Why the Panama 1989 Comparison Is Wrong

As the US military escalates its position on Venezuela – through naval deployments to the Caribbean, B-52 flyovers, deadly strikes on alleged drug boats, and confirmed CIA covert operations – regime change advocates are reviving a dangerous analogy. Many pointed to the 1989 US invasion of Panama and overthrow of dictator Manuel Noriega as proof that quick surgeries could get the job done.

In private conversations with several current and former American officials, they referred to this analogy. Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who received the Nobel Peace Prize last month, has appealed to the United States to help fight what she calls a “war” waged by Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. When asked about striking Venezuelan territory, US President Donald Trump refused to rule it out, saying: “Well, you’ll find out.”

As the US military escalates its position on Venezuela – through naval deployments to the Caribbean, B-52 flyovers, deadly strikes on alleged drug boats, and confirmed CIA covert operations – regime change advocates are reviving a dangerous analogy. Many pointed to the 1989 US invasion of Panama and overthrow of dictator Manuel Noriega as proof that quick surgeries could get the job done.

In private conversations with several current and former American officials, they referred to this analogy. Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who received the Nobel Peace Prize last month, has appealed to the United States to help fight what she calls a “war” waged by Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. When asked about striking Venezuelan territory, US President Donald Trump refused to rule it out, saying: “Well, you’ll find out.”

The comparison between Panama in 1989 and Venezuela in 2025 is tempting. It is also fundamentally flawed. The two situations differ at almost every structural and operational level. Conflating U.S. history in Panama as a model for American action in Venezuela today could lead to counterinsurgency going too long.

The United States did not do that It invaded Panama in 1989, attacking it from within. At the time, there were approximately 13,000 American troops permanently stationed in the country, a remnant of the American role in overseeing the Panama Canal. When President George H.W. Bush ordered Operation Just Cause on December 17, 1989, it required the deployment of 14,000 additional troops by air. But nearly half of the invasion force was already on the ground, pre-positioned and intimately familiar with its objectives.

Noriega was once a US intelligence asset, but became increasingly hostile to US interests throughout the 1980s. After Noriega annulled the May 1989 presidential election won by opposition candidate Guillermo Endara, the Bush administration became convinced that only military force could restore democracy in Panama.

For several months before Bush ordered the invasion, U.S. forces conducted maneuvers through Operation Sand Flea—exercises disguised as force protection exercises—reducing the readiness of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) to respond to U.S. troop movements. As the official history of the US Army records, “exercises were conducted so frequently that the enemy became insensitive to rapid troop movements.”

By December 1989, US intelligence knew Noriega’s command points as well as the actions of the PDF unit and key officers. Operation Just Cause called for simultaneous strikes on more than two dozen PDF targets to cut off their command and control capabilities before they could organize resistance. At about 1 a.m. on December 20, it worked. Major combat operations ended within five days, and Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990. By January 12, the operation was over.

Venezuela is a completely different story. The United States has no forward presence, no in-country bases, no treaty rights, and no comparable intelligence infrastructure. Recent US movements – helicopters near Trinidad and Tobago, warships in international waters, bomber patrols – may indicate Washington’s resolve. But it does not help extend power to a country that lacks a US foothold.

The original 1988 US plan for Panama called for gradual military buildup over 22 days. After Noriega annulled the May 1989 elections, Bush replaced him as head of US Southern Command. General Maxwell Thurman compressed the timetable to three days and turned to a surprise strategy. This plan worked because the infrastructure to support it was already in place. In Venezuela, this does not happen.

Although the United States had every advantage in Operation Just Cause, it was not a bloodless endeavour. The PDF fought harder than expected: on just the first day of the operation, an estimated 19 American soldiers were killed and 99 wounded. Panamanian losses included 300 to 500 civilian deaths.

The conflict in Venezuela will be deadlier, partly because of geography. Panama is much smaller than Venezuela, with an area of ​​only 75,000 square kilometers. Venezuela is 12 times larger and twice the size of Iraq, which has consumed U.S. forces in counterinsurgency for nearly a decade. Furthermore, while Panama is a narrow isthmus, Venezuela includes vast savannas, the Andes, the Amazon rainforest, and several major urban centers. This diverse terrain complicates military operations at all levels.

