The Danger of Fake European Military Spending

The idea of a bridge across the Mesina Strait has acquired perceptions since the oldest time, including in the letter of the letter such as Charlemagne and Benito Mussolini. In 2000, the government of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Perloskoni developed detailed plans for a bridge length of two miles that would link the Italian mainland to Sicily. In the coming years, the project may become a reality, partly due to the new spending plans adopted by NATO at a summit in June.

The summit set an ambitious target of 5 percent for defensive spending, with 3.5 percent allocating to basic defense requirements and 1.5 percent for defense and security investments. Italian officials immediately seized the idea of the bridge as a two-use project, integrating with Italy’s defenses-and thus part of the 5 % spending commitment. Italy is historically suffering in the coalition, as the defense was less than 1.5 percent of GDP in 2024.

The idea of a bridge across the Mesina Strait has acquired perceptions since the oldest time, including in the letter of the letter such as Charlemagne and Benito Mussolini. In 2000, the government of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Perloskoni developed detailed plans for a bridge length of two miles that would link the Italian mainland to Sicily. In the coming years, the project may become a reality, partly due to the new spending plans adopted by NATO at a summit in June.

The summit set an ambitious target of 5 percent for defensive spending, with 3.5 percent allocating to basic defense requirements and 1.5 percent for defense and security investments. Italian officials immediately seized the idea of the bridge as a two-use project, integrating with Italy’s defenses-and thus part of the 5 % spending commitment. Italy is historically suffering in the coalition, as the defense was less than 1.5 percent of GDP in 2024.

The bridge through the Missina Strait shows a wider point. While Europe must compensate for the previous investment in its defenses by increasing spending, how Additional spending is important – if not more – like How much is the price?. This is true for both the basic goal 3.5 percent and 1.5 percent target.

Some countries take the task seriously. Poland, for example, plans to use about $ 6.9 billion from the recovery fund after $ 19 to the European Union, which was apparently allocated to green projects, to build tanks and shelters. Likewise, the Netherlands plans to improve roads and bridge, as well as investments in cybersecurity. In Sweden, there are ongoing plans to build stocks of food, fuel and medicine.

The decisions taken by other governments to spend on pet projects – some of which are very weak to defense – excite eyebrows. The British government would like to calculate its rural broader investments as part of improving the defense infrastructure. A non -European member state, Canada, also pays envelope; It is keen to rename the transmission ties improvements for the mining industry as spending on the defense infrastructure. After all, it is eventually related to “critical metal supply chains”.

What some of the most doubts refer to is the need to impose discipline on what the investment in infrastructure should be and should not count on collective NATO goals. NATO Secretary-General may have to follow a practical approach to forming thinking about infrastructure projects that can be included in the 1.5 percent target-and it is a very far bridge.

The first step towards a degree of cohesion through the coalition is to narrow the target range of 1.5 percent to specific forms of infrastructure, especially the hard transport infrastructure. The second is to set joint standards to evaluate possible projects. For anyone, does the investment project in question (for example, a bridge to Sicily) adds a useful way to the defensive capabilities of the country? And if this is not the case, is it permissible for the communication problem that can concern NATO as a whole, along some of the critical corridors that the coalition may need, especially in a war with Russia?

Through these lenses, two main categories of projects should be preceding others.

First, the focus on projects that secure Europe’s ports and connect them to the railway infrastructure must be. Ports, like those in Antwerp, play an important role in NATO logistics. None of them has been tested about stress to see if they could deal with increased materials during the main continental war.

It is especially important that supplies are able to move smoothly, without the need for brokers, between ports and rail network – which is not the case in major European ports such as Genoa, Italy or Barcelona, Spain. Likewise, the Italian Trieste port is the main shipyard in NATO, however the railway system around the port area is SubPar and in the urgent need for investment.

