Trump’s Threats to Europe Have Triggered the Balance-of-Power Theory

Have we begun, after a long wait, to see countries that were previously friendly beginning to achieve balance in the face of a rogue America?

Such a shift would constitute a huge change in global affairs. If that happens, it will be entirely due to the strategic shortsightedness of the Trump administration and the predatory impulses of an increasingly erratic president.

Have we begun, after a long wait, to see countries that were previously friendly beginning to achieve balance in the face of a rogue America?

Such a shift would constitute a huge change in global affairs. If that happens, it will be entirely due to the strategic shortsightedness of the Trump administration and the predatory impulses of an increasingly erratic president.

Over the past 100 years or so, America’s rise to global dominance has been a partial exception to the old-fashioned balance of power theory, insofar as its superior position has not motivated many other countries to join forces to keep Washington in check. Although the United States faced a counterbalancing alliance led by the Soviets during the Cold War, most of the major or middle powers in the world saw the United States as a valuable ally, even if they sometimes disagreed with certain American policies. But as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told attendees at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Tuesday, that world is a thing of the past. Today, he said, “In a world of great power competition, the countries in between have a choice: either compete with each other for advantage, or come together to create a third path of influence.”

Forgive me for citing some of my work below, but I have been thinking and writing about this topic—the origins of alliances and the causes of states in equilibrium—since I wrote my doctoral dissertation (and first book) more than 40 years ago. I have argued that states form alliances primarily in response to threats, not just to force alone. Of course, power is one element of the threat (that is, other things being equal, strong states pose a greater threat than weak states), but geography and perceived intentions are also important. Close states tend to be more troubling than those far away, and states with intense reactionary ambitions are particularly dangerous, especially when they seek to seize territory from others or control who rules elsewhere. Although weak and/or isolated states sometimes attempt to accommodate threatening powers by “accommodating” them, the most common response is to balance against the threatening power, ideally in partnership with others.

Among other things, this formulation—which I called “balance of threat theory”—explained why the American alliance system during the Cold War was significantly larger and stronger than the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union’s various non-aligned clients. The United States had greater overall power, but the Soviet Union was adjacent to many of the middle powers in Europe and Asia, had a large army equipped to conquer territories, and whose leaders were openly committed to spreading communism. By contrast, the United States was separated from Europe and Asia by two enormous oceans, and had no territorial ambitions there. Balance of threat theory can also explain unbalanced alliances such as the coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. In that incident, an unexpected group of states emerged whose combined capabilities far exceeded Iraq’s combined forces, because they all saw their actions as posing a serious threat to regional stability.

Balance of threat theory can also help us understand the apparent anomaly of the “unipolar moment,” when the United States stood alone at the apex of power, yet overt efforts to achieve balance were limited to a handful of weak rogue states. America’s Cold War allies stayed on board because of: 1) institutional inertia (“If NATO isn’t broken, why fix it?”); 2) Desire to hedge against uncertainty. 3) Admitting that relying on American protection was a very good deal; and 4) the fact that Washington’s worst impulses were directed elsewhere. European leaders have questioned US judgment on numerous occasions, fearing that mistakes such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq would negatively affect them, but they have limited themselves to “soft balancing” and made no effort to regroup or become independent. This decision was facilitated because the United States still treated its allies with restraint, had no territorial ambitions toward them, and often sought to work constructively with their governments. In contrast, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have engaged in more active efforts to counterbalance U.S. power because they have reason to be more concerned about potential threats from the United States.

That was then; This is now. Since the beginning of his second term as president, Donald Trump has done everything that the balance of threat theory warns against, with predictably negative results. He has publicly and repeatedly declared expansionist goals toward Canada, Greenland/Denmark, and Panama, and his ambitions may not stop there. He and his closest advisers seem to believe that international law – including the rule of sovereignty – is meaningless and that the powerful can take whatever they can get. He has repeatedly waved or imposed the threat of tariffs in an attempt to force others to make economic and political concessions. He has used military force against more than a half-dozen countries, often for questionable reasons, and has threatened to use it against loyal allies such as Denmark. He treated other foreign leaders with open contempt and approved the killing of more than a hundred foreign civilians without due process, another violation of international law. By unleashing a splinter group of government thugs (e.g., Immigration and Customs Enforcement) on U.S. cities, he made it impossible for other communities to see the United States as a stable, well-ordered society or to view his foreign policy actions as an aberration. In short, the United States government, both at home and abroad, behaves like a dangerous bully and a compulsive predator.

On the one hand, this behavior is strange. Smart predators try to hide their true intentions for as long as possible, as Trump did in 2016 and throughout most of his first term, in part because he has been scrutinized by “the adults in the room.” But after he got away with the crimes of January 6, 2021, won re-election, and stocked his administration with friends, loyalists, sycophants, and opportunists with no fixed principles, he unleashed his worst impulses. And the world is now taking notice.

How do they respond? To be sure, America’s closest allies have been slow to confront Trump’s belligerence, for several obvious reasons. Downsizing with the United States and moving against it is costly, and creating enough countries to constitute a real counterweight faces the usual dilemmas of collective action. It is understandable, then, that people like British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO chief Mark Rutte, and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung chose to see whether a combination of flattery, symbolic obeisance, gifts, and simple concessions would preserve most of the benefits of a close partnership with Washington.

It might have been worth a shot, but the gamble clearly didn’t pay off. Trump’s words and actions have exposed the folly of this approach: You cannot accommodate a predator who believes all previous agreements are open to renegotiation at any time, and who interprets any concession as an invitation to demand more.

So, as balance of threat theory predicts, we are now witnessing former friends distancing themselves, reducing their reliance on an unreliable and potentially hostile America, and making new arrangements with each other and perhaps with some of the United States’ adversaries. When the Prime Minister of Canada – a country that has long been the best neighbor any country could hope for – travels to Beijing and lays out the “pillars of the country” [a] “A New Strategic Partnership” As you know, the tectonic plates are shifting. It seems that European leaders are starting to grow some bone again after decades of jelly, because they have little choice left. Financial Times He puts it plainly: “Standing up to Trump offers no guarantee of success. On the other hand, capitulation is certain to fail.”

Isn’t it too late to prevent further erosion of America’s impressive array of global partnerships and build new arrangements better suited to the emerging world? Sure, but only if the Trump administration abandons its predatory playbook and begins to show that America is willing to work with others for the common good, not just for unilateral gain. Are there any bets on how likely that is?