World Leaders Should Take Steps to Avoid Nuclear War

Eighty years after the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, there is a disturbing number of prolonged crises – or risk – that define nuclear forces against each other. US president Donald Trump’s recent announcement that he transferred two nuclear submarines to “appropriate areas” in response to the social media message by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that may not lead to a catastrophic escalation. But this was a time reminder that the “final weapon” is a permanent factor in the volatile security environment today.

Today, nuclear armed opponents are on various aspects of conflicts and approvals, from Europe to the Himalayas to the Korean Peninsula. This is just now. Israel and the United States strongly raised Iran’s nuclear capabilities to military strikes last June, but Iran could try to rebuild its program and race in favor of a bomb. At a time when arms control talks are all parts of the world, it is necessary to decrease tensions between nuclear forces and construction frameworks to manage friction between them.

Eighty years after the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, there is a disturbing number of prolonged crises – or risk – that define nuclear forces against each other. US President Donald Trump’s recent announcement that he transferred two nuclear submarines to “appropriate areas” in response to the social media message by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that may not lead to a catastrophic escalation. But this was a time reminder that the “final weapon” is a permanent factor in the volatile security environment today.

Today, nuclear armed opponents are on various aspects of conflicts and approvals, from Europe to the Himalayas to the Korean Peninsula. This is just now. Israel and the United States strongly raised Iran’s nuclear capabilities to military strikes last June, but Iran could try to rebuild its program and race in favor of a bomb. At a time when arms control talks are all parts of the world, it is necessary to decrease tensions between nuclear forces and construction frameworks to manage friction between them.

There are no identical oppositions. In Europe, Russia has repeatedly used nuclear threats because it tries to keep the United States and its allies from its war with Ukraine and limit their support to Kev. In Asia, a terrorist attack in Kashmir last April sparked an armed conflict between India and Pakistan, which many were afraid to get out of control. Either way, there is a risk that future hostilities will be more intense.

The logic of nuclear deterrence may still limit the escalation of these crises. At the same time that nuclear threats were used, Russia avoided steps-such as strikes on supplies to Ukraine through NATO lands-which could lead to a comprehensive war with those countries. Likewise, while the recent India crisis has risen at an uncomfortable speed, South Asian officials insisted that both India and Pakistan know the rules of the game to maintain indirect clashes below the nuclear level.

Although this may be true, but there is no guarantee that, on purpose or unintentionally, the nuclear forces will not express the red lines for each other – and it is not certain of what is happening after the use of a nuclear weapon.

The risk of escalation increases in some areas. In Europe, NATO and Russia seem to start the traditional armament race. Although it is necessary for European-non-confirmed countries on the future of US security obligations-to replace their defenses, this may also stimulate more Russian soap boxes. In exchange for North Korea’s support against Ukraine, Russia has actually ended its limited cooperation with the United States to curb the military ambitions in North Korea. Russian technical support risks North Korea a more dangerous military opponent, while Russia has used the cassation of the United Nations Security Council to prevent the United Nations monitoring of the nuclear sanctions.

The current non -proliferation system has done a good job of work that restricts the spread of nuclear weapons. But it is now hard -line and it is only clear use in the situations in which the main powers are withdrawn in different directions. As a result, it is important for the countries concerned – including the United States – steps to reduce the risk of individual crises that escalate to the nuclear level. This not only involves treating nuclear weapons, but also includes political frictions and traditional military tensions that can lead to nuclear use opponents.

One of the relatively immediate and easy step is to improve communication between nuclear armed cases. This was a lesson behind the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union created hot emergency lines. With Russia’s war on Ukraine, the two countries maintain some channels to communicate with each other. This enabled them to arrange the exchange of prisoners and even engaging in direct cross negotiations. American and Russian officials also continued to communicate and meet. But the official military contact between NATO and Russia does not exist. In South Asia, the major military communication to the military between India and Pakistan hindered it, although it is still active during the recent conflict, due to mutual lack of confidence and the blatant absence of any high -level diplomatic communication channels.

The presence of clear and reliable communication channels on both sides can help refer to their commitment to prevent escalation and quickly defuse crises. In the case of India and Pakistan, for example, the two must complete the military channels to the military to communicate with the hot lines that link their political offices. The creation of a quiet channel among the National Security Advisers of the two countries can also help defuse future tensions, especially when local political pressure makes difficult diplomatic interactions.

In the long run, it is necessary to enhance global non -spread mechanisms. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played an important role in reporting the Iranian nuclear program, for example, but Iran is increasingly viewing the agency as a tool for Western overlap. It is important for influential forces from the global south to support the political delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the non -proliferation base to enhance their continuous credibility.

In 2022, when Russia seemed to be studying a nuclear attack on Ukraine, the G-20 leaders signed an environment in coordination by Indonesia, which announced that “the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable.” The main forces must reaffirm this point, especially in the period before the review conference on the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty next year. Each country should aim to strengthen all taboos against nuclear use and not to have something to break it.

The sooner the nuclear and non -nuclear powers start, the better. It is always better to put temporary stores against the risks of nuclear escalation early instead of trying to restore calm in the temperature of the crisis. Nuclear weapons risk management will be vital for international crisis management in the foreseeable future.

If August 6 represented 80 years ago, the first time a atomic bomb was used in the war, then August 9 represents another memory: 80 years ago since the time of an atomic bomb was used in the war. By taking measures to reduce the basic risk at the present time, world leaders can ensure this success for eight decades.