The U.S. Should Minimize Nuclear War Risk With China

When Chinese military planners, and perhaps even the Chinese leadership itself, think of a virtual war in the future with the United States, they are concerned that the US military will try to behead the Chinese leadership. This may seem far from the Americans, but there is very strong evidence that Beijing really worries about cutting strikes-and that these concerns mean that the conflict of the United States and China extends the risks of an escalation higher than it was previously understood.

The risk of escalation not only comes from the actual cutting strikes of the United States, but from any American measures that the Popular Liberation Army (PLA) and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The mismanagement of American actions can lead to an escalation spiral, including the first Chinese nuclear use. Although the United States is unlikely to aim to reduce Chinese concerns completely, there are steps that the American army can take to reduce risks. This includes that they are particularly careful about any strikes around Beijing during a possible conflict, evaluating the effect of potential American acquisitions on Chinese perceptions, and clearly communicating that any strike in China on the mainland will be to stop the invasion of Taiwan, not beheading.

When Chinese military planners, and perhaps even the Chinese leadership itself, think of a virtual war in the future with the United States, they are concerned that the US military will try to behead the Chinese leadership. This may seem far from the Americans, but there is very strong evidence that Beijing really worries about cutting strikes-and that these concerns mean that the conflict of the United States and China extends the risks of an escalation higher than it was previously understood.

The risk of escalation not only comes from the actual cutting strikes of the United States, but from any American measures that the Popular Liberation Army (PLA) and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The mismanagement of American actions can lead to an escalation spiral, including the first Chinese nuclear use. Although the United States is unlikely to aim to reduce Chinese concerns completely, there are steps that the American army can take to reduce risks. This includes that they are particularly careful about any strikes around Beijing during a possible conflict, evaluating the effect of potential American acquisitions on Chinese perceptions, and clearly communicating that any strike in China on the mainland will be to stop the invasion of Taiwan, not beheading.

Chinese army She has long studied its counterpart in the United States, not only to track the general development of the war, but also to redesign itself specifically in preparation for the potential conflict with the United States. One of the main meals of Chinese military planners is that the American war method includes the head strike, especially at the beginning of the conflict. For example, an official Chinese military book explains from 2020: “The US Army, at the beginning of many modern local [limited] Wars, which have always chosen military and government presidents of the enemy, members of the leadership, and TV and radio stations are important goals. “

Chinese officials are very clear about the threat of the United States to their capital. The 2013 PLA book notes that a “large -scale strategic raid” is one of the greatest foreign security threats in China. Moreover, it is possible that researchers in the Analytical Paradise are responsible for air defense in Beijing in the 2019 article that their main mission in the future will be to defense against us “high -intensity air strikes.” While these writings may reflect a typical planning for the worst army, the perception of the threat and the evaluation of the intention of the United States is still revealing.

These fears appear to extend beyond the PLA rank and its file along the way to the top of the Chinese driving. In an internal speech in July 2017 devoted to air defense in Beijing, which the author watched, Chinese Secretary -General Xi Jinping warned of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army that the risk of air strikes on the capitals had grown significantly and complained that the service was still weak in its ability to manage the air defenses in Beijing. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army urged its defenses and repeated its call for more realistic training.

Xi revealed, as it reveals how much Xi and the supreme leadership focused on this issue, “I have always linked great importance to the issue of joint air defense on the capital,” and later added that “the Central Military Committee must enhance its coordination and general guidance for air defense. To lead the US threat to the home, Shi said specifically” during [Korean War]The United States looked at the bombing of major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai and even launching an air strike against our country. “

Emerging techniques that enable the targeting of leadership, such as a long -term careful strike and non -vocal weapons along with great intelligence, are likely to increase Chinese concerns. According to Shi, Xi said in the 2014 speech that the United States had “accelerated the development of global capabilities of rapid scabies,” which clearly indicated the global strike program of the United States, which has since been called a traditional rapid strike. Shi continued to explain that “as soon as it was already published, [this and other advanced weapons] It will mainly change the traditional style of offensive and defensive war. “In his 2017 internal speech on the capital’s air defense, Shi also linked this attention to weapons directions, noting that there is” more range, flour, hidden, drone, smart, and high speed [weapons]. … Space strategic strikes have an increasingly greater impact on the results of wars. “

This Chinese perception may be a confusing US officials, who realize that the safe nuclear capacity in China in China means that cutting the head of driving will carry huge escalation risks. But Beijing’s concerns are not baseless if one looks at our past behavior. The United States tried to hit Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in the Gulf wars and also routinely targeted the leadership of terrorist organizations over the years. Recently, the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the drone strike in January 2020, which resulted in the killing of the Iranian senior military official and the commander of the Jerusalem forces Qassem Soleimani. Beijing is not alone: ​​North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is said to have similar concerns about our strikes. Moreover, of course, the Pentagon has many expressions related to beheading, such as high -value nodes, targeting of the nodes and control (C2), or even anti -targeting C2.

