Where Does Globalization Go From Here?

in the The worst bet in the worldDavid Lynch set out to explain the error that occurred in globalization-an idea that was one day in the world of the post-Cold War for growth, prosperity and peace, but instead it became a means of displacement, division and polarizing politics.

The problem, as Lynch, the veteran economy correspondent, explains, is clear on a journey during more than three decades of modern history, that this is a big mistake: the shock of China, or the sudden explosion of low -cost exports that begins a quarter of a century before. An uncompromising campaign for the efficiency of companies and profits; The increasingly weak global supply chains; Increased financial for the economy; 2008 financial crisis; The epidemic. Wars, especially in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. No wonder in globalization.

in the The worst bet in the worldDavid Lynch set out to explain the error that occurred in globalization-an idea that was one day in the world of the post-Cold War for growth, prosperity and peace, but instead it became a means of displacement, division and polarizing politics.

The problem, as Lynch, the veteran economy correspondent, explains, is clear on a journey during more than three decades of modern history, that this is a big mistake: the shock of China, or the sudden explosion of low -cost exports that begins a quarter of a century before. An uncompromising campaign for the efficiency of companies and profits; The increasingly weak global supply chains; Increased financial for the economy; 2008 financial crisis; The epidemic. Wars, especially in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. No wonder in globalization.

For example, yesterday’s heresy-which is that globalization will destroy American workers, or that increased economic integration will turn into zero-in most quarters of Washington, traditional wisdom today. There is a little daylight about the economic policy between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, and the only change in Trump’s second term is his keenness to give up any remnants of ancient shibbaleths.

The question about how this happens is the heart of Lynch’s book, which provides a convincing history, and if arranged, about an idea promised a new brave world and it seems that it has been delivered instead.

The tour is through Three decades of American economic history, which has recently become a political history, is the deputy of the book and its hardship. Lynch has an amazing set of presidents, policy makers, legislators, defenders, workers, investors and executives of companies to explain exactly how globalization came out of bars.

Short articles-whether President Bill Clinton’s efforts to avoid China in the global economic system, which peaked in joining the World Trade Organization at the end of the century, or factory workers in the town of Soghaar wandering through the disappearance of destroyed jobs and societies-a wonderful reading. But sometimes it is somewhat impractical: from the “affected giant voice” from the discussion about the nineties about Nava to Seattle’s protests against the World Trade Organization to Trump’s rise to the influence of the epidemic on global supply chains, a lot has happened in the past few decades to be filled in a clear narration.

Some of the best parts of the book include a review of the creativity of Washington’s embrace of globalization in the nineties, especially conviction that more trade with China, Canada, Mexico and others would bring both economic and political benefits. This idea, which was taken as an article for faith at the dawn of excessive forgery, has been on fire in Washington in recent years. But what is great is to see the number of people who were already skeptical of this magic realism at the time, and Lynch tells this story well with a group of deep -drawn characters, such as a fair trade activist Lori, a cush and veteran capitalist Tim Derbar.

Other Edify materials are found near today, with Trump’s appearance; Peden’s final conversion to skeptical in trade and a potential working class champion; Of course, Trump’s return to the White House with a larger ball to destroy to swing against the global trading order. (George W. Bush and Barack Obama revolve around a lot of fun reading as was the case in living.)

Lynch is also insightful about what it will seem to re -calibrate today. “Looking forward, not the unrestricted globalization in the period 1989-2008 and does not retreat to Autarky in the cards,” he writes in The worst bet in the world. “Instead, countries and companies will move in a more complex world, choose the industry by industry, or one product at one time, whether cooperation or self -reliance is the best. Amid the return of geopolitical risks, including those that stem from the United States less predictable, national security considerations will take precedence over economic efficiency.”

Everything is real, and reminds us of modern diagnoses in books such as Edward Fishman ChokePoints points David Sanger New cold wars. But the necessities of national security-whether the “high fence and the small square” of Denin to protect American technology or Trump’s efforts to use customs tariffs and trade trade to rebuild critical industries-were not what was tension on people at first.

Basically, as with previous experiences in the economy, not all the benefits of globalization have decreased: while the American economy as a whole has benefited from a larger trade, some postal symbols have been obliterated as low -cost manufacturing led to the emergence of complete factories and the cities of factories. In addition to the financial crisis and then the chaos of the supply chain in the years of the epidemic, it seemed that all smart gossip around the smooth benefits of globalization seem to be, as it was, malalarky.

Lynch’s book It is very clear in the American experience with globalization, and the latter’s opposite by policy makers on both sides of the corridor, although some of the only voices are still defending greater economic integration and the benefits of trade. In many ways, for many parts of the world, globalization was not a wrong bet, but the bet was amazingly true. China raised hundreds of millions of poverty. The standard of living in countries from Bulgaria to Indonesia has increased to Taiwan in recent decades, thanks to a small part of the trade in goods, services and financial flows that came after the Cold War.

For all the deaths that are written about globalization-are completely understood, given the Trump administration’s contradiction to trade and definitions, and the widespread common concerns in the United States and Europe about the devastating effects of excessive Chinese industrial capacity-it is important to note that globalization had not actually died.

The integration of global trading may not rise as happened in the nineties and early first decade of the twentieth century, but not in a complete decline. According to the World Bank, trade remains as a share of global gross domestic product as it was before the epidemic, its height or higher than it was in the years before the financial crisis. More goods and services are ever traded. Some economies, such as the European Union, are still adopting globalization, as much as Brussels may lose strange Chinese investment or stop the floods of reduced goods.

Those different experiences of globalization – abandoned industrial heart attack in the United States and some other advanced economies, and the best billions in other parts of the world – in what Lynch notes in conclusion. The reverse reaction against globalization has what justifies it for many reasons, not the least of which is the unequal distribution of the benefits and the lack of political will or the ability to expand those you lose from. But he risk going to a large extent.

“While the United States is trying to correct it from its bad bet on unrestricted globalization, it risks excessive compensation,” Lynch writes. Unlimited consumers all over the world gained the flow of products and services at reasonable prices; The economies as a whole, especially those at the top of the pyramid, have gained much more than they lost from globalization.

The only field that Lynch does not fully offer, just like a full generation of politicians before him, is a delegate to make globalization really work. It provides recipes of the type that was engraved decades ago, but it was unprecedented, from wholesale reform of the tax law to helping to amend trade for the affected workers to a realistic understanding that the factory functions that have disappeared will never return in large numbers.

But it is important to know why the United States fails (and many other advanced economies, such as the United Kingdom) significantly in providing artistic globalization for all-because what will happen in the Pike will be bigger and much more tariff.

“Even if the United States is starting from a new increase in Chinese manufactured goods, there will be other shocks in the future labor market, such as the rise of artificial intelligence and the transition to a low -carbon economy,” Lynch writes. “The American safety network, which has proven insufficient amid globalization, is not ready for what awaits us.”