The Trump Administration Is Inching Toward Regime Change in Venezuela

US President Donald Trump was re -elected as a pro -axial candidate. But his administration is now creating the domino of what could be a devastating and unnecessary war: an offer to change the regime in Venezuela.

On August 7, the Trump administration announced that it had doubled the reward for the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro to $ 50 million. The United States had already announced that Maduro is the head of the drug cardmate and sanctions that a carclist as a global terrorist is specially dedicated, claiming that it provided material support to the designated groups as foreign terrorist organizations, including Terin de Aragoa and Cinepois Cartel. (It should be noted that the Mexican government said that it did not find any connection between the Mexico-based Maduoro government and its headquarters.)

US President Donald Trump was re -elected as a pro -axial candidate. But his administration is now creating the domino of what could be a devastating and unnecessary war: an offer to change the regime in Venezuela.

On August 7, the Trump administration announced that it had doubled the reward for the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro to $ 50 million. The United States had already announced that Maduro is the head of the drug cardmate and sanctions that a carclist as a global terrorist is specially dedicated, claiming that it provided material support to the designated groups as foreign terrorist organizations, including Terin de Aragoa and Cinepois Cartel. (It should be noted that the Mexican government said that it did not find any connection between the Mexico-based Maduoro government and its headquarters.)

Not only that the Trump administration has lined up a legal basis for the use of military force against the Venezuelan government. American warships have already been sent to the Venezuela coast alongside a large group of US Navy. Maduro responded to his role with Safir Saber, equally enthusiastic, mobilizing the militias and urging the Venezuelas to defend their homeland. It is not exaggerated to say that the United States and Venezuela are closer to war at this moment more than any time in the current century. Indeed, on September 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the American army had a deadly military strike against an alleged “drug ship” that left Venezuela-a sharp departure from a firm and less fatal sea objection methods such as the Coast Guard.

Changing the regime in Venezuela was a long target for those in the orbit of Trump, if not Trump himself. During the first period of Trump, the United States threw its full support behind Juan Guido’s attempt to head the Venezuelan. The tensions increased in almost 2019 to the war point until Trump retreated from the edge of the abyss, probably with the realization of how a full war will be in Venezuela, including among many of his demonstrators of intervention.

However, the Trump administration enacted devastating economic sanctions, including in the Venezuelan oil industry, despite the clear warnings that doing this would get worse for the Venezuelan refugee crisis across Western football. Such huge flows of refugees in the Venezuelan have come, as they were overwhelming in the ability of many Latin American countries to host them and lead many Venezuelans to take the trip to the United States. Thus, the Penalt Policy in the Trump administration first helped to complete the second Trump administration inadvertently to the Trump administration, as the large -scale Venezuelan migration did a lot to create a visualization of the border crisis that Trump rode to the White House.

As a member of the Senate in Florida, Rubio was at the heart of the Trump administration’s first efforts to change the system in Venezuela. He has long been opposed to left-wing governments in Latin America-including not only left-wing dictatorships in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, but also many democratically elected left-wing governments, such as Mexico and Colombia, whose cooperation is still necessary to manage delicious immigration to the United States. Rubio may see that both the US National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State for the first time since Henry Kissinger will see Rubio to see incomplete work with Maduro.

It should not be this way. In his second term, Trump’s top priority in dealing with Venezuela was dealing with the immigration crisis, which helped his regime change in the first period. The inability to deport the Venezuelan to their country of origin has proven due to the lack of natural diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela, a major obstacle to Trump’s mass policies, which stripped a legal status of hundreds of thousands of witch asylum in Venezuelan.

In January, before Rubio traveled to many Latin American countries on his first trip as minister of state, Richard Greenil – as a “special presidential envoy for special missions” to Trump, not Rubio – visited Caracas and met personally with Maduro himself. In the previous week, Rubio had jumped on a call with opposition leaders, Venezuela, including Edmondo Gonzalez Orroitia, whose Trump administration aims to admit that she is a legitimate head of Venezuela.

However, Greenil’s talks with Maduro showed that productive diplomacy with Venezuela was possible, as she got a deal to release American hostages in the country while Maduro agreed to accept regular response trips. While the White House was keen on denying that this deal was a normalization, Maduro’s brief cooperation on immigration showed his diplomatic passion.

It was Rubio who actually outperformed this promising diplomacy. One month after Greenil’s flight, Trump canceled Chevron’s license to continue working in Venezuela despite US oil sanctions – a firmly opposed privilege – prevents any continuous improvement in relations.

