Trump Created Chance for Pakistan’s Diplomatic Tsunami

It is difficult to say which is the greater achievement of Islamabad’s diplomacy: US President Donald Trump’s shift toward Pakistan, or the uproar over the recently announced Saudi-Pakistani Joint Strategic Defense Agreement, both of which are resonating throughout Southwest Asia — though the American tilt may be fleeting.

The agreement highlights a tsunami of quasi-Kissingerian diplomacy in just the past six months: a stunning reset with the United States — at India’s expense, strengthening defense and trade ties with Turkey, a defense pact with Malaysia, a trade and energy pact with Iran announced during a visit by the Iranian president in August, and an expansion of already strong ties with China during Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s trip in September to Pakistan. Beijing.

Pakistan’s prosperity is even more remarkable when we consider that last spring, when the country received its 24th bailout from the International Monetary Fund, the financial world was concerned that Pakistan might become a failed state. The sense of surprise among South Asians over how quickly technocratic officials have stabilized their economy rivals their astonishment at Islamabad’s diplomatic generosity. All these achievements come despite the growing terrorist insurgency in Balochistan and among the Pakistani Taliban along the country’s border with Afghanistan.

What does this mean in the long term? The direct reason for the Saudi-Pakistani defense agreement appears to be Israel’s bombing of the Hamas office in Qatar. The idea of ​​Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu getting a license to attack Qatar — which hosts the largest American air base in the Middle East and a close partner of the United States — stunned Riyadh and other Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia is now incorporating US unreliability into its regional security strategy. Pakistani officials said that the door is not closed for other Gulf countries to also join the defense agreement. However, the recent NATO-like security guarantee offered by Washington to Qatar and reports that a similar agreement may be reached with Saudi Arabia soon, suggest that the United States has gotten the message and is doubling down on its regional security role.

Alternatively, Saudi-Pakistani deals may align with Trump’s goals. If reports of a new American defense strategy based on entrenchment – and prioritization of the Western Hemisphere – are true, Washington may welcome Islamabad to play a greater role as a provider of Gulf security, perhaps as an additional layer of insurance. Pakistan’s support for Trump’s Gaza peace plan will help keep Islamabad in his good graces.

However, Pakistan’s deepening Gulf ties may risk plunging the country into regional conflicts such as the civil war in Yemen or into a peacemaking force if Trump’s plan for the Gaza Strip is realized. The Saudis – India’s major oil suppliers who have their own strategic partnership with New Delhi – may have some tough choices in a future standoff between India and Pakistan.

Some argue that the defense agreement is more of a formalization of long-standing Saudi-Pakistani military and economic relations than a seismic event — and suggest that it could be a form of extended deterrence, with a Sunni nuclear weapon breaking Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly. In his book 2024 warAmerican journalist Bob Woodward quotes Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as saying to a member of the US Senate: “I don’t need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan.”

A joint Saudi-Pakistani statement used NATO-like language to describe the agreement, noting that “any aggression against either country is considered an aggression against both.” How the Saudis or Pakistanis would respond to any security threat has not yet been tested.

Saudi-Pakistani defense relations go back to the 1970s. Pakistani commandos helped the Saudis suppress a terrorist attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and the Pakistani army now has about 2,000 soldiers in Saudi Arabia to train and advise Saudi forces. Meanwhile, Pakistan needs Saudi money. Riyadh has extended and renewed loans — $3 billion last December — and has reportedly finalized approval for a long-discussed $10 billion oil refinery in Gwadar, as well as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

However, the most notable result of Pakistan’s smart diplomacy – in the category of Richard Nixon with China – is the revival of atrophied US-Pakistani relations, which have waned since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, while the US-India relationship has also been torn apart. India fears that Trump’s shift in Pakistan will undermine 25 years of careful nurturing and confidence-building in the distinguished US-India relationship. Before this administration, India was increasingly viewed in Washington — with strong bipartisan support — as a key partner, a counterweight to China, and a pillar of what was then known as the US Indo-Pacific strategy.

The new detente between Islamabad and Washington was based on a series of serendipitous events that began in March, when Pakistani intelligence helped the United States capture the ISIS-K operative responsible for the August 2021 bombing of the monastery gate at Kabul airport that killed 13 American soldiers. The head of the US Central Command, Gen. Michael Corella, praised Islamabad’s “extraordinary cooperation.” Abad in Afghanistan. Counter-terrorism after the operation.

