What the War Changed Inside Iran

The 12 -day war ended between Iran, Israel and the United States, but dust has not yet settled. Many official voices in Tehran warn that the war can resume at any moment. Iran is now facing deepening economic turmoil, political uncertainty, and difficult options about its nuclear future. The main question is whether the Islamic Republic will appear stronger through national or weakest mobilization, which is exposed to the weaknesses that have sought to deny it for a long time. There is no doubt that Iran’s leaders are standing at a real crossroads. In addition to the video message, the continued absence of the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneini from public opinion, doubting his ability to dictate politics, especially with the continued Israeli threats. This potential gap in power can open a space for pragmatic sounds within the system, but this shift is far from certain.

The Israeli strikes and subsequent US bombings focused on June 22 by an overwhelming majority on Iranian nuclear sites and the ballistic missile program. On the eleventh day of the war, Israel struck elements of the forced regime’s regime agencies-the Pasij headquarters (which includes the anti-floor forces), the security units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the intelligence of law enforcement, and even the famous Evin prison-but these attacks came almost late. By giving priority to the nuclear and missile targets on the mechanism of domestic control of the regime, Israel indicated that Israel through the Islamic Republic through the popular uprising was not its primary goal, and there is no evidence that Israel has this policy option in view of the size of the regime’s change in Tehran. However, these late strikes were a blatant warning to Iran’s leaders, as a war would wait for them if the war continued.

The 12 -day war ended between Iran, Israel and the United States, but dust has not yet settled. Many official voices in Tehran warn that the war can resume at any moment. Iran is now facing deepening economic turmoil, political uncertainty, and difficult options about its nuclear future. The main question is whether the Islamic Republic will appear stronger through national or weakest mobilization, which is exposed to the weaknesses that have sought to deny it for a long time. There is no doubt that Iran’s leaders are standing at a real crossroads. In addition to the video message, the continued absence of the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneini from public opinion, doubting his ability to dictate politics, especially with the continued Israeli threats. This potential gap in power can open a space for pragmatic sounds within the system, but this shift is far from certain.

The Israeli strikes and subsequent US bombings focused on June 22 by an overwhelming majority on Iranian nuclear sites and the ballistic missile program. On the eleventh day of the war, Israel struck elements of the forced regime’s regime agencies-the Pasij headquarters (which includes the anti-floor forces), the security units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the intelligence of law enforcement, and even the famous Evin prison-but these attacks came almost late. By giving priority to the nuclear and missile targets on the mechanism of domestic control of the regime, Israel indicated that Israel through the Islamic Republic through the popular uprising was not its primary goal, and there is no evidence that Israel has this policy option in view of the size of the regime’s change in Tehran. However, these late strikes were a blatant warning to Iran’s leaders, as a war would wait for them if the war continued.

While no visible fracture appeared inside the driving, the pressure on Tehran cannot be denied. The war did not resolve the local conflicts or tensions of Iran with its foreign enemies; I just turned them. The ceasefire in the United States has also ended the basic crises that lead its escalation. Instead, the war changed the context in which Iranian leaders are working, forcing a possible reassessment of doctrines and alliances. Iran is now facing three times a challenge: securing the airspace and borders, maintaining stability for its citizens, and managing public opinion before another possible round of confrontation – or a fragile return to talks with Washington, whether through brokers such as Oman or direct negotiations, with increasing demand for the United States. There are many variables, but one thing is clear: Iran cannot return to what it was before the Israeli attacks on June 13.

Inside Iran, and The war doubles a severe economic hardship. Economists warn that the government lacks a coherent post -war recovery plan, even as low -income groups that have suffered more than the Internet and relief for instability. An estimated 13 million Iranian, including party workers and handover drivers, has entered them during the conflict, which provides public discontent. “The ignorance of poverty could turn a poor society into an unsafe society,” economist Hussein Rajafar warned. Raghfar has argued that without cash assistance, food support, and wage protection, despair can lead to cooperation with foreign opponents. This fear of unrest forces the regime to balance repression with calls for unity.

Meanwhile, fragile shooting. A return to war would deepen economic destruction, from an estimated $ 1.4 billion of oil revenues lost during the conflict to the high cost of missile weeds, may be hundreds of millions per round. Israeli Israeli attacks on the Iranian financial regime – a major reason for the assembly of Iranian authorities on the Internet for most of the war – caused more damage. Unlike the Iran war and return to 1980-1988, the resumption of this conflict threatens vital economic assets such as petrochemical facilities and other industrial bases, which raised the risks to Iran’s level that it had not faced before.

Ideological, the amazing advantage of this early environment after the war is the axis of the regime from revolutionary Islam to Iranian nationalism. This transformation is important in a political system, since 1979 gave priority to Islamic ideology over nationalism. Horman, President Masoud Bezishian, and figures such as former Foreign Minister Mohamed Javad Zarif and the Supreme Horman Adviser Ali Shamkhani, who are now regularly summoned “national dignity” to mobilize the public, and avoid recognizing the failure of the Islamic regime. For example, in a Khwana speech on June 18, one of the three of the three places was to hide during the war, Islam and the Palestinian issue clearly absent, and replaced by calls to defend the homeland targeting residents of the war.

