Ukraine Can Only Rely on Its Own Military, Not Security Guarantees from Trump or Europe

Any potential peace agreement to end Russia’s war with Ukraine would likely include some form of security guarantees designed to ensure foreign assistance to the Ukrainians in the event of a renewed Russian offensive. But it is unclear whether such a guarantee would be credible.

Some in Ukraine already fear that the Trump administration’s desire to make trade deals with Russia will undermine its resolve to help Ukraine in the crisis — and that any peace deal could be merely a stop-gap measure before Russia’s next invasion attempt.

These concerns have shaped the negotiating strategies of Ukrainian officials who have recently traveled between world capitals to secure diplomatic support. Ukrainians and their European allies increasingly realize that their best hope for a lasting peace may be outright reliance on the Ukrainian military establishment.

The United States has categorically refused to deploy forces under any possible scenario. Likewise, the Europeans have made clear that they are not willing to die for Ukraine either.

Instead, Ukraine’s best bet for the future may be to create a domestic armed force that is better paid, better trained, better armed, and more motivated by the Kremlin’s contracts with Russian soldiers and convicts, as well as a domestic defense industry that not only produces but innovates.

In short, as US President Donald Trump tries to emulate the Gaza model for peace — a quick deal with details to be discovered later — Ukraine must transform itself into a militarily powerful state like Israel, or a “steel porcupine,” as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen previously noted.

“It’s a metaphor for Ukraine becoming so powerful that Russia can’t swallow it,” said Rafael Luce, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Trump’s original proposal called for Ukraine not only to give up territory currently under Russian occupation, but also to demilitarize parts of the Donbas region that had been painstakingly fortified by the Ukrainians. But the worry is that abandoning that region will make it easier for Russia to attack and invade later, under one pretext or another. Moreover, Ukraine felt threatened by the proposal, which also called for limiting the number of its armed forces from approximately 1 million to 600,000 soldiers, while imposing no such condition on Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said: “Of course, we will continue to work with partners, especially the United States, and look for compromises that strengthen us but do not weaken us.” He appeared to be trying to avoid angering the irritable US president, while also clarifying his reservations.

The original draft of the peace deal would have placed a permanent veto on Ukraine’s NATO membership on behalf of Russia, as well as a veto against the deployment of European troops, even as trainers. It even hinted at a decline in NATO infrastructure, with the deployment of European fighter planes in Poland.

All of this is ostensibly in exchange for a vague reference to security guarantees that will be determined at a later stage.

Trump’s proposal provides “compensation” for any guarantees it might provide, but without specifically answering how it would intervene militarily if Russia violates the agreement. “Anything that limits the size of the armed forces, anything that limits what external guarantors can do inside Ukraine or on behalf of Ukraine, places limits on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, especially when such restrictions are not imposed on Russia,” Luce said.

Ukraine fears that even if it hands over actual control of occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia, there is no guarantee that Russian President Vladimir Putin will stop. Despite the 1994 Budapest Agreement, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia itself, Moscow has backed away from its commitments. It invaded Crimea in 2014 and marched on Ukraine again in 2022, each time trying to carve out part of sovereign Ukrainian territory.

“From the Ukrainian perspective, the size of Ukrainian territory and whether Russia controls 100 kilometers more or less are less important than Ukrainian sovereignty and the security guarantees it can achieve,” Luce said.

In August, Trump suggested that the United States might provide air support to Ukraine as part of a potential peace deal with Russia, but it is now playing an ambiguous role. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly told the Europeans that US security guarantees would not be discussed until after a deal was agreed upon.

However, in hushed voices in Brussels – the seat of the European Union – officials have long been whispering about whether Trump’s penchant for Putin and his mercantilist approach to negotiations have actually crushed the deterrent effect they were supposed to provide to Ukraine and even other NATO members. Although a different US government may lend different credibility to the same assurances, a returning MAGA candidate may not.

The Europeans are angry, marginalized, and desperate to find a way to influence Trump. But they have also been half-heartedly engaged in supporting Ukraine — sending some weapons, blocking more — since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. They have not yet tuned in to the endgame, which is likely to avoid being tempted to match that ambition with action.

France and the United Kingdom have taken the lead in determining future guarantees for Ukraine through the so-called coalition of the willing – a total of 31 countries. Each country is expected to offer a specific way to help Ukraine with defense in the future. French President Emmanuel Macron said soldiers from France, the UK and Turkey – which has friendlier relations with Russia – could be sent to Ukraine as part of a so-called reassurance force that is expected to monitor the peace deal once an agreement is reached.

In contrast to the United States, France and the United Kingdom are willing to deploy forces in Ukraine, but they have not been equally clear about their military response if Russia invades again or attacks one of their countries. The deterrent effect of having a non-combat European force on the ground is equally questionable.

An EU official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: “The Europeans have no idea what to do if such a force were deployed and a European unit was attacked by Russia.”

A source in the French President’s office stressed Ukraine’s role when asked about how the conversation about security guarantees developed. They added that Ukraine’s first security guarantee would be the strength of its army, the second would be European support, and the third, we hope, would be an American commitment.

However, militarily strong Ukraine, and the powerful and huge Ukrainian army, also constitute a buffer zone for Europe.

The Europeans are increasingly serious about arranging financing to pay salaries, pensions and benefits to Ukrainian soldiers, as well as developing mechanisms for joint production and purchase of key equipment such as ammunition, drones and air defense systems.

The European Union decided to raise €150 billion – primarily for EU member states through the Security Action for Europe, also known as the SAFE instrument. These funds will allow EU members to fill capacity gaps in their defence, send existing equipment to Ukraine, and replenish their supplies.

But experts said the Europeans have been too slow, and although they are finally moving in the right direction, it will take years before this expanded plan begins to have any impact. In an editorial for New York TimesStopping Russia on the front line “will require Europe to stop treating defense production as a bureaucratic necessity and start treating it as a continental emergency,” wrote former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba.

Moreover, the Europeans are still debating whether or not to use frozen Russian assets – worth more than $300 billion, the lion’s share of which are located in European countries – to help Ukraine rebuild its cities and strengthen its defense sector. According to a Ukrainian assessment shared with Europe, the cost of the country’s defense needs will range between $70 to $100 billion next year.

The Ukrainians have been in the trenches for nearly four years. War fatigue and other domestic restrictions make it difficult for them to transform into a military giant.

In the first seven months of 2025 alone, 110,000 cases of soldiers being absent without leave were recorded.

For Ukrainians, the road ahead – with or without an agreement – ​​is paved with challenges. A militarily weak Ukraine would be a perching duck for an expansionist Russia. Despite war’s endless deprivations, pain, anguish, and loneliness, Ukrainians have no other choice but to train, arm, and remain vigilant.