Russia’s New Drone Strategy

On September 7, Russia launched the largest air strike against its war against Ukraine – 860 drones and missiles in one night. The goals were not limited to Ukraine. Two days later, 19 of these explosive drones to Poland, forced into NATO combat aircraft in the sky. Follow a similar incursion against Roman airspace after only days. These were not isolated incidents. They were distinguished by a wider style in which Moscow manufactured cheap aircraft produced by drones from the axis of its air campaign.

Over the past three years, Russia has increased the launch of a drone in one direction significantly. At the beginning of the war, Moscow launched an average of 150 to 200 of these drones per month, according to the Ukrainian Air Force data analyzed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Today, it produces and publishing approximately 5,000 per month, with an average of more than 1000 a week. In 2025 alone, Russia launched more than 33,000 drones and its variables against Ukraine. This number was only 4800 for the same period last year. Meanwhile, ballistic and ballistic missile launch operations remained relatively fixed, as shown in the graph below.

On September 7, Russia launched the largest air strike against its war against Ukraine – 860 drones and missiles in one night. The goals were not limited to Ukraine. Two days later, 19 of these explosive drones to Poland, forced into NATO combat aircraft in the sky. Follow a similar incursion against Roman airspace after only days. These were not isolated incidents. They were distinguished by a wider style in which Moscow manufactured cheap aircraft produced by drones from the axis of its air campaign.

Over the past three years, Russia has increased the launch of a drone in one direction significantly. At the beginning of the war, Moscow launched an average of 150 to 200 of these drones per month, according to the Ukrainian Air Force data analyzed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Today, it produces and publishing approximately 5,000 per month, with an average of more than 1000 a week. In 2025 alone, Russia launched more than 33,000 drones and its variables against Ukraine. This number was only 4800 for the same period last year. Meanwhile, ballistic and ballistic missile launch operations remained relatively fixed, as shown in the graph below.

This shift clearly shows Russia’s advanced strategy that includes saturation of air defenses, compressed city centers, and forcing Ukraine to surrender. Moscow believes that it will win the war not through decisive tank attacks and precise strikes, but through endless decrease with low -cost weapons.

The ability to expand is the key Russia’s low -cost drone strategy. Shahid drones were initially designed in Iran – the name literally translated into the “witness” in Persian and Arabic – and was imported in the early stages of the war. Today, it is produced inside Russia in multiple locations, including factories in Alabuga and Electrical IEZ KUPOL.

To maintain its production, Russia settles in the international supply chains of electronic components, and stated that it continues to use smuggled Western electronics as well. Manufacturing has expanded in recent months, especially in the IEMZ KUPOL facility, where advanced variables such as Shahed-238 are developed to accommodate, according to reports.

This production capacity allowed Russia to innovate, develop various variables, and add polytheism systems to its launch operations based on the battlefield notes. For example, it is said that the most advanced alternative to the Graan-3 has a range of up to 2500 km (1550 miles). This ability means that Russia is not only able to send 19 of these drones to Poland, as it did recently, but it may also hit west. The targets in the Baltic countries and parts of Central Europe have become on hand, and Russia has the ability to launch these drones against multiple countries at the same time.

The challenge facing the West is not the difficulty of intercepting these drones, but rather to do so at a sustainable cost. Their photography with NATO combat aircraft may prove or send expensive objections, as Poland did, with his intention, yet it cannot be financed financially. This is because the cost of dropping them with missiles or aircraft aircraft is not the same. Russia can produce these munitions full of $ 20,000 to $ 50,000, and some trap versions lower cost. Defenders cannot spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to eliminate each one.

Ukraine has learned this in this field. Most of these drones are dropped from Shahid (neighbors) by the Ukrainian Mobile Gunners anti -aircraft because they are slow. Other options have become cheaper, such as interceptor drones and laser energy, the primary option. Western countries will need to follow a similar path if they want to carry the drone attacks on a large scale.

Drones played a major role in Ukraine as well. Early war, Arsenal drone was from Kiev modest, which depends heavily on Bayraktar TB2S and Quadcopters ready for survey and artillery discovery. However, over time, Ukraine exceeded dependence on foreign platforms and developed its own environmental system. Through initiatives such as the “Done Army”, KYIV has fill out volunteer workshops, private companies and state -backed programs to produce a varied fleet of unmanned systems. Local production capacity has been built, and it is now able to produce 5 million drones annually.

