The Weak Link in Trump’s Mideast Peace Plan Might Be Trump Himself – Foreign Policy

Even in an angry, functional, functional, conflict, like the Middle East, it is difficult to believe that we enter the third year of the Israel war are in Gaza-a conflict that has now exceeded the period, terror, blood, and previous Israeli blood and the Porttitimum. There is now a recently populated US peace plan on the table, but its importance has not yet been tested.

We may be hostage to the constructive realism born of experience, after we were about many peace plans and negotiations with good but failed intentions. But we are warning of the events and initiatives that are marketed as two trends of games, reflection points, marine changes, and transformations designed to achieve peace forever-especially those that are not related to a process to reach or implement the agreement.

Even in an angry, functional, functional, conflict, like the Middle East, it is difficult to believe that we enter the third year of the Israel war are in Gaza-a conflict that has now exceeded the period, terror, blood, and previous Israeli blood and the Porttitimum. There is now a recently populated US peace plan on the table, but its importance has not yet been tested.

We may be hostage to the constructive realism born of experience, after we were about many peace plans and negotiations with good but failed intentions. But we are warning of the events and initiatives that are marketed as two trends of games, reflection points, marine changes, and transformations designed to achieve peace forever-especially those that are not related to a process to reach or implement the agreement.

A lot about post -OCT. 7, 2023, Middle East, after two years, remain familiar, even terrifying, familiar. However, there are some new meals that are new and perhaps important – not only reflect the current addresses but may also form the upcoming future trend lines. These will form the options and policies for US policy makers.

Trump plan consisting of 20 points

After eight months of entering again/outside Israel’s Palestinian diplomacy, the plan in which US President Donald Trump on September 29 is a presidential plan, as Trump himself takes the role of the “Peace Council” that oversees the process. Unlike the previous efforts, which Trump retreated when Israel or Hamas retreated to the proposal on the table, it will be impossible for Trump to move away this time.

The president’s challenge will be to stop watching the conflict as a real estate deal with economic incentives, and to understand and address existential accounts of the parties. All Palestinians want the end of the occupation. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. All Israelis want peace and security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to destroy Hamas and Palestinian national aspirations. Trump’s plan is valuable, but it is only the beginning.

Immediately, Trump will need to be insisting by the parties to negotiate the details. These issues will not be resolved by jobs and threats on social truth. It will be difficult to achieve the agreement, given the absence of complete confidence between two parties. Thus, every side is unlikely to take any step that is called in the plan until it is confirmed that the other side does what is supposed to do.

The long -term plan in that it contains items that determine how the war should end, as well as how the hostages return, Israel withdraws, humanitarian assistance grows, and Gaza rules after the war. It includes commitment to follow -up of Palestinian independence, depends on serious Palestinian reform. It is difficult for Netanyahu and his allies to swallow a Palestinian state, but it seems that he is pleased because the plan is verifying the principles decided by the Israeli security cabinet. There is nothing for Hamas in the plan other than the need to swallow the bitter defeat, disarm and remove power.

Nevertheless, it is possible that Hamas is smart enough to respond to “Yes, but, the reservations that must be discussed and agree on. Verdings are a confirmed strategy for not reaching the agreement.

This is not just a challenge to negotiation. The plan calls for certain procedures within 72 hours – the hostage, the end of the fighting, and the beginning of the Israeli withdrawal. Can these simply occur on the basis of Fiat Trump? Will Israel start withdrawing before Hamas begins to disarm it?

Trump loves to advertise. It is likely that he nor his negotiation is not understood that the “agreement” that he declared is subject to significantly different interpretations, and great views of the details, and yes, but this seems positive but the differences that cannot be reconciled. The sad truth is that Hamas and the current Israeli government have an interest in avoiding Trump’s anger, but not to end the war.

The dominance of escalation

Ironically, if there is nothing else, that Israel’s strike against Hamas’s Upper Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, helped this stage in this peace plan in addition to a new security agreement between the Trump and Qatar administration.

In fact, this Israeli strike reflects perhaps the most permanent and important developments since October 7. For the first time in its 77 -year -old history, Israel has the dominance of escalation, which is a fictional way to describe its ability to control the pace of its military activities, focus and intensity with all its opponents; Extracting the will; And prevent its enemies from doing this.

Israel is not vulnerable to celebration, nor is it regional domination capable of controlling decisions for its partners or opponents. However, at the same time, with the support of the United States, Israel has formed its opponents and acted freely maneuver, operating success, and unprecedented and unusual impulses. It determines the anticipation and the prevention of the Israeli strategy, through its actions included in hitting the lands of its opponents in an attempt to influence the decision -making decisions.

One look about the area tells everyone. Israel destroyed Hamas as an organized military threat and is now occupying three quarters of Gaza. Hezbollah’s military ability, its micro -guided missile ability, and its supreme leadership, has been eliminated. The Israeli army sits on five strategic points in southern Lebanon and continues to strike Hezbollah despite the ceasefire. In the West Bank, Israeli forces were deployed with numbers that have not been seen since the second intifada. In Syria, Israel has identified large areas southwest of Damascus as a region without transition, occupied part of the previous United Nations disengagement area, and interfered in the defense of the Syrian Druze. Israel has also repeatedly struck nuclear and traditional sites in Iran and attacked the Houthis’ goals in Yemen.

This practice of power also has serious negative aspects and consequences. Israeli military successes depend on the American military parade and active assistance. Some of these measures have challenged and undermined American interests and values. It is not clear that Israel’s front strategy has taken into account this reality.

Great forces, small tribes

The remainder of the Middle East is full of the remains of the great powers that sought to impose their will on the smaller powers. It is completely unusual that the external forces – the United States, the main Arab countries, and the Europeans – have failed to change the strategies and actions of the main fighters, Hamas and Israel

It is amazing that no one was able to influence the course of the war in Gaza – not the United States, nor Ibrahim Accord’s partners in Israel, nor the Europeans. As the main actor, the United States resembles something from Galver in the modern era: burdened with its own delusions and linked to smaller powers whose interests are not always in line with Washington.

Many of these restrictions manage the unique nature of the American -Israeli relationship and the reluctance of successive presidents from pressure on Israel. Thus, Israel and other regional actors, no matter how weak, find the ability to reshape themselves. Looking at the strength of Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Houthis – below but they are able to continue their place and even increase their position.

The road forward?

Despite the shocks of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the horrors of October 7 and the war in Gaza have opened opportunities elsewhere. Lebanon was partially liberated from Hezbollah’s grip. The government of Ahmed Al -Sharra in Syria shows an unprecedented degree of pragmatism and negotiating directly with Israel in a security agreement.

There are opportunities in the Persian Gulf to make dangerous regional peace under the appropriate circumstances. However, the problems are many. It seems that an agreement to restrict the Iranian nuclear program is now short, and there is likely to be more Israeli -Iranian conflict. The administration-let it alone solve-the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is happier than ever.

Whether Trump has the will and skill to move in the post -Middle East on October 7, it is very unlikely but still seen. Trump is now more involved and more exposed than Gaza than in any other conflict that sought to solve it. It does not seem to be patient to negotiate in the Middle East Major. He has a little leverage for Hamas. He may not have the political will that should be highly descended from Netanyahu if the Israelis are making part of the plan.

Even if Trump turns magically to Henry Kissinger or James Baker, he will need regional and able regional partners. In Israel and between the Palestinians, they cannot be found now. October 7 was waving on the horizon and dead. Trump as a peacemaker? It is difficult to imagine, but perhaps the only way to an area can be hoped for hope and promise is a dark future for Israelis and Palestinians.