U.S. and Israeli Strikes on Iran Could Create New Nuclear Risks

On June 22, US President Donald Trump asked, “[I]The current Iranian regime is unable to make Iran great again, why will there be a change in the system ??? “This comment came amid a large -scale Israeli military campaign, although it was apparently aimed at retreating from the Iranian nuclear program, but it was clearly aimed at weakness, and perhaps even the collapse of the regime.

For decades, the primary international anxiety about the Iranian nuclear program was how Tehran could use its nuclear materials, technologies and expertise to produce nuclear weapons. But if the Islamic Republic will suddenly collapse, preventing these resources from falling into the wrong hands will be a more urgent concern.

On June 22, US President Donald Trump asked, “[I]The current Iranian regime is unable to make Iran great again, why will there be a change in the system ??? “This comment came amid a large -scale Israeli military campaign, although it was apparently aimed at retreating from the Iranian nuclear program, but it was clearly aimed at weakness, and perhaps even the collapse of the regime.

For decades, the primary international anxiety about the Iranian nuclear program was how Tehran could use its nuclear materials, technologies and expertise to produce nuclear weapons. But if the Islamic Republic will suddenly collapse, preventing these resources from falling into the wrong hands will be a more urgent concern.

Although there was a hot debate about the extent of damage caused by Israeli strikes, the fact is that the Iranian nuclear infrastructure was not fully destroyed. Iran still has uranium mining capabilities, nuclear energy reactors and search, as well as any material or technology that can be saved from damaged enrichment sites, including Natans and Ford. More importantly, Iran still possesses some of them if not all about 8,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, including at least 400 kilograms of enriched uranium 60 percent – 10 of nuclear weapons, if fertilized at the degree of weapons. Iran is also likely to keep a large stock of advanced centrifugal devices, central face cuts and specialized equipment that may be specialized in making these machines, as well as documents and equipment related to the previous nuclear weapons program. It is also possible that there will be hundreds if not thousands of scientists in Iran who have a critical nuclear know how, including how to operate centrifugation and weapons building. In 2018, Musad’s nomination of hidden documents again confirmed the extensive work that Iran has done to develop the technologies and operations necessary for nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to reach Iranian centrifugal stocks and manufacturing capabilities for years before the last American strike, and the inspectors have not been able to reach any Iranian nuclear sites since June 13. With the emergence of the bombing by Israel, if it is not before, many of these multiple materials and equipment are hidden. The lack of a clear foundation will make it difficult for the international community to know whether any material or technology has been lost or stolen. The director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Groste, has been explicit about the loss of “continuity of knowledge” that has been built in the past over the past decade. On July 2, Iran also announced that it agreed with a new law, whose cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency was suspended.

Experts know little about Iran’s nuclear security practices, but the measures necessary to preserve nuclear materials and sensitive equipment within the state’s control of the state are usually wide. They include material protection measures (for example, guns, gates, and guards), and ways to control nuclear materials and accounting for produced nuclear materials, and ideally, programs that reduce the risk of internal theft and espionage. But maintaining this system requires a operating government. The guards and scientists will not appear whether they are not paid or if chaos and violence prevents them from reaching work safely. If the current government collapses, it is quite reasonable for the Iranian nuclear security organization to collapse with it.

The most important in this scenario is the fate of very enriched uranium (Heu). Although it is not technically uranium at the level of weapons (it is usually defined as fertilizing uranium at a rate of at least 90 percent), enriched uranium can be used by 60 percent for Iran to record a raw nuclear device. Since the production of this material is the most difficult step in making a nuclear weapon, it will be very attractive to any actor or unresolved interested in obtaining a nuclear bomb. It is approximately 400 kilograms of Heu in Iran in Iran approximately 20 cooled bottles of water and are stored in cans that can be easily loaded into a truck. The current location of the Iranian Heu is unclear, leaving the international community with difficult research if the system is low.

Nuclear experience is also value. Iranian nuclear scientists have more than two decades of experience in building, testing and expelling centrifugations – critical techniques for producing bomb materials. In the years after the United States withdrew from the joint comprehensive action plan, these scientists sharpen their skills that produce uranium metal, an activity that applies directly to the construction of a nuclear device. Other Iranian researchers are said to have participated in research and experiences with some explosion systems and the preparations of neutrons – important steps to build a bomb. Israel killed some of these employees, but certainly not all of them. These individuals will be very attractive to a terrorist organization or a country interested in creating a nuclear bomb.

Given the lack of understanding about Iran’s remaining materials and capabilities, the inevitable chaos will accompany any change in the system may represent the most dangerous nuclear security challenge since the fall of the Soviet Union. The nature of the problem will be much more severe than, for example, in Iraq after the fall of the regime in 2003, the end of the Gaddafi government in Libya in 2011, or the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in 2024. This will require a much greater effort to convert more weu than Heu in Iran.

How should Washington respond if you face this nuclear security crisis? Without guards or international inspectors on Earth, Washington may have to rely on its smart capabilities and its ability to determine the location of Iranian nuclear materials and evaluate their weakness. Washington and its partners should start thinking through options now to seize any substance at a great risk of theft, including with us or allied staff. This option will not be free of risk, and the ability to implement it depends on a set of other factors, but it should remain on the table.

Governments around the world must think about sharing information and alerting the emerging Iranian government if it discovers the sharp security weaknesses of sensitive nuclear materials. And you should do this regardless of questions about the health of that government, or how democracy or pro -US is. The risk of obtaining a nuclear weapon is very large.

The international community must also ask any new Iranian government to rebuild relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume inspections on Iranian nuclear sites without obstacles, and to perpetuate employees to ensure that the main facilities of Iran remain safe. Given the history of the International Atomic Energy Agency in monitoring the Iran program and its ability to work in dangerous environments, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the agency can play a decisive role.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States was set. Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar plan known today as the Cooperative Threats Program (CTR), which helped secure weapons and nuclear facilities in close cooperation with Russia and former Soviet countries. This program immediately implemented a series of promotions to deal with the most bright safety problems, such as stiff facilities and stabilization of equipment to calculate all nuclear materials in a specific location.

Once there is a new Iranian government, Washington and its partners must consider a similar effort to make the Iranian nuclear program safe and resistant to spread as possible. A major part of this is to find work for Iranian scientists who may be unemployed due to reducing the size of nuclear weapons. The work of the Najouli systems helped to the fact that the Soviet scientists and engineers, as rulers of the prominent and successful nuclear weapons program, felt a great responsibility for managing their materials and their knowledge. Iranian scientists may not have the same motivation, so some additional incentives may be necessary. Depending on the direction of the new government in Iran, these projects can include implementing projects to help the growth and modernization of the Iranian civil nuclear program in line with strong non -proliferation criteria or help Iran fill any gaps in nuclear security. The role of China in updating the ARAK reactor as part of the Iranian nuclear deal – although it has left incomplete due to the American withdrawal and the subsequent deterioration of that deal – how other countries can also play a role.

It may reduce the fall of the Iranian government or not reduce the long -term challenge represented by the Iranian nuclear program, but it will definitely be a threat to nuclear security more urgent. The United States and the international community will have many important issues on its plate – as the nuclear catastrophe must be at the top.