ASEAN Is No Longer Just a Talk Shop – Foreign Policy

ASEAN is often seen as little more than a forum for talks, holding long meetings and statements but lacking concrete action. As I argued previously in Foreign policyThe bloc has generally suffered from political paralysis since its establishment in 1967, mainly due to division among members over collective security measures to address challenges across Southeast Asia. However, this assessment needs updating: in recent years, the 11-member group has increasingly sought to match its words with action – perhaps because heightened threat perceptions, stronger leadership, and greater pressures from US-China competition are pushing ASEAN to act to avoid losing relevance.

The most recent example is Cambodia and Thailand, two member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that have been locked in border disputes for many decades. During US President Donald Trump’s visit to Malaysia last month for the annual ASEAN summit, he also presided over a peace signing ceremony that officially ended hostilities between Phnom Penh and Bangkok over the disputed Preah Vihear temple and its surrounding areas. But a new round of violence has brought these two countries back to the brink. On November 10, four Thai soldiers were injured in a landmine explosion, followed by a shootout that killed a Cambodian villager. Bangkok blames Phnom Penh for recently planting the explosive device, while the Cambodian government claims it is a remnant of past wars.

ASEAN is often seen as little more than a forum for talks, holding long meetings and statements but lacking concrete action. As I did before Argue in Foreign policyThe bloc has generally suffered from political paralysis since its establishment in 1967, mainly due to division among members over collective security measures to address challenges across Southeast Asia. However, this assessment needs updating: in recent years, the 11-member group has increasingly sought to match its words with action – perhaps because heightened threat perceptions, stronger leadership, and greater pressures from US-China competition are pushing ASEAN to act to avoid losing relevance.

The most recent example is Cambodia and Thailand, two member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that have been locked in border disputes for many decades. During the era of US President Donald Trump Visit He visited Malaysia last month to attend the annual ASEAN summit, and also chaired the peace signing ceremony that officially ended Hostilities Between Phnom Penh and Bangkok over the disputed Preah Vihear temple and its surrounding areas. But a new round of violence It has brought these two countries back to the brink of abyss. On November 10, four Thai soldiers were injured in a landmine explosion, followed by a shootout that killed a Cambodian villager. Bangkok blames Phnom Penh for recently planting the explosive device, while the Cambodian government claims it is a remnant of past wars.

Regardless, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through Malaysia’s presidency this year, has intervened to deal with the escalating situation. group quickly Spread out An observer team was formed to investigate the incident and inspect landmines in the area. Monitors Delivered Helpful finding: The landmine has indeed been newly laid, although they haven’t blamed either party yet (and probably won’t). However, through this ongoing process, ASEAN has demonstrated its ability to bring together a coalition of its members to deliver real value towards maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Another example of ASEAN finally getting some skin in the game concerns another member, Myanmar. In February 2021, the military junta overthrew the civilian-led government, leading to mass protests that eventually turned into a civil war that continues to this day. Brunei, which chaired the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the time of the coup, began pushing for a resolution. The bloc reached the so-called Five-Point Consensus, which called for an immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue between all parties, the appointment of a special envoy to facilitate mediation, the provision of humanitarian aid from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties.

To be sure, ASEAN has not yet been able to leverage its consensus to resolve the civil war in Myanmar – and it may never happen. Regardless, it is worth noting that the consensus was not just rhetorical, but also included many concrete practical items. Since reaching the agreement, ASEAN has sought to meet its own labor standards. For example, the Humanitarian Aid Coordination Center of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) tried to provide aid, but succeeded restricted Due to lack of funding. ASEAN has sent envoys to Naypyidaw to conduct negotiations with the junta and the civilian government, but they have not made much progress, not only because of the regime’s stubbornness but also because of a lack of cohesion among ASEAN members. Cambodia, Laosand Thailand It broke ranks and dealt with Myanmar bilaterally outside the ASEAN mechanism. Although collective efforts have not succeeded so far, the bloc has shown an unusually high appetite for rolling up its sleeves to get things done rather than sitting in conference halls conducting endless, underpowered negotiations.

It remains unclear whether ASEAN will continue to play a proactive role in regional disputes and whether its efforts will be more successful in the future. Until 2026, at least, this possibility is very likely because the Philippines, as the next rotating president of the group, hopes to reach an agreement. Collective security response Due to China’s continued encroachments in the South China Sea. Recently, Manila has been at the forefront of criticism of Beijing’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region, highlighted by its increasing use of gray zone tactics to threaten the Philippines and secure its vast territorial claims, including the exclusive economic zones of the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries. This has prompted Manila to Reconfirm A July 2026 deadline for ASEAN and China to end their decades-long negotiations on a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea. This document will seek to legally prevent aggressive behavior and mandate the settlement of disputes on the basis of international law and customs set forth by UNCLOS.

But Manila is unlikely to take full advantage of ASEAN’s recent proactive mood. This is because some members, especially Cambodia and Laos, are less responsible for the outcome of the dispute in the South China Sea; These two countries also maintain close strategic partnerships with China that enable Beijing to put pressure on them to veto any collective action that China does not like. Hence, the Philippines may find itself doing most of the heavy lifting either with Vietnam — another major maritime nation in the South China Sea — or even on its own, given Hanoi’s evasiveness about offending Beijing. Neither Brunei nor Malaysia – the other two ASEAN countries subject to China’s maritime expansionism – have shown much resolve in defending their exclusive economic zones and overlapping territories.

Nevertheless, the overall trend is positive: ASEAN has begun to take a more active role in addressing mutual concerns and regional threats. However, it is clear that ASEAN members do not consider every issue to be equally important to their national interests, leading to varying levels of support for collective responses. Additionally, when it comes to China, such as in the South China Sea, the dynamic swings sharply toward less cohesion in ASEAN because of the potential strategic risks those closely allied with Beijing would face if they bucked China’s will. Ultimately, ASEAN’s deeper engagement in regional crises will likely be limited to resolving disputes between members, or within a single member, as is the case in Myanmar. This is, in essence, the founding mission of ASEAN, after all.