Mike Waltz Has Somehow Gotten Even Worse at Using Signal

Thursday , Reuters posted a photo of the National Security Adviser in the United States in the United States, Mike Waltz, examined his phone during the cabinet meeting held by President Trump at the White House. If you enlarge the part of the image that captures the Waltz screen, it appears that it appears to be used by using the encrypted messaging application from end to end. But if you look closely, the screen notice indicates the app as “TM SGNL”. During the White House cabinet meeting on Wednesday, it was clear that Waltz was using an Israeli manufacturing application called Telemessge to a message with people who seem to be senior US officials, including JD Vance, Marco Rubio and TULSI GABBARD.

After the members of the major cabinet in the Trump administration used the vanishing signal messages to coordinate military strikes in March in Yemen-and he would unintentionally include the Atlantic Editor-in-Chief in the group chat-the “Signalgate” scandal that was highlighted in relation to the violations of the government’s “operating security” protocol in addition to cases of compliance with the laws of maintaining federal records. In the midst of the disaster, Waltz, who was toppled by Trump as a US national security adviser on Thursday. Waltz created the “Houthi PC Small Group” chat and was the member who added the editor -in -chief of Top Atlantic Jeffrey Goldberg. “I take full responsibility. The group was built,” Waltz told Fox News in late March. He added at that time: “We have the best technical minds looking at how this happens.”

Signalgate was not related to the signal. The application was working normally and it was simply used in an inappropriate time to an incredibly sensitive discussion that should have been implemented on federal devices and special purposes. If you are going to distort protocols, although the signal is (relatively from) a good place to do this, because the app is designed so that the messengers and receptors in the group chat can only read it. The application is designed to collect as much information as possible about its users and partners. This means that if American government officials are talking about the application, spies or malicious infiltrators can only reach their connections by bargaining directly on the participants’ devices – a challenge that can be overcome but at least limits potential access points. Using an application like a TELEMESSAGE signal, though, it is supposed to try to comply with the requirements for retaining data, opens many other routes for the opponents to reach messages.

“I don’t even know where to start with this,” says Jake Williams, a former infiltration of the National Security Agency and Vice President of Research and Development at Strategy. ))

Telemessge was established in Israel in 1999 by former defense technicians in Israel and dedicated to the country until it was acquired last year by SMARSH. The service creates repetitions of the communications applications that are equipped with a “mobile archiving” tool to record and store messages sent through the application.

“Chat, archive and monitoring of mobile communication: SMS, MMS, voice calls, WhatsApp, WeChat, Telegram & Signal,” says TELEMESSAGE on its website. To indicate that he adds, “Record and pick up signal calls, texts, multimedia and files on BYD phones issued by companies and employee.” (Byod means bringing your own device.) In other words, there are remote versions of the signal for any major consumer. The company says that using the Telegssage signal, users can “maintain all the features and functions of the signal applications as well as sign the signal,” adding that the application provides “comprehensive encryption from the mobile phone to the corporate archive.” Nevertheless, the presence of “corporate archive”, undermines the privacy and security of the encryption scheme from one to the end.