Xi Jinping’s Military Parade Puts Strength First

The Chinese military parade on September 3, which was held to celebrate the eighty anniversary of the end of the resistance war against Japan, will be the fourth of this since president Xi Jinping arrived in power. However, the context today is remarkably different. At home, the country faces economic opposite winds, but its military strength is still growing. Outside, relations with the West-especially the United States-are increasingly numerous, while the international regime is reshaped after the war under the pressure of Russia and Krin war.

Therefore, the procession of this year is not just a festive display of forces and weapons. It is a carefully coordinated work of strategic communication, questioning the messages of military power, diplomatic sites, and historical accounts, directed to the masses at home and abroad.

The Chinese military parade on September 3, which was held to celebrate the eighty anniversary of the end of the resistance war against Japan, will be the fourth of this since President Xi Jinping arrived in power. However, the context today is remarkably different. At home, the country faces economic opposite winds, but its military strength is still growing. Outside, relations with the West-especially the United States-are increasingly numerous, while the international regime is reshaped after the war under the pressure of Russia and Krin war.

Therefore, the procession of this year is not just a festive display of forces and weapons. It is a carefully coordinated work of strategic communication, questioning the messages of military power, diplomatic sites, and historical accounts, directed to the masses at home and abroad.

The military component, in particular, is designed for the United States, Japan, Taiwan and China’s naval neighbors as much as a local audience.

As in the previous marches, Beijing will display recently commissioned systems or will be soon-but weapons are still in the test or the most secret projects. However, given the increase in military update in recent years, it is expected that the width of 2025 equipment is expected to display more than ever.

Surrounds indicate that the focus will be on fourth -generation tanks, carrier -based planes, and combat aircraft. It has also been shown prominently, it may be new capabilities in the electronic and electronic war, including drones, directed energy weapons, and jamming technologies, as well as high -chest missiles, missile defense, and strategic strike systems.

For a local audience, this message is reinforced by the fact that China, which was now wandering once, is a great power-a major part of the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to legitimacy. For foreign masses, it sends a sign that the Popular Liberation Army (PLA) is no longer prepared simply for future wars, but rather is ready to fight today. The presentation will emphasize the ability of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to offer power, deter opponents, and impose Chinese security claims in the region.

The show is also an opportunity for the diplomatic theater. The record for foreign attendance may break, with reports in particular that high-level leaders from most of Southeast Asian countries-with the benefit of the Philippines only-will be present. This contrast is deliberate. By collecting leaders from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America, Beijing seeks to throw itself as a representative of the “global south” instead of an isolated competitor to the West. The list of guests itself is a diplomatic vote for confidence.

Absence is equal. Manila options are restricted through its relationships with Washington; Repeated clashes at sea with the Chinese navy. The Dotrt family, the rival of the ruling Marcus clan, is close to Beijing, while Singapore, which only sends the Deputy Prime Minister, tends strategically towards neutrality or supporters of the United States. In contrast, the presence of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia and Myanmar allows Beijing to claim that most of Southeast Asian countries prefer to cooperate on the confrontation despite the ongoing land conflicts in the South China Sea.

Thus, the show will make two shows: missiles and configurations in the Tiananmen Square and a circle of friends in the review position. Vladimir Putin’s visit will be the visit of Vladimir Putin. The Russian President will attend the show and the Singhi -Cooperation Organization summit, which will be held in the previous days, and will meet with the eleventh to hold bilateral talks. Putin, is still isolated by the Ukrainian war, Beijing is legitimate. For eleventh, Putin’s presence emphasizes strategic confidence in China-Russia. The two leaders will be sitting side by side, as Shi did in the second global memory procession of Russia in May, one of the most striking images of the event.

The timing is especially noticed. As a Samos in Washington, it is expected that the dialogue of the United States of America-Russia Ukraine will discuss, Shi and Putin quietly discuss post-war arrangements, including the prospects for peace and the form of a new world order. Such talks will not be published, but their importance lies in the fact that Beijing and Moscow coordinates they exceed immediate fears in wartime. For Beijing, this is an opportunity to drop itself as a responsible power; For Moscow, it is a way out of isolation.

However, expectations should be modest. There are no major new agreements, and there will be no general declaration of the Western opposition. Instead, Shi and Putin are likely to abide by the familiar fashionable pattern of “strategic mystery”-which raises emphasis on cooperation while leaving the field for flexibility.

Shi’s speech, which celebrates the eighties of the victory in the resistance war, will be another pivotal point. For decades, the World War II’s global novel on the contributions of the United States and the Soviet Union was agreed while reducing the sacrifices of China. XI offer provides a stage to recount that story.

It is expected that China has played a “decisive role” in defeating Japan and forming the results of the war in Asia, which strengthens both nationalist pride at home and Beijing’s claim that he was a founding engineer for post -war. Towards Japan, Shi is likely to strike a precise tone-exposed to historical responsibility while avoiding inflammatory and axis rhetoric instead to see “Asia and the Pacific Society with a common future.”

On a broader scale, Shi will link the legacy of World War II with China’s aspirations for the future system. He is likely to stress the end of American global domination, multiple deduction, and greater representation of developing countries.

The comprehensive message is that China is not just a power that boasts. It provides an integrated narration: it has been a decisive actor in the past, it is a tremendous power at the present time, and it looks forward to forming the future. Xi Jinping is seeking to unite his local authority while indicating the world that China intends to be a fair inheritance of history and tomorrow’s ranking engineer.