Why Don’t the Iranian People Rise Up?

The war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran last month did not produce any sign of regime change in Iran. Of course, Israel explicitly made it clear from the beginning that its goal was not to change the regime in Iran, but its actions can unintentionally create the circumstances of the Iranian people to achieve this. Since Israel took control of the sky of Iran and successfully began to eliminate many of the military leadership and the higher military infrastructure of the Islamic Republic, the belief that this could stimulate the anti-regime protests has gained momentum-not at least among the Iranian opposition abroad.

Now, with the stability of dust resulting from the conflict, policy makers, military officials, and many Iranian dissidents and opposition groups ask why the Iranian people are not seized this unique moment to end. Of course, the advertising apparatus of the Islamic Republic benefited from the lack of disturbances, claiming that the reason that the Iranians did not come to the streets is that they actually support the regime.

The war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran last month did not produce any sign of regime change in Iran. Of course, Israel explicitly made it clear from the beginning that its goal was not to change the regime in Iran, but its actions can unintentionally create the circumstances of the Iranian people to achieve this. Since Israel took control of the sky of Iran and successfully began to eliminate many of the military leadership and the higher military infrastructure of the Islamic Republic, the belief that this could stimulate the anti-regime protests has gained momentum-not at least among the Iranian opposition abroad.

Now, with the stability of dust resulting from the conflict, policy makers, military officials, and many Iranian dissidents and opposition groups ask why the Iranian people are not seized this unique moment to end. Of course, the advertising apparatus of the Islamic Republic benefited from the lack of disturbances, claiming that the reason that the Iranians did not come to the streets is that they actually support the regime.

But this is far from the truth. The real reason is associated with unknown security measures that the regime was proactively activated at the moment when Israel’s operations began. Since 2007, the regime has invested in creating a large -scale repressive system throughout Iran, at every level of society – which has been completely ignored by both foreign forces and Iranian opposition.

While there Intelligence and analysis on the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (mois), which is the most important operational member in terms of implementing security measures in the Iranian streets during the turmoil times that were completely overlooked: IRGC operating headquarters. Since 2007, this headquarters have created a comprehensive device that exceeds every Iranian province, city, municipality, province and even alive.

Work under IRGC-one of the main branches of the organization-there are 11 headquarters of operating military security throughout Iran. This headquarters is responsible for maintaining the security and political system of the regime in Iran’s 31st provinces.

Usually, each of these 11 headquarters is about three Iranian provinces under their jurisdiction and control. Each province also has an IRGC regional guard under the leadership of the relevant security headquarters.

In 2007, IRGC Commander, Major General Mohamed Ali Jaafari-now headed by the head of the headquarters of culture and social in IRGC, to the mysterious IRGC guards to better replace coordination between military and security units in every Iranian province. This was necessary after the lessons IRGC learned from the American war in Iraq in 2003 and the rapid collapse of Saddam Hussein. This concept was based on the opinion that every boycott must have ways to protect itself during times of crisis when the main leadership chain is interrupted with Tehran. These regional guards, like military presidents, are working for their provinces, and they supervise all IRGC and BASIG offices and bases all over the region. Each regional guard leads two operating wings: infantry unit and a security unit.

The first to protect the boycott is designed from foreign attacks, while the latter is trained to neutralize local threats in the form of protests and uprisings. However, during times of local crises such as widespread turmoil, pedestrian units are merged into the security system, as was the case during the anti -regime protests in Iran in both 2019 and 2022.

But the security classes of the IRGC operating security headquarters do not simply stop at the boycott level. It covers every geographical class within every Iranian province: from cities and towns to municipal areas to every neighborhood, where there are units that include both men and women. (Sex units have become of particular importance as women have become more involved in leading anti -regime protests.)

This entire repressive ecosystem was operated completely and completely, as Israel’s military operations began in Iran in mid -June. While Israel took control of the Iranian airspace, the National Security Council of the Iranian Ministry of Interior (known as “Shak”) issued orders to the IRGC operating security headquarters to neutralize any gathering that could lead to protests.

After the orders of Shak, the IRGC military operational headquarters and the IRGC County Guards activated all the security layers under the leadership structure throughout Iran, especially in large cities such as Tehran.

This has led to the immediate confirmation of security inspection points in regional regions, regions and regional neighborhoods of each municipality – including rural areas – in all Iranian provinces, including the cities of Tehran, Sherrit, and Asbhan. These checkpoints are designed to enable stopping and searching against Iranian pedestrians and vehicles. These measures included the confiscation of civil phones without orders to search for any hostile content of the regime or a supporter of Israel, including any material that mocks the Islamic Republic. Vehicles were also searched for the “sensitive” double use elements that can undermine the security apparatus, such as drones and communications equipment.

In addition to such measures, the road barriers managed by the armed BASIJ units have been deployed with the hooks in all highways and major squares throughout the areas and municipal areas by the regional office IRGC-BASIG and the BASIJ district offices. BASIG patrols have also been activated across all major roads and intersections. Likewise, when reports began to generalize the Iranians who take their roofs to repeat the anti-regime slogans-such as “death for the dictator”-the biology offices published their male and female groups to implement patrols in the streets through different neighborhoods to determine the apartment blocks that carry out such activity.

In addition to the physical operations, the headquarters of 11 IRGC military security also took wide measures aimed at the Iranian people’s ability to communicate. With the start of Israeli strikes, Iranian national security bodies provided orders to reduce the Internet significantly, and then imposed a complete blackout for more than three days. (The internet speed in the country is still very low and restricted, despite the end of the conflict.)

When adopting such preventive measures, the goals of the IRGC operating security headquarters were three times. First, to stir fear and intimidation by creating an environment and deep atmosphere. Second, to prove the population that the regime still preserves the streets and controls the political system.

Finally, perhaps most importantly, the preventive development of this broad security network is directed towards preventing and neutralizing the initial nucleus (Wheel-e avaliyeh In the knight) from any possible gathering that can go out of control and stimulate irreversible protests.

These paid measures Arrow profits of the Islamic Republic. In just 12 days, nearly 1,000 civilians were arbitrarily held under the mysterious idea of ​​”supporting” Israel. This includes those who were stopped and discussed at checkpoints and found that they have content on their mobile phones, which were considered “supporting Israeli attacks” or mocking the Islamic Republic. The regime has already implemented an unclear number of current detainees on charges of charges.

Perhaps more importantly, the very intrusive and interventional environment that these measures was able to reinforce, along with Israel’s strikes, led to the Iranians staying either at home or emptying the main cities instead of going to the streets.

It was not until the last few days of the war that turned Israel to targeting the headquarters of the operating security and the provincial forces in IRGC. For example, the headquarters of the Krala – which controls the security of Khuztan, Kohajaji and Bir Ahmed and Lorstan – was. Likewise, the regional guards of Alborz Province, Irgc Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps have been targeted.

However, while Israel’s strikes have effectively disintegrated a lot of military and nuclear infrastructure in IRGC, it has touched only the tip of the iceberg in relation to its wide repressive system. The main artery that maintains the domestic security of the regime has been left relatively safe. In other words, despite the control of Israel in the sky, the security forces in the regime still dominate the streets, and have not left any space for the Iranian people to protest.

Unless the IRGC-which permeates each level of Iranian society and the boycott structure-at least or weakly weak, is unlikely that anti-regime protests are not widespread. This device has been the most important obstacle to change in Iran over the past 46 years.