Another concern is China’s economic presence in Piraeus ports, Greece; Valencia and Bilbo, Spain; Ziproge, Belgium; Rotterdam, Netherlands. While China has a share in maintaining transportation links with open Europe, one must worry about the Chinese investment weapon if NATO needs to defend itself against Russia -backed by China. European ports should be considered critical supply centers and their treatment accordingly – the coalition cannot leave them vulnerable to external interference.

Second, Europe must upgrade critical railways. The European Commission has identified a number of projects worthy of attention under the policy of the European Union Transport Network (TEN-T). Some of these are also prominent in the context of defending NATO. The North Sea Corridor is the penis and its project in the Baltic in the railways is especially important due to the incomplete ties between Finland, Estonia, Latwania, Lithuania, Poland and the rest of Europe. The merger of the Baltic countries into the European rail network should be a priority for NATO. In a wider confrontation with Russia, Eastern European countries will be the front line. More cross -border rail connections may mean more flexibility for NATO, Mixing points and weaknesses.

NATO’s support for Ukraine in the war against Russia and the possibility of the European Union in Ukraine enhances the issue of projects that deal with the difference in standards between two railway networks (Ukraine scale is broader than the 1435 million scale, and adds time and the cost of cycling). Along the main corridors that will help restore the coalition provider in times of war, it is worth investing in facilities that would allow the operation of charging trains longer than the standard of 2460 feet. Transforming the system is not a legitimate project overnight, but the presence of criteria at the NATO level for transportation models helps to remove smooth cooperation barriers between countries.

There is more work to be done along other European railway lanes. A major project for the extremist Scandinavian corridor is the Brenner Base. The European Union already covers half the cost, and the rest is divided between Austria and Italy. To the east in the alliance, the North and South connection are still limited, which may be a great responsibility in times of conflict. The expansion of high-quality transport infrastructure-by meeting the ten T standards of railway speeds that exceed 62 miles per hour-modern railway movement systems will begin to reduce this challenge in Romania and Bulgaria.

Europe will be more coherent and technician more willing to defend itself. The full invasion of Russia Ukraine in 2022 explains the importance of logistics and strategic supply centers. It is not a coincidence that Hostometr Airport is the first in the Russian goals list. Despite the disputed thanks to Ukraine’s skilled use of unmanned surface ships, the Crimea Port in Sevastopol is the key to Russian marine operations. Now, Russia is preparing to take the city of Boucrovsk – a main railway center in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. NATO must pay attention and learn how to protect supply and strengthening methods throughout Europe, the Northern and Atlantic.

Setting high standards for investment in infrastructure will prove the seriousness of the target. The target should not be considered 1.5 percent to satisfy the Trump administration in the United States while continuing the status policies. Instead, it is an important supplement to buying new military equipment, building the defensive industrial base in Europe, storing it, and preparing the continent for a dangerous contract or two decades.

Unfortunately for Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni and its government, the road is unlikely to be connected to the Missina Strait. Matteo Salvini, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure in Italy, said that the money for building the bridge – $ 15.6 billion – will also be used to build another infrastructure such as schools and congress halls, although this is not. Such comments, given the history of the Italian government while transferring money to achieve personal profit and mafia relations, should not be taken seriously.

In contrast, Italy’s ports and air bases are a different story-as they are the country’s shipbuilding basins and the infrastructure elements of other industrial defense. Some forms of investment in the desired infrastructure may not directly contribute to military mobility, for example, the eastern side but may provide heaviness for industrial defense production, which Europe lacks strongly. Brenner Base Tunnel is one example. Another will be faster links between the artificial heart in Germany and Eastern Europe (Dresden’s Brakes connection, for example), where Rheinmetall, fresh, fresh weapons may be needed, one day.

In short, what NATO needs is a good conversation about the best ways that individual countries can contribute to collective capabilities, whether in terms of military power or defense infrastructure. The answer should be designed for the characteristics of each member state, including Italy. In other words, NATO must make its goal of 1.5 percent more strict in determining the military importance and more open to identifying various national contributions. It remains to see whether the Europeans can upgrade this challenge.