic minerals of American defense and technology industries remain outside Washington’s control.

In addition to controlling metal, Rwanda’s strategy depends on refusing to resolve the long-term issue for more than 200,000 Rwandan refugees who remain in the Congo-a number most likely exceeding half a million when the unconfirmed refugees are added. These exiles are the legacy of 1994, when more than two million Rwandans collectively fled amid Rwandan genocide and the civil war that followed.

Although official action frameworks – the country – like the 2010 triple agreement with the United Nations Refugee Agency – enabled the return of small refugee groups, they represent a decrease in the ocean. The vast majority of Rwandan refugees refuse to return constantly without reliable guarantees for safety, justice and political inclusion.

The situation is exacerbated by the recent forced returns in the controlled areas where the refugees are tracked, arrested or deported under pressure. Instead of addressing this crisis through reform, Rwanda exploits it by mixing all refugees with the democratic forces of the liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a political and military movement consisting of Rwandan refugees. Since the first and second Congo wars (1996-2003) played-which Rwanda has played a leading role-the Rwandan government has continued with the presence of FDLR as the main threat to regional stability, a narration that justified successive military interventions. Now, the same peak continues to give legitimacy to the attacks in the M23, which leads to collective displacement, civil losses, and the looting of Congolese resources.

Instead of solving The problems created by the behavior of Rwanda are equivalent to the recent Washington Agreement. FDLR has been cited more than 40 times in the text of the agreement, while M23 is mentioned only twice. This blatant contrast indicates that the agreement will not address the root causes of the current crisis. Most likely, Rwanda’s position will be established at the expense of Congolese sovereignty and regional stability.

The current agreement gives the official nature to the obligations of both countries to cancel the escalation, decompose and joint security coordination. But Rwanda did not show any reference to the re -calibration of the Calculipomia and Strategic Completion. On the contrary, within just 48 hours of signing the Washington Agreement, M23 launched new regional attacks in the eastern Congo.

The comprehensive peace agreement risk becoming meaningless without accountability. If Rwanda fails to withdraw its forces and end the support to the M23 during the deadline for a period of three months stipulated in the agreement, the informed consequences must be followed. Supervision mechanisms and penalties already exist – what is required is the political will to activate them.

To protect its long -term interests, the United States must resist the temptation to deal with the peace agreement as a platform to assign to Rwanda. Providing Kigali’s economic or commercial incentives in the hope of consolidating Kagami in the regional cooperative system that offends the nature of his system. Kagame’s strength comes from hegemony, not cooperation, and its impact through direct control or agent on the Eastern Congo. Any commercial or security arrangement arising from the agreement should be conditional, viable, and supported by real enforcement.

Although short -term participation may help to install the eastern Congo, the American strategy should remain focused on the long game: gradual disposal of Kagame outside the regional equation. This requires a different policy in the United States – reducing strategic dependence on Rwanda, enhancing the sovereignty of the Congo, and supporting the emergence of a regional framework that is not focused on the Kagame system.

The challenge is not just Kagame as an individual, but rather the unification of a regime by virtue of the reality that suppresses the opposition, criminalizes the opposition, and sweats political pluralism. Over the past three decades, Kagame systematically dismantled the local political opposition, which led to the removal of all checks on his authority. Victoire Umuhoza, the opposition leader in Rwanda, is highlighted by the regime’s continuous campaign against the opposition.

The solid stability in the Great Lakes region depends on the efforts of the United States and international to enhance democratic alternatives. This includes the involvement of reliable opposition forces and the support of air conditioning and partnerships – especially in the mining sector – on tangible political reforms inside Rwanda. US military support to Rwanda should be gradually reduced and Rwanda’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The system based on exclusion and coercion cannot link a long -term peace. Finally, Washington must also face the constant exploitation of the 1994 Rwandan sexual intercourse as a political shield to justify authoritarian rule and external aggression. Policy towards Rwanda should be based on the current facts, not historical guilt.

To break the self -defeat in which the United States supports the Kagame system in the end it undermines American interests in the region, Washington must give priority to direct participation with the Congolese government. Strategic investment should aim to ensure that the metal value chain benefits more than the Congo and the United States-by supporting medium and long-term treatment within the country inside the Congo, rather than allowing the transformation in Rwanda. Infrastructure projects such as Lobito – the rail network and ports that connect the Eastern Congo to Angola – can help bypass Rwanda, enhance traceability, and safe metal supply chains, which reduces dependence on the United States on China. While American companies may follow strategic mining concessions in the eastern Congo, these projects remain primarily unsafe when carrying out in a war area, under the occupation of the rebels, and the actual control of Rwandan.

While relying on Kagame and on the image of Rwanda as a model of the system may provide short -term comfort, it is a strategic illusion. The last peace agreement will not strengthen regional stability if it is imposed strictly and does not unify Rwanda’s grip on the Eastern Congo. Peace cannot be built on the goodwill of the regime, whose strength depends on the permanent conflict and destabilizing systematic stability.