Will Turkey-PKK Negotiations Lead to Multicultural Authoritarianism?

At a careful party on July 11 in Solomon, Iraq, 30 members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) burned their weapons. This unprecedented action was a sign of good faith towards Ankara amid the ongoing peace talks that both sides hope to end the ten -year Kurdish conflict.

For years, liberal observers and preachers have imagined a decision of this conflict as a major step in modernizing democracy in Türkiye, which will be accompanied by the full civil rights of the Kurdish society in Türkiye. On the contrary, the current peace process is not directly aimed at liberation, but rather to unify the power of Turkish President Rajab, Tayyip Erdogan.

The question now is whether Erdogan and the PKK can succeed in reseting society relations in Türkiye and reshaping the standards of political integration, all without any useful steps towards democracy. In other words, can Erdogan succeed in giving the country to the country a multi -cultural crust?

Türkiye’s relationship with Historically, its Kurdish population was formed by the national and central ideology in the country, which suppressed the ethnic diversity in favor of the unique Turkish identity. The armed conflict has been widely claimed between the Turkish state and the PKK, which began in 1984, tens of thousands of lives, displaced societies, and the imposition of severe political and economic costs. Despite the attempts of political solutions since the 1990s, unprecedented.

The peace process started by the AKP Justice and Development Party (AKP) between 2013 and 2015 to renew the violence – somewhat the most intense in the history of the conflict – which led to the damage of urban centers in the southeast. Since 2016, Ankara has also carried out military operations in northern Iraq to target PKK bases and in northern Syria to reduce the impact of the independent administration led by the Kurdish. At the local level, this period coincided with the intense anti -legs nationalism, the sweeping legal repression of Kurdish politicians, and the erosion of the democratic space of Kurdish representation.

The current initiative of dialogue was publicly launched by Devlet Bahceli, the extremist leader of the National Labor Party (MHP), who rules an alliance with AKP. Bahsali has always been among the most severe opponents of the political solution to the Kurdish conflict. In October 2024, the country surprised the country when Abdullah Oaklan, the founder of the Kurdistan Workers Party, called for the prison, to disarm the Kurdistan Workers Party and the solution on the floor of the Turkish parliament. Since then, the pro -equality and democracy party (DM) has played a major role in facilitating communications between Ocalan and Ankara while also engaging in opposition, public and Kurdish assault.

Oaklan’s public message to the PKK, which was delivered through a message in late February, was unambiguous: “Integration with [Turkish] The state and society voluntarily. “Rejection of autonomy, federalism, an independent state, or even the expansion of cultural rights as viable solutions, Ocalan have argued that the historical conditions that led to the presence of the PKK no longer exist.

“Integration” has recently become the cornerstone of the Kurdish political lexicon. Selahatin Demirtas, the former co -chair of the predecessor of Dem, also calls on reconciliation through Kurdish integration in Turkish rule. For Demirtas, coexistence is not only desirable, but inevitable: “Kurds are already combined in Türkiye – they are everywhere.” The veteran Kurdish politician Ahmed Turk repeats this vision, saying: “The Kurds can only follow the life of a fair and free with the Turks.”

However, the integration that it will actually follow is still unclear. Bahceli suggested symbolic representation – such as the appointment of a Kurdish Vice President and Vice President of Alevi – as an initiative of inclusiveness. Where he may have insisted that this type of arrangement was dangerously exciting, Bahsli now claims to confirm national unity: “The Kurds and the Levis belong to us [the Turkish nation]”

For Bahceli and Ardogan, peace with Kurds is more than local reconciliation. It is part of a broader strategy to fortify Türkiye by building a coherent local front against what they describe as foreign threats – including Israel. The pro -government commentators and former supporters suggested that the Kurdistan Workers Party can be re -prepared by a pro -Turkish combat force.

To serve this strategic goal, Erdogan reactivated a historical narration that extends “a thousand years of Turkish brothers.” Speaking at a party meeting on July 12, Erdogan praised the symbolic disarmament of PKK as a step towards peaceful coexistence between the Turks, the Kurds and the Arabs. Then the Battle of Manzaker was called in 1071, the siege of Jerusalem in 1187, and the Turkish independence war between 1919 and 1922 as the three best demonstrations in victory, prosperity, and glory that was achieved when the Turks and the Kurds stand together.

In Erdogan’s novel, Islam is the common thread that connects these peoples. These historical episodes represent Islamic military battles against imperialism and other civilization. Turkish leadership and care is seen as necessary to ensure the mass security of the Turks, the Kurds and the Arabs – not only in Türkiye but also in the region, at a time of tremendous turmoil. It seems that the Turkish leaders and the Kurdish political elites strengthened by this narration are now agreed that reconciliation with the Kurds will help Türkiye as a model of peace and prosperity for the Middle East.

