Trump’s Tariff Polices Have Pushed Southeast Asian States Toward China

US President Donald Trump’s recent visit to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to attend the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit went as well as one had hoped. Trump spoke in a positive tone from the beginning, as he danced on the red carpet that greeted his arrival.

But the bigger picture remains troubling. Under the second Trump administration, the United States is rapidly using up the goodwill and support it enjoys in the region. Trump’s unilateral tariffs against export-dependent economies such as Malaysia and Vietnam have sparked deep anger. So, while the administration has been able to conclude bilateral trade agreements with Cambodia and Malaysia, as well as framework agreements with Thailand and Vietnam, it still lacks a comprehensive regional strategy to halt the decline of US influence.

US President Donald Trump’s recent visit to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to attend the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit went as well as one had hoped. Trump spoke in a positive tone from the beginning, as he danced on the red carpet that greeted his arrival.

But the bigger picture remains troubling. Under the second Trump administration, the United States is rapidly using up the goodwill and support it enjoys in the region. Trump’s unilateral tariffs against export-dependent economies such as Malaysia and Vietnam have sparked deep anger. So, while the administration has been able to conclude bilateral trade agreements with Cambodia and Malaysia, as well as framework agreements with Thailand and Vietnam, it still lacks a comprehensive regional strategy to halt the decline of US influence.

If Trump is unwilling to change his approach to tariffs, he should at least appoint the ambassadors and National Security Council staff needed to engage in Southeast Asia. Sustained attention, not casual dancing, is necessary to counter Chinese influence in the region.

During the first Under the Trump administration, Washington has prioritized great power competition with China as the guiding star of American foreign policy. In the words of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are key priorities for the Department, and require increased and sustained investments, due to the magnitude of the threats they pose to the security and prosperity of the United States.” The doctrine of strategic rivalry with Beijing has largely ensured that Washington remains engaged in Southeast Asia, the front line of the competition between the two great powers. The Biden administration has continued this competitive framework with China, even intensifying pressure on Beijing by implementing stricter export controls to prevent the flow of critical technologies to the People’s Liberation Army.

However, the second Trump administration appears intent on reversing perceived trade imbalances through unilateral tariffs on partners and allies alike, regardless of the damage to Washington’s strategic partnerships. The United States has imposed some of the highest tariff rates on close allies and partners, including India and Brazil, the latter of which has become a major non-NATO ally since 2019. Both countries have been hit with 50% tariffs.

Trump also did not favor close strategic partners or allies in Washington’s competition with Beijing, which was the focus of American policymakers during his first term. Vietnam, which saw a significant expansion of its relationship with the United States under the Biden administration as both sides had a shared interest in deterring China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, was dismayed when Trump announced a 46 percent tariff rate on Vietnamese exports in April. Hanoi immediately sent a trade delegation to negotiate with the United States, and was one of the first countries to receive a better rate, of 20% on Vietnamese exports and 40% on any shipments through Vietnam.

The two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership during then-US President Joe Biden’s visit to Hanoi in September 2023, putting the United States on the same level as Russia and China in the hierarchy of partners in Vietnam. Given the uncertainty caused by current US policy, Hanoi has improved relations with Beijing in recent months, with Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting Hanoi twice in 18 months, and Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam traveling to Beijing in August 2024.

One bright spot in US-Southeast Asia policy remains the US-Philippines alliance, which now appears stronger than at any time in the past decade. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has made sustained efforts to court the Trump administration, and was the first Southeast Asian leader to secure a meeting with Trump during his second term.

Although the tariff rate now stands at 19 percent, the Philippines still has the second lowest rate in the region, tied with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Moreover, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Hegseth personally drew attention to the importance of the bilateral alliance “to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.”

But in the rest of Southeast Asia, US influence appears to be faltering. While it is too early to dismiss the United States in the long term, several data points confirm that US credibility has reached an inflection point, and that the Trump administration is compounding its losses with unnecessary mistakes.

In August, the United States and Singapore quietly announced that they had “mutually agreed” to cancel plans to deploy Singapore Air Force F-15SG fighter jets at Andersen Air Base on Guam. This deployment was part of the 2019 renewal of the 1990 US-Singapore Memorandum of Understanding, which covered US access to military facilities in Singapore. Singapore has conducted joint training exercises with the US armed forces since 1980, and relies on the US, Australia and India for access to open spaces where its armed forces can train and operate. Canceling the deployment of F-15SGs to Guam sends a signal that Singapore cannot rely on Washington to share its security concerns and may prompt it to seek alternative security partners.

Regional commentators were initially optimistic when Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim confirmed Trump’s plan to attend the annual ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur. However, expectations suddenly changed when Trump announced that his attendance was conditional on the condition that he preside over the signing ceremony of a peace agreement between Thailand and Cambodia, which were engaged in a brief but heated border dispute over the summer.

Trump also sought to pressure Bangkok, a nominal US ally, to acknowledge its role in brokering an initial ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet was quick to thank Trump for his efforts to secure a peace deal, and even said he nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize as a result. However, Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul rejected Trump and refused to acknowledge his mediation role.

Trump’s play put Ibrahim in an awkward position. As chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia has sought to restore the bloc’s importance in global affairs by making it an active and inclusive forum. In line with this approach, Ibrahim invited Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi to attend the October summit. Although that did not happen, the forum continued to turn into an arena for great power competition when Trump insisted that he would not participate in the signing ceremony if the Chinese were present.

Personal politics aside, the region has already seen a decline in exports to the United States as a result of Trump’s tariffs. More broadly, US volatility has prompted Southeast Asian countries to redouble their existing efforts to diversify and “de-risk” away from the United States. If current trends continue, the United States will find its trade with this rapidly growing region increasingly diminished, despite strong interest from the American private sector and consumer demand for Southeast Asian goods.

Regional policymakers are wasting no time in pursuing trade agreements with other countries to reshape supply chains so that they become less dependent on the American consumer market. While Trump reached two bilateral trade agreements last week, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) collectively updated its free trade agreement with China. Chinese Premier Li Qiang used this occasion to compare the approach adopted by Beijing and current American policies, saying: “Pursuing confrontation instead of solidarity does not bring any benefit,” adding that “unity is strength.”

Southeast Asian countries have also diversified their security partnerships by deepening ties with Australia, India, Japan, Korea, and the United Kingdom as a hedge against the less reliable and less engaged United States. For example, in October, Singapore upgraded its relations with both Australia and New Zealand to a comprehensive strategic partnership within a week.

To start backing away With the damage, the Trump administration must move quickly to fill key Asia-related positions across the government. The US Senate did not confirm Trump’s nomination for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Michael Desembre, until early October, nine months into Trump’s second term. Meanwhile, the United States has no ambassador to Cambodia, Indonesia or Myanmar, while the Senate has yet to confirm Trump’s controversial nominee for ambassador to Malaysia.

It did not help that Trump reduced the membership of the National Security Council from about 350 to fewer than 150 people and expelled large numbers of regional experts from the State Department. The administration has largely viewed these policy advisers, who have honed their Asia expertise over years working within the government, as “leftovers” with loyalties to previous administrations or members of the “deep state,” who oppose Trump’s ideological agenda.

So far, the second Trump administration has done little to signal that it takes Southeast Asia seriously, despite repeated statements from senior officials that Washington considers the region vital to its interests. If Washington wants to reverse the decline of American influence and remain a reliable partner in the region that will define the 21st century, the administration has no time to waste.