The war sparked real calls for policy reset, as many argue that the regime should adopt local reforms to maintain calm in the fragile wartime. Pezshkian raises awareness and calls for redefining re -definition society relations in the hope of possible calibration, although it is still unclear whether this is real or tactical. Former President Hassan Rohani and opposition leader Mahdi Karakibi also chanted calls to unity, while urging her to expand space for the opposition to political votes. This “unity” is the least sign of public support than admitting that anti -regime riots did not explode during the war and still can go out. And whether these calls will respond are still doubtful. At the present time, security services have become alive, as hundreds of people were arrested to cooperate with us with the American, Israeli and individual intelligence of Kurds, Jews and Bahayen for the sake of repression.

Others in the regime also turn into national calls for mysterious Islamic slogans. “Goodwill brings good intentions, and respect brings respect,” this is what Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchchi commented in response to the demands of US President Donald Trump that Iran would give up its nuclear program with the rejection of Iranian sovereignty mainly. Aragici’s choice of words was not a coincidence. In his opening speech of 1989, President George HW Bush used the phrase “goodwill generating goodwill” to indicate that the United States will be ready to improve relations with Iran if it is possible to achieve reciprocity.

However, whether this national axis will remain uncertain. More conflict can unify the public – or deepen the irony of the leadership of a lot of blame for Iran’s leadership into a war that was not unacceptable to fight. Inside Iran and between the diaspora, a clear conclusion is formed: The ideological vision of Ghamni led to a confrontation with Israel and the United States, but it failed to prepare it for the consequences.

Iran’s leaders are now facing a blatant option: continued in the way of revolutionary transgression, isolation or axis towards pragmatic diplomacy that gives priority to the regime and the basic national interests of the Islamic ideology. This reminds us of the past moments, such as the regional losses of the Qajar dynasty of Russia in the nineteenth century, and the occupation of allies in Iran in 1941 when Tehran was very soft on Nazi Germany, the longest expensive, unnecessary for the Iran and Iraq war. In each of them, Brid outperformed pragmatism, and Iran has paid the price of ignoring the technological and strategic inferiority. Today, Israel and the United States have proven that modern wars are fighting through superior air energy, smart operations, drones, electronic attacks, micro -missiles, not slogans.

Iranian revenge strikes may have shown flexibility and caused pain on Israel, but they failed to deter attacks in the first place. Excessive dependence in Tehran has left relations with Russia and China strategically isolated. The war has made clear that Iran is not ready for a long -tech conflict and that Iran does not have real friends to reach its help. The question, therefore, remains: Will Iran learn from its past or repeat it?

On the nuclear question, the war also left Iran at a strategic crossroads. Years of hedge, developing the ability to enrich the weapons degree with an arms stop, failed to deter the attack and instead revealed the limits of mystery. Trump’s strikes, which were launched after Israel deteriorating Iranian air defenses, showed Iran’s military weakness. However, the bruises of the nuclear program were in Iran, and it was not broken. Technical experience, fertilized uranium, stored, and basic industrial ability remain intact, while maintaining Iran’s potential potential if it chooses to build weapons. Inside Iran, voices such as Araghchi hints to the transformation of transparency demanding strategic ambiguity, while the eager pressures for missile and nuclear expansion, on the pretext that only the maximum of deterrence-not diplomacy-does not guarantee security.

This leaves Tehran with blatant options. It can remain within the nuclear proliferation treaty and hedge, risk of future strikes and persistent weakness, or can withdraw and follow up on a secret deterrent, and risk severe penalties and isolation. The secret reconstruction seems to be now more likely than public reconstruction, as Iran is likely to distract the central expulsion to hidden sites and prepare a deterrent calmly in the event of its exacerbation of its security environment. The war closed the separation around mystery without a large cost.

After the shooting The stage offers opportunities and risks. National feelings can temporarily unite the public, but economic difficulties and political discontent are still strong. The regime’s efforts to reformulate the war may be like a hollow victory if it fails to address regular weaknesses. Meanwhile, the assumptions that China and Russia will provide meaningful support, that regional agents will deter attacks, and that the gradual nuclear hedge that will protect from direct confrontation has been undermined.

There is a lesson at all this for Washington and Israel as well. Changing the regime in Iran is not easy. There is no armed opposition to joining, and there are no external representatives ready to intervene militarily to topple the Khamenei regime. However, the system reserves the ability to change the path if he chooses to listen to its people and give up solid policies, whether on the local or foreign front.

Divisions within the political system are possible, as in 2009 when the disputed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re -elected to the leadership and ignited the green movement. Internal change, instead of external overthrow, is still the most realistic path of shift in Iran. Meanwhile, Tehran’s next nuclear decision will take a long way to form the nature of his ongoing confrontation with Israel and the United States.