Manpower poses another problem: unlike the PDF, Venezuelan forces and their allies cannot be beheaded on a weekend. In December 1989, the Panamanian army numbered 12,800 personnel, but only 4,000 were combat-ready. The PDF was a personal apparatus built around Noriega and his small circle of allies. Control was centralized in Panama City. When the US forces struck, they destroyed the backbone of the PDF leadership in three hours. The centralized structure of the PDF meant that the United States could neutralize it before it could launch a guerrilla insurgency.

In contrast, Venezuela’s security architecture is multi-layered and flexible. The country’s army, the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, has between 130,000 and 160,000 active personnel. The Maduro regime has also created parallel structures designed to prevent rapid military collapse. The Bolivarian militia, made up of reserve soldiers, has more than 1.6 million members. The pro-government paramilitary forces known as colectivos The number is about 100,000. They are decentralized and ideologically committed to Maduro’s party and operate with great autonomy in urban neighborhoods with rapid response forces deployed against the opposition.

Then there are non-state actors. Colombian guerrilla groups – dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army – maintain a presence in Venezuelan border areas, controlling drug trafficking as well as illegal mining of gold and other minerals.

The differences do not stop on the ground. In 1989, Panama had no meaningful air defenses, allowing American aircraft to operate freely. But Venezuela could compete in the sky for a little while. The Venezuelan military uses S-300VM Antey-2500 long-range surface-to-air systems capable of engaging aircraft at a distance of up to 200 kilometers. The army also has S-125 Pechora medium-range systems and Igla-S man-portable air defense systems. After years of poor maintenance, the operational readiness of these systems is unclear.

But even degraded defenses pose risks: Any serious U.S. air campaign against Venezuela would require it to suppress enemy air defenses with direct strikes that could escalate into open war.

On December 19, 1989, Hours before Operation Just Cause began, the Panama-based Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States called Endara, the winner of the May election, and his colleagues to a secret meeting. Thurman briefed them on the status of the operation and offered them their elected positions. Shortly before midnight, a Panamanian judge took the oath.

Thus, when American forces launched their attack at 1 a.m., Panama had a functioning alternative government. The Endara administration provided political legitimacy to the invasion and began disbanding the PDF. This direct succession was crucial: Operation Just Cause led to regime change, not occupation.

Venezuela has no similar government in waiting. Machado has been forced into hiding. Opposition presidential candidate Edmundo Gonzalez, who won last year’s election according to independent results, fled the country after the Maduro regime issued an arrest warrant for him. The political opposition remains divided over how to confront Maduro: some favor negotiations, others favor street mobilization, and still others favor military defection.

A US occupation or appointed transitional council would turn Venezuela’s liberation into imperialism — and provide Maduro’s remnants with a nationalist cause for resistance.

In 1989, the United States faced little international reaction to its invasion of Panama: the Cold War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union was collapsing, and Latin American governments were unwilling to challenge Washington militarily or economically. The Organization of American States condemned the invasion, but the United States faced only rhetorical consequences. Panama itself, traumatized by civilian casualties and destruction, eventually accepted Endara’s government.

In 2025, the geopolitical chessboard will be crowded. China has deepened its economic presence across Latin America through investments in infrastructure, port operations, and financial partnerships. While Trump has raised US concerns about Chinese influence in the Panama Canal, the broader pattern of Chinese involvement complicates unilateral US military action in the region. Russia and Iran also maintain security relations with Venezuela. Latin American governments, even those hostile to Maduro, remain deeply skeptical of US military intervention.

None of this means that the US military lacks the capacity to oust Maduro. In 1991, Iraq sent what was considered the fifth largest army in the world, but the American ground campaign that liberated Kuwait lasted only 100 hours. The argument here is structural, not ideological. Military capabilities and operational conditions are distinct variables. Venezuela is not Panama, and the conditions that enabled Operation Just Cause to achieve rapid success do not exist today.

The Panama analogy persists because it emotionally satisfies hawks in the United States: fast action, low cost, and moral clarity. But Washington cannot invade its way to the desired results in Caracas. The US occupation of Venezuela will continue for years, with the probability of a stable, democratic state emerging close to zero. Pretending otherwise is not a strategy, it is nostalgia.