And whether or not Chinese fears are rational, the country’s leadership is working on them by trying to defend their capital. The 2016 RAND report, which documents PLA, found that China’s air defense systems are focused on the capital and that Beijing is always receiving the latest and most capable systems. Chinese media reports from 2022 indicate that HQ-19 was deployed, at the time, the latest surface missiles to another in China, for the first time in the leadership of the central theater around Beijing.

These concerns about our temptations and series of strategies are part of CCP wider and long -term concerns about the American desire to change the system in China, and these concerns are likely to be particularly sharp during the conflict. For example, researchers in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army describe Washington’s attempt to lead Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi from power in 2011 as “cutting public opinion.” In the CCP narration, the United States was responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the “colored revolutions” in Eastern Europe in the early first decade of the twentieth century, and even the Hong Kong protests 2019. In this context, Chinese military researchers are also concerned about non -total measures, who believe that the United States can take it to support system change, including American information operations.

In light of the deep Chinese leadership fears, the greatest danger is not in fact trying to behead the United States. Instead, the risks are that Beijing will misrepresent our actions and revenge, and perhaps with nuclear weapons.

American strikes around Beijing can be particularly fraught with risk. For example, Washington may seek the deterioration of the Chinese industrial base by hitting the main ammunition facilities around the capital. In this case, busyness, operational efficiency, and the ability to survive to the US Air Force to target the air defense systems first around Beijing before sending two bombers targeting ammunition factories. However, Chinese leaders are unlikely to know that the United States is just following the production of ammunition. Instead, they see that their air capital defenses are attributed, and the US Air Force bombers quickly followed by the city.

But even American measures away from China can be explained. For example, a former PLA researcher now working in a research tank at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an interview with him in 2017 claimed that the deployment of long -term strikes to South Korea to practice a dual exercise that year was demonstrations of American parts capabilities.

These concerns can push the Chinese escalation. 2004 The second artillery campaignsSpecifically, a textbook classified by the Chinese missile forces is determined by “medium or high -density strikes against our capital” as one of the four cases that can lead to Chinese nuclear signals. Moreover, the recent RAND report argues that these same circumstances actually represent some of the most likely operators of the first Chinese nuclear use.

Although there may be benefits to deter in relying on Chinese leadership fears, the challenge is that it is difficult to predict the date of these concerns. In the worst scenario, Beijing can carry out a protective preliminary nuclear strike to thwart an attempt for us from distillation.

Washington is unlikely To persuade Beijing that he will not make such strikes. However, it is still possible to reduce the risks of the escalation management better by taking steps that include acquisition, targeting, employment and training in the time of peace and public data.

The first step is simply recognizing China’s perception and recognition that American actions may be controlled, regardless of the United States ’intentions. Second, American acquisitions should be seen in Chinese perceptions when purchasing weapons that can be explained as the head beheaded. For example, if the United States developed a limited number of long -term non -vocal ascending weapons that are subject to discount strikes, Beijing may assume that it was dedicated as weapons from the first blow and designed towards beheading. Likewise, the purchase of the ammunition that is explicitly designed to attack the difficult and deep -buried goals (HDBT) can also focus on beheading. Pentagon should think about long -term and high -speed potential and HDBT that he really needs to support the theory of denial of victory.

These examples of strategic sympathy and modify the strength structure are not gifts to Beijing. Instead, they are logical measures to reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation. Moreover, Washington did this before-the Bush administration had launched the development of an immediate global strike in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century because it recognized that the risk of strategic escalation exceeded virtual military operational benefit.

Third, the United States must carefully weigh the operational benefits against the strategic risks of any strikes in or around Beijing. To make this possible, the planners must ensure that they have multiple targeting options for any operating goal they seek to achieve and beware of any launch path that can be considered to be targeted by Beijing.

Fourth, the United States can avoid collecting any targeting data on Chinese leadership. In the event of conflict, it can avoid the decomposition of any air defense systems intended to protect Chinese leadership.

Fifth, training at the time of ladder should avoid activities that can be considered in preparation for cutting headscarf.

Finally, if the United States has launched strikes against China, the mainland, Washington must be at least clear in its message that it is only for the purpose of stopping the invasion of Taiwan and not attempts to behead the leadership.

None of these procedures will not be valid on its own Chinese perceptions. However, the first step to solve a problem is confessing that you have a step. Combating, these steps will begin to reduce the risk of Chinese appreciation that transforms a traditional war between the United States and China into a nuclear war.