However, this mutual ambition apparently to raise Türkiye to regional domination is not the only factor that leads the spirit of the Turkish Brotherhood and the Kurdish. Correcting the “historical error” committed by the Republican elites in early Türkiye is another. In particular, for the Islamists in Erdogan and Turkey, the secular policies of the early republic spoil the Islamic and cultural standards. The project of building the republican state linked to the Treaty of Lausanne and the constitution of 1924 is seen as the dismantling of the Ottoman culture-which depends on joint faith and formed by local cultures. More specifically, Erdogan and his allies regretted the loss of Islam as an organized principle of the nation and the driving force in daily life.

The Kurdistan Workers Party and Kalalan also followed the Kurdish grievances to the same moment of historical rupture, even if they understand it differently. For them, the early Republican project presented the policies of ethnic homogeneity and assimilation, depriving the Kurdish identity and suppressing the opposition. Both accounts – the Justice and Development Party and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – was distinguished by an additional advantage of throwing the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the country’s founding party and the current main opposition party, as the historical villain.

However, along with these ideological foundations, there are also more concrete political considerations. The current term of the Turkish president ends in 2028, with the exception of early elections or constitutional change, he cannot constitutionally run again. Summoning elections in Parliament or setting constitutional changes in the referendum requires at least 360 votes in Parliament. While the AKP and MHP together do not get such numbers, bringing the DEM party on the plane will give Erdogan votes to expand its rule. As Erdogan’s ally, Bahselli also sees the value of unifying the current situation and maintaining authoritarian stability. Bhasli has repeatedly emphasized the need to strengthen the presidential system. For him, the process towards a possible end of armed conflict is a way towards establishing the regime and neutralizing the opposition.

The government seems to be now following a double strategy: the Republican People’s Party’s repression while reintegrating the Kurdish political actors with caution. This dominant inclusion of DM and PKK party aims to reshape the political scene, marginalize competitors, and to dominate hegemony.

For its part, it seems that the DEM party has shifted priorities. For a little half a decade, the party worked alongside the Republican People’s Party to confront the AKP-MHP bloc in the name of Türkiye’s Democrat. Now, it seems that the party has concluded that this effort has failed and that Erdogan is now the only game in the city. As a result, they are looking for concrete gains for Kurdish citizens by cooperating with the ruling coalition. Over the past decade, Erdogan has imprisoned many of the political leadership of the Kurdish movement while stripping the heads of the Kurdish municipalities elected in their positions. From the position of Dem, if Erdogan stops the prison of Kurdish leaders and political prisons, instead, this is still better than them in prison together.

If this seems sarcastically, the Euclinan officials and the party are also arguing that disarmament and expanding the rights of the Kurdistan Workers Party Party will expand the democratic area of all, including the Republican People’s Party. Along with the ruling elites, the main opposition party calls to join the Parliamentary Committee to discuss legal steps towards disarmament and the dissolution of the PKK. This, they insist on it, will eventually produce the best possible results for the country as a whole.

Whatever the motives are satirical Among the main actors, the challenges they face are still important.

At the local level, the ongoing legal and political campaign against the Republican People’s Party can create problems that go beyond fears of democracy. Erdogan’s campaign against the opposition undermines the public’s confidence in this process. Specifically, it nourishes fears between the high national public, which already prevails to see concessions to the Kurds as a betrayal of the Turkish identity. For most of the secular opposition in Türkiye, the possibility of the arrangement of authoritarian power between political elites that represent religious and Kurdish electoral districts is a conspiracy for a long time. This can generate an unpredictable violent reaction.

On the Kurdish side, the leadership of Türkiye also faces a deeper structural challenge. The Kurdish political scene is far from the Stone Age. Oclamean’s personal worship is still strong. But under this there is a great deal of political diversity. Many Kurds may resist attempts to participate in a unified national framework with collective tones.

Beyond Türkiye’s borders, and another concern is the future of the independent administration in northeastern Syria. For Ankara, any disarmament must be extended by the PKK to all affiliated groups, including the elements of the Syrian democratic forces (SDF). However, SDF is still cautious, as it remains the broader lines of Syria’s political future unconfirmed and unstable. Negotiations between SDF and the Damascus government are continuing, but there is still a lot that may make a mistake.

The current peace process represents a highly dangerous gambling to reshape Türkiye. If it succeeds, this will strengthen the Islamic and national, Turkish and Kurdish elites, under the slogan of Turkish superiority and carefully managed pluralism. It will devote strength – and define the legacies – from Erdogan, Bahsli, and Eucalan alike. But without the rule of law, equal political representation, and a rights -based approach to society as a whole, the benefits of the rest of Turkey will be limited.