Against this backdrop, a tense phone call between Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi led to a rift in US-India relations, creating an opening for Pakistan. Seeking a Nobel Peace Prize, Trump in May claimed credit for the ceasefire that followed clashes between Islamabad and New Delhi, saying it had “resolved” the most intense India-Pakistan conflict in 30 years. He followed this up by offering to mediate the Kashmir dispute, crossing India’s firm red line against third-party mediation.

This led to a heated phone call with an angry Modi, who is heavily invested in what he believes is a personal relationship with Trump. Modi said the ceasefire was achieved thanks to the efforts of India and Pakistan, and not the efforts of the president, which angered Trump. Meanwhile, Pakistani officials lavished praise on Trump for the ceasefire, welcomed him for mediating in Kashmir, and nominated him for a Nobel Prize.

It is no coincidence that Trump then imposed 50% tariffs on India for purchasing Russian oil at discounted prices (a policy the US had previously encouraged. Trump and senior US officials began talking trash about India. In late July, Trump said that India, which grew by 6.5% in 2024, was a “dead economy,” while Treasury Secretary Scott Besent repeatedly attacked India. And again because of “profiteering” from Russian oil.

Bitterness towards India has created opportunities for Pakistan. This helps explain the two-hour lunch between Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir and Trump in June, as well as several meetings between Trump and Sharif at the United Nations, the White House, and at the recent Gaza peace conference in Egypt.

At the same time, it has pushed New Delhi, usually wary of China’s rise, closer to Beijing. Modi, who boasts of his strategic independence, was in China last month where he met Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin and laid out plans to boost economic ties.

Pakistan also got a very favorable trade package from Trump. Sharif has two prizes the White House is obsessed with: US rights to develop what Trump says are huge oil reserves (Pakistan imports 80% of its oil), and the rights to extract important minerals, for which an American company has announced a $500 million investment. Remarkably, Islamabad maintains its status as a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States while simultaneously deepening ties with the three major powers.

But these victories may not be sustainable. For starters, Pakistan’s bright promises of an important US cryptocurrency, oil and metals deal may be mostly just a mirage. Regarding oil, there may not be huge reserves. ExxonMobil and other oil companies have drilled, drilled and left for Pakistani oil, and even Pakistani energy officials doubt the existence of such vast, commercially extractable resources.

There is no doubt that Pakistan possesses significant and significant minerals, but most of them are located in Balochistan, the site of intense terrorist attacks on government targets, which has given China pause. Mining operations in the United States will be problematic at best. Then there is Pakistan’s masterful alliance with Moscow and Beijing. How might this be the case with the intensification of competition between the great powers? What might be the fate of the US-Pakistan warming up if some of these weaknesses fail to deliver on the promise of a new detente?

It is certainly possible that the tension with India is a bargaining tactic by Trump aimed at gaining leverage in a trade deal that is still quietly being negotiated. Trump seemed to extend an olive branch recently, saying sadly that he “will always be a friend of Modi” and that the United States and India share a “very special relationship.” Trump said that during a phone call on October 15, Modi pledged to stop buying Russian oil, although India denied this.

None of the fundamentals of the strategic logic driving US India policy has changed: strategic competition with China continues to drive Washington’s national security and industrial policies. This will be true whatever the outcome of the current trade war — and a potential meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping. The idea of ​​India as a counterweight to China and an economic and technological partner has not lost its appeal for Washington, although Indian anger and resentment at the insulting snub will persist.

Pakistani diplomacy raises a number of questions about whether geopolitics in South Asia is more fluid than it previously appeared, or whether polarization in the region continues. How will Iran, which publicly welcomed the defense agreement, react to these new circumstances? Will the agreement strengthen or erode the emerging Saudi-Iranian entente?

Finally, how might China respond to the new dynamics? So far, it has doubled its ties with Pakistan while welcoming opportunities to engage with New Delhi. Despite all the promises of Pakistani diplomacy, India and China have not been able to resolve territorial and other fundamental disputes, tensions between India and Pakistan remain high, and the Middle East remains the scorpion and the frog, where endless cycles of revenge and missed opportunities are endemic.

But whether the Pakistani diplomatic offensive continues or not, the Pakistani diplomatic offensive deserves due appreciation. It has strengthened its strategic position, diversifying its support and commitments while injecting greater uncertainty into the geopolitics of South and Southwest Asia.