Will Trump Take Part in the Next War Between Israel and Iran?

Israel will probably make another war with Iran before December – perhaps even late August.

Iran expects and prepares to attack. She played the long game in the first war, where she photographed missile attacks as she expected a long struggle. However, in the next round, Iran is likely to strike decisively from the beginning, with the aim of dispelling any idea that it can be subjected to Israeli military domination.

As a result, the next war is likely to be more bloody than the first. If US president Donald Trump is under Israeli pressure again and joins the battle, the United States may face a full war with Iran that will make Iraq look easy to compare.

The Israel war in June was not only related to Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, it was about turning the balance of power in the Middle East, even though Iranian nuclear capabilities are an important but not decisive factor. For more than two decades, Israel has prompted the United States to take military measures against Iran to weaken it and restore a positive regional balance – which Israel cannot achieve alone.

In this context, Israel’s strikes had three main targets that go beyond Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It has sought to attract the United States into a direct military conflict with Iran, beheaded the Iranian regime, and turning the country to the next Syria or Lebanon – the issues that Israel can bomb without punishment and without any American involvement. Only one of the three goals was achieved. Moreover, Trump did not “blur” the Iranian nuclear program, and did not return to a point that could be considered the problem.

In other words, with its attacks in June, Israel achieved a partial victory at best. The preferred result of Trump was to fully engage, and to target both the traditional forces of Iranian and economic infrastructure. But while Trump prefers fast and rapid military action, he fears a widespread war. Consequently, its strategy is designed to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities to reduce escalation rather than expanding it. In the short term, Trump succeeded – well to the anger of Israel – but in the long run, Israel allowed his mouth in a route.

His refusal to escalate beyond a limited bombing campaign was a major cause that Israel agreed to a ceasefire. As the war continued, Israel assumed serious losses: its air defenses deteriorated, and Iran grew more effectively in penetrating its missiles. While Israel was likely to continue the conflict if the United States was completely committed, the calculus account changed as soon as it became clear that Trump’s strikes were once. Israel succeeded in drawing Trump and the United States in the war, but it failed to keep it there.

However, two other goals in Israel were clear failure. Despite the successes of early intelligence – such as the killing of 30 leaders and 19 nuclear flags – were only able to temporarily disrupt Iranian leadership and control. Within 18 hours, Iran had replaced most if not all of these leaders and fired a heavy missile, which indicates its ability to absorb great losses and is still a fierce counter attack.

Israel hopes to incite its initial strikes on panic inside the Iranian regime and accelerate its collapse. According to Washington PostMossad agents, fluently in the Persian language, called on senior Iranian officials on their mobile phones, threatening to kill them and their families unless they photograph videos condemning the regime and publicly. More than 20 calls were made in the first war hours, when the Iranian elite was still shocking and swinging from great losses. However, there is no evidence of the presence of one Iranian general in threats, and the cohesion of the system remained intact.

Contrary to Israel’s expectations, the killing of senior leaders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps did not lead to mass protests or an uprising against the Islamic Republic. Instead, the Iranians gathered from all political lines around science, if not the system itself, as a wave of nationalism increased throughout the country.

Israel could not benefit from the incompetence of the Iranian regime. Nearly two years after the atrocities in Gaza and the launch of a deceptive attack on Iran amid nuclear negotiations, only a small segment of the Iranians – in the diaspora – has experienced positively.

In fact, instead of mobilizing the population against the regime, Israel was able to give a new rental contract for the novel of the Islamic Republic. Instead of condemning the regime to invest in a nuclear program, missiles, and a network of non -allies, many Iranians are now angry because these elements of Iran’s deterrence have proven insufficient.

“I used to be one of those who will chant during the protests not to send Iranian funds to Lebanon or Palestine. But now I understand that the bombs we are facing all are one, and if we do not have strong defenses throughout the region, the war comes to us,” said an artist in Tehran Narij Bagogli, a professor at Jones Hopkins University.

Whether this shift will continue unclear. But in the short term, it appears that the Israeli attacks have strengthened the Iranian regime in a contradictory – which leads to internal cohesion and narrowing the gap between the state and society.

Israel also failed to turn Iran into Syria again and create a sustainable weather domination independent of American support. While Israel controls Iranian airspace during the war, it did not work without punishment. Iran’s missile response caused unrelated damage.

Without great American assistance – including the use of 25 percent of Thalad missile objections in the United States in just 12 days – Israel may not be able to continue the war.

This makes a possible new Israeli attack. Israeli Minister of Defense Katz and the Chief of Military Staff, Eye Zamir, pointed out that. The June war was only the first stage, according to Kisir, who added that Israel “is now entering a new chapter” of the conflict.

Regardless of whether Iran is resuming uranium enrichment, Israel is determined to deprive it of time to renew the missile arsenal, restore air defenses, or spread improved systems. This logic is essential to Israel’s strategy “cutting the grass”: it struck with the protection and frequent prohibition on the prohibitions of the capabilities that could challenge Israeli military domination.

This means that with Iran already rebuilding its military resources, Israel has an incentive to strike sooner, not later. Moreover, the calculation and political integration account for another attack becomes more complicated as soon as the United States enters the election season in the middle of the period. As a result, the strike can occur well in the coming months.

This, of course, is the result that Iranian leaders want to deter. To dispel any illusion that Israel’s strategy “cutting the grass” is likely to strike Iran with force and fast at the beginning of the next war.

“If the aggression is repeated, we will not hesitate to respond in a more critical way and in a way that it will be impossible to cover up,” this is what Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchchi published on X. Iranian leaders believe that the cost that Israel must be overwhelming, otherwise it gradually eroded from Iranian classroom capabilities and left it in the country.

Although the June war has ended illegally, the results of the following resulting will depend on any learning aspect and act faster: Can Israel renew its objections faster than Iran can rebuild its bombers and re -storage the rocket conscience? Does the Mossad still have a deep presence within Iran, or is most of its origins spent in seeking to achieve the collapse of the regime during the first war? Did Iran gain an insight into the penetration of air defenses for Israel more than Israel in bridging the gaps? At the present time, none of the two sides can answer these questions with confidence.

This is specifically because Iran cannot be sure that the most powerful response will neutralize Israel’s strategy, which is likely to re-evaluate its nuclear position-especially that the other columns of deterrence, including the so-called axis of resistance and nuclear ambiguity, have proven insufficient.

Trump’s response to the second Israeli war with Iran may be decisive. It seems that he is unwilling to engage in a long conflict. Politically, his initial strikes sparked a civil war within the Maga movement. Military, 12 -day war revealed critical gaps in the US missile stock. Trump and former US President Joe Biden drained a large part of the US air defense objections in an uninterrupted region of American interests.

However, through green lighting at the opening, Trump entered the trap of Israel-and it is not clear whether he could find a way out, especially if it is proven to be enriching on zero as the basic line of an agreement with Iran. Participation is likely to be an option. Trump will either have to join or sit in war. And staying abroad requires more than just one rejection-it requires continuous resistance to Israeli pressure, which has been shown so far, neither the will nor the force that must be withdrawn.