‘Sanctions Paradox’ Author On Russia-Ukraine War

More than 40 months have passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which means that it was more than 40 months of economic sanctions imposed on Russia. The fact that Russia has launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine revealed how to threaten sanctions as a tool for deterrence-and the continuous trial of Russia since February 2022 is a strong evidence that they have failed as a tool for coercion.

The question is, where do we go from here? This depends on who you ask. The Trump administration’s position on this issue was irregular. US President Donald Trump periodically threatened to increase sanctions against Russia, just to decline every time. Recently imposed a very high tariff on India because this country bought Russian oil – any failure to impose similar measures against China, which import more Russian oil.

More than 40 months have passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which means that it was more than 40 months of economic sanctions imposed on Russia. The fact that Russia has launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine revealed how to threaten sanctions as a tool for deterrence-and the continuous trial of Russia since February 2022 is a strong evidence that they have failed as a tool for coercion.

The question is, where do we go from here? This depends on who you ask. The Trump administration’s position on this issue was irregular. US President Donald Trump periodically threatened to increase sanctions against Russia, just to decline every time. Recently imposed a very high tariff on India because this country bought Russian oil – any failure to impose similar measures against China, which import more Russian oil.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was a sanctions defender in Russia while serving in the Senate, looks more doubtful now. on Meet Last month, he said: “I do not think that the new sanctions on Russia will compel him [Russian President Vladimir Putin] To accept the ceasefire. They are already under the imposition of very severe penalties. … There is no evidence that more penalties [will work]Because the sanctions take months and sometimes a bite, and we may end in this place. “

On the other hand, penal supporters argue that if current efforts in economic coercion fail, the answer is trying, trying again. On September 7, the director of the National Economic Council of the White House, Kevin Haysit, said he expected “a lot of talk” about the sanctions this week. Republicans in the Senate were working on a draft law trying to impose more severe secondary sanctions on those countries that still import Russian energy. By maximizing economic pain, this logic works, Russia will take peace negotiations more seriously.

Will any of this really do? Full disclosure: I answered “no” on this query more than a quarter of a century ago. The question is whether anything has changed since then to make me think in this case differently.

In 1999, it was published Displayed penaltiesEconomic governance and international relations. The book dealt with the central puzzle of economic sanctions, and this is: Why is it repeatedly imposed when they seem to work badly as a tool for coercion?

My argument was simple: future conflict expectations help explain the reason for imposing sanctions frequently, and why it seems rarely resulted in concessions. The more the conflict expected by the observer (also called the sender) and the goal, the more eager the sender is to impose penalties. The expectation of repeated conflicts in the future stimulates the sender to adopt a more striking bargaining position at the present time. Any concessions that have now been made can improve its forced advantage in future conflicts.

However, the paradox is that these same dynamics stimulate the goal to stand firm when the conflict expectations are high. The expected goals of the future conflict with the sender know that any concessions they make at the present time erod their position in the future negotiations. Physical concessions weaken the target government’s ability to resist future coercion attempts. Moreover, their reputation in confession will not encourage the sender except to try again the next time the conflict arises. The real penal paradox is that the sender is usually eager to employ sanctions in situations where concessions are less likely.

To what extent does this argument explain the sanctions against Russia? Although I have attractive interest in this hypothesis, I think most analysts will admit that he has withstood well. The US -led financial and commercial sanctions against Russia contributed to negative economic growth, high interest rates, and high inflation. However, the moment Russia decided to launch its invasion on a large scale, the difficult situation of economic sanctions has become impossible.

This was particularly true given Russia’s shares in its invasion of Ukraine. Regional demands are the largest demand in global politics. Moreover, as the war advanced, Russia spent huge amounts of blood and treasure to gain the Ukrainian lands that they tried to include.

When you face such large demands, even the weakest and poorest the targeted governments have the ability to resist economic pressure. In the past half -decade, the US -led sanctions were paralyzed by Iranian and Venezuelan economies, which led to major local unrest in both countries. However, none of the targeted system responded with noticeable privileges. Russia is a great and stronger representative than Iran or Venezuela.

Displayed penalties It was published in 1999, which is far from the last word on this topic. Does anything in subsequent literature provide any additional optimism for successful economic coercion against Russia? Not real. Certainly, other scientists have identified additional factors that can improve successful coercion. The penalties that target elites should improve more than the population of the possibility of contentment. Multi -party cooperation also promotes the possibility of success. Regardless, expressing clear demands can reassure the goal that the sender can adhere to the budget of lifting the penalties.

The thing is that none of these factors works very well for the issue of Russia. While the seizure of yachts may mix the Russian few, their behavior over the past decade reveals that they fear Putin much more than freezing their western origins. Although there is some international cooperation in Russia, its effects are limited. This world sits mostly one, and my research indicates that the goals are imagined allocated alliances such as approval of fragile Russia. This motivates Putin to withstand the hope that the coalition will be broken-and let us be honest, given Trump’s courses in this issue, these expectations are on a good basis.

Perhaps the most obvious problem with the penal system is that attached demands remain mysterious and ambitious. This has been a problem since the beginning of the invasion of 2022. On its essence, the West demanded that Russia be abandoned by all its regional ambitions on Ukraine. The problem is not only that Russia is hesitant to do so; At this stage, you cannot do it legally. Although it was a violation of international law, Russia officially included four Ukrainian Obour during the first year of the war. For the sake of contentment with Western demands, Russia will have to give up their annexation – a potential result.

Does this mean that economic sanctions on Russia have reached a dead end? Will the West be better than recognizing defeat? Is this the best way to solve paradoxical penalties?

Well, no – because economic sanctions are not just a tool for coercion. It serves other purposes as well, and this applies to a certain strength in this case.

There are two reasons To preserve and even the promotions of sanctions against Russia. The first reason is to enhance the regional sovereignty base.

One of the few permanent criteria since the end of World War II to the front is the principle that sovereign lands cannot be seized through the use of power. This is mainly what Russia is trying to do in Ukraine. Even if Russia maintains actual control over parts of Ukraine, the recognition of the recognition of Deer. The symbolism of punishing economic sanctions sends a message to other actors in global policy that is trying to redraw the sovereign borders through the use of micro power.

The other reason is that economic sanctions can weaken the country’s ability to prosecute a long -term war. Maria Greenberg’s latest book Trade in war It indicates that economic sanctions at the beginning of hostilities are often modest – were rented in arms ban, for example – because the sender believes the war will be short. Once the messengers realize that the conflict will be long, they will be ready to expand the siege. Double-use technologies that can be employed in fighting-and the missionaries will be ready to bear more costs to direct the measures in the battlefield.

In the case of Russia, this means expanding the oil ban to reduce its ability to import strategic goods. The most cruel sanctions – associated with the promotion of Ukraine’s ability to sue war – will exactly work a huge ability to fight Russia.

The dirty small secret in political science is that most theories have no long life. The world continues to change, and political science needs to change with it. I am pleased to see that Displayed penalties It is still a link to economic government analysis. It is far from the only model. In thinking about the issue of Russia, my theory correctly expects that the sanctions will not lead to a successful coercion. This does not mean that the sanctions will not work in other ways.