However, Rubio was keen to ensure that diplomacy was sabotaged with Venezuela, still parallel to the priorities of his president’s deportation. It is important, Rubio obtained an alternative deportation destination for Venezuelan by making a deal with Al Salvadori President Nayeb Bokil. Venezuelan immigrants – who entered the United States legally, were deported, some of whom target for any reason other than tattoos – to the maximum security prison in El Salvador, known as Cecot, where we now know that they have been subjected to human rights shock violations, including beating and sexual, according to the beloved interviews. For Rubio and Latin America, this human suffering was a price worthy of avoiding cooperation with Maduro.

This leads us to one of the main problems in the possibility of changing the US -led system in Venezuela: the link to the Trump administration’s harsh immigration policies has harm the legitimacy of the opposition and its isolation within Latin America. Say what you want about Maduro – an authoritarian ruler who has undoubtedly adhered to the non -democratic power – but it still proves more general concern of Venezuelan citizens in CECOT more than the United States or Venezuelan opposition. It was Maduro who eventually obtained the release of Venezuelan citizens detained in El Salvador in exchange for the issuance of many Venezuelan political prisoners and American citizens (one of whom was convicted of triple killing).

Looking at this reality, it is Maduro who can currently put himself as a defender of the ordinary Venezuelans, while the opposition appears to be not old and weak, taking into account the whims of her sponsor in Washington. Such novels are played with the local Venezuela fans, with the regulator of the Maduro regime in Karacas to condemn the abuse of the United States and Salvadori for Venezuelan citizens. Under the current circumstances, many unusual Venezuelans are unlikely to welcome the American forces as editors.

The Trump administration also has the diplomatic support it needs from Latin America to make a successful change in the system in Venezuela. Unlike 2019, Colombia is now running a left -wing government that has publicly clashed with the Trump administration on issues, including the use of military aircraft for deportations and Gaza. Rubio’s open hostility to Colombian President Gustavo Petro will definitely not help things. Brazil finds itself facing a collective tariff as part of the Trump administration’s efforts to interfere in the Brazilian justice system on behalf of former Brazilian President Jayyar Bolsonaro, Trump’s ally, who faces charges of January 6 attempt to stay in power after losing the elections. While Mexico maintains a pragmatic working relationship with its strong neighbor, President Claudia Shinbom and the ruling Mourina Party repeatedly explained that they oppose American interventions in Latin America.

It should be noted that Brazil, Colombia and Mexico were together in the midst of the diplomatic effort to pressure Maduro to acknowledge the results of the recent Venezuelan elections – an effort that the Trump administration seems completely abandoned in favor of unilateral sanctions and the boat diplomacy. It is impossible to imagine strong cooperation in America in America now on Venezuela. Even traditional American allies may be concerned to see the United States use power in Western hemisphere in the context of Trump’s regional threats against Canada, Greenland and Panama.

Then there are actual military challenges and judgment to change the system in Venezuela. Certainly, the American army remains largely the most amazing in the Western hemisphere. After Venezuela in 2025, it is not Panama in 1989; It is a much larger country with more population. If the US military withdrew the Venezuelan state through military means, whether it is air strikes or shoes on the ground, then who will provide security in Caracas? Who will manage Venezuelan oil fields? What are the elements of the current Venezuelan security forces that will be brought into the government? What will turn towards crime or rebellion if left? Amid the occupation of the chaotic United States and unavoidable political instability, there is no doubt that the Venezuelan will continue to migrate abroad, as many north go. If any disturbance in the Venezuelan oil industry results, global energy prices may rise more. Even if everything walks relatively smoothly, this will continue to be a costly transfer to the limited American resources.

All these facts were in 2019, when Trump retreated. They did not disappear in the decisive years. The war of changing the American regime in Venezuela, whatever the shaky legal reasons, will undoubtedly prove that all the catastrophe in which the wars of the American regime in the Middle East have proven. Only this time, the displaced people will be able to walk to Texas.

In June, members of Trump’s political alliance managed to exert great pressure to prevent further escalation of the US short war with Iran. Allowing the Iranian regime to survive, no matter how abusive, it was recognized as a favorite for American interests from another war or a power vacuum in the Middle East.

Let’s hope that similar dynamics will prevail over Venezuela. A group of strong diplomacy from Latin American countries, the congress use of the constitutional war authorities, is needed, and a reverse reaction from Trump’s political base to prevent the American war with Venezuela that the current administration has seriously caused – before Trump decided to take a swing.