For Ukraine, the pursuit of unmanned systems in autonomy is the main vision to compensate for the lack of forces in Ukraine. Drones from the first person (FPV) is good examples of this. On the front lines, the FPV drones have become the spine, as they act as accurate striking systems against tanks, artillery and hidden. FPVs, associated with drones in the sky of drones, often allows the shortening of killing and beating within minutes of discovering the target. To counter Russian jamming – a strategy that disrupts communication between drones and its operators – Ortania began deploying drones from the optical fibers associated with its operators by cables, making it immune to electronic warfare and capable of flying 10 km (6.2 miles) to 15 km (9.3 miles). These innovations help compensate for the deficiency of artillery shells by replacing the shells charged with targeted drones.

Ukraine has also invested in increasing production of long -term systems. Unlike Russia, which SALVOS at City Convert increases psychological pressure, Ukraine’s strategy focuses more on strategic infrastructure – oil refineries, warehouses and military bases. In fact, it seems that Ukraine is successful in it. Recently, it managed to hit the largest oil refinery in Russia, which was 1400 km (870 miles) from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine aims to strangle logistics services in Russia and weaken its economy – but the breadth of Russian lands makes these operations more difficult to maintain.

For Russia, drone production redefined its strategy in the battlefield. Russia launches these drones in two forms: routine strikes and group salads. Routine strikes include daily launches of accused munitions, designed to maintain fixed pressure on Ukraine. On the other hand, the collective salvos is much larger and coordinated and often associated with naval and ballistic flight missiles to overcome defense.

Our analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Relationships revealed that in 2022, Silvo Silvo participated about 100 drones and missiles and came once a month. By mid -2015, the average rose to approximately 370 ammunition, with a sulfos occurring almost every eight days. Sometimes, Russia has launched such big pains for two days of up to two days.

This climax follows a clear logic in the battlefield strategy in Russia. The primary goal is not to destroy specific goals, but psychological losses on defenders and civilians. When Russia sends more than 500 drones in one direction in one night, bars often strike city centers such as KYIV, spread fear and uncertainty. Residents do not ask about the number of drones. What they test is sirens, explosions, and nights that do not sleep. This atmosphere of fatigue and dread is exactly what Moscow is trying to create, weakening the civil morale and testing Ukraine’s determination.

These operations also give Russia a way to expand the conflict vertically and horizontally. Inside Ukraine, drone strikes allow pressure on Moscow to pressure multiple areas simultaneously. Beyond Ukraine, as shown in the Poland case, Russia enables Russia to extend the war fingerprint to NATO. Some of the polytheism systems do not hold a load, and Moscow can deny the responsibility when it loses its followers in the far west of the borders of Ukraine.

Successful weapon Perspective, the strategy seems ineffective. The drones are slow and have a low probability of hitting and successfully destroying the target. Its accuracy is often bad, and its speed is less than 200 km per hour (134 miles per hour). In most of the war, their success rate was less than 10 percent.

However, the event cannot be reduced to raw numbers. By maintaining constant pressure, Moscow aims to wear morale, deplete defensive resources, and to force Ukraine supporters to question the long -term costs to support Kiev. Even if most drones are destroyed, the martyr remains costly effective because its purpose is to deplete, not accuracy.

Russia has also improved its drones over time. Early versions flew low, about 1 km (0.6 miles) or 2 km (1.2 miles) in height, and were easier to objection. This is visible in neutralization rates. Earlier, with limited launch operations as well as less saturated defense and early variables, the half of these drones per day was about 7 percent to 8 percent. It is now difficult to intercept the latest variables in traditional ways, and with the tactics of their modern wealth, the multiplication rate has increased to 20 percent in recent months.

Mathematics concern. Even if the accuracy has never improved, the launch of hundreds of drones ensures that more through the weight of the numbers simply. With both the size and effectiveness, the share that penetrates the defenses is now much larger than it was in the previous stages of the war.

This campaign is consistent with the Soviet and Russian military thinking. The first strategists have long expected that progress in the sensors, unmanned systems and fine weapons will force the armies to disperse and fight in fragmented and non -written ways, and the same Non -commitment war It will replace traditional battles.

Shahid drones (neighbors) fit this form accurately. It allows Russia to attack from afar, saturate defenses, and impose fixed costs without relying on decisive earth maneuvers. It is a war of drain in the form of a drone, mixing coercion with fatigue. Russia can do this in a very economical way.

By launching swarms night after night, Moscow has created a recent version of the non -scattered war that theorists like Vladimir Silchenko. These drones are not aimed at achieving tactical breakthroughs. Instead, the purpose of them is to grind Ukraine and impose